Directions for Defense
Report of the
lommission on Roles and Missions
of the Armed Forces
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES
1 lOO WILSON BLVD, SUITE 1 200F
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
We are pleased to present this report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces, in accordance with Section 954(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994.
The Department of Defense is a remarkably successful institution. The women and men
who serve today are better educated, better trained, and more skilled than ever before. But we
have concluded that DOD must do more to ensure its ability to conduct effective, unified
military operations — the overarching goal of America's National Security Strategy. This
means that the Military Services and all other elements of the Department of Defense must
focus their energies on supporting the unified Commanders in Chief who plan for and conduct
our military operations, as directed by the President and by the Secretary of Defense.
The traditional approach to roles and missions — attempting to allocate them among the
Services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948 — is no longer appropriate. That
approach leads to institutional quarrels (as reported in the press during our deliberations) and
unsatisfactory compromises (as discussed in our report). More importantly, it does not lead to
achieving the Department's goals.
I cannot stress our message too strongly. It means a change in orientation for many. It
means fully implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
You will find many recommendations in the report, grouped in terms of joint military
operations, efficient and responsive support, and improved management and direction. All of
them are designed to improve joint military operations.
We are convinced that lasting solutions to the problems you asked us to address depend
on setting the right directions for the future, not merely adjusting the boundaries — which are
increasingly artificial — among the various defense organizations. Redefining those problems
makes them no less daunting. Our report. Directions for Defense, lays out our contribution to the
solution.
John P. White
Chairman
COMMISSION ON ROLES AND MISSIONS
OF THE ARMED FORCES
John P. White, Chairman
Admiral Leon A. Edney,
USN (Ret.)
Major General John L. Matthews,
ANG (Ret.)
Franklin D. Raines
General Robert W. RisCassi,
USA (Ret.)
Lt. General Bernard E. Trainor,
USMC (Ret.)
General Larry D. Welch,
USAF (Ret.) "
Les Aspin, In Memoriam
This report is dedicated to the memory of the Honorable Les Aspin, Commissioner and former Secretary of
Defense and former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, with profound appreciation for his sage
counsel and tireless dedication to the national security of the United States.
Directions for Defense
COMMISSION STAFF MEMBERS
Immediate Staff
Michael Leonard, Executive Director
Gene H. Porter, Deputy Executive Director
Phillip E. Lacombe, Special Assistant to the Chairman
Patti Benner Antsen, Assistant for Integration
James H. Kurtz, COL, USA, Staff Coordinator
Mark F. Cancian, Infrastructure & Central Support Coordinator
John D. Christie, Process Coordinator
Wade P. Hinkle, Major Contingencies Coordinator
Robert E. Schafer, Joint Warfare/New Missions Coordinator
Larry S. Barlow, Director for Administration
Wendy J. Jordan, Director for Legislative Affairs
Gregory H. Hartung, CDR, USN, Director for Public Affairs
Amy A. McCallum, ILt, USAF, Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Michael Bob Starr, ILt, USAF, Executive Assistant to the Chairman/Scheduler
Professional Staff
Michael F. Altfeld
Raymond H. Barker Jr.
Ronald J. Bath, Lt Col, NVANG
John R. Bioty Jr., Col, USMC
S. Eric Briggs, CAPT, USN
Natharuel F. Caldwell
Francis X. Cantwell
Jeffrey L. Cimbalo
David A. Deptula, Col, USAF
Fritz Ermarth
Senior Consultants
Raoul H. Alcala
Robert Bovey
Eliot Cohen
John B. Conaway, LtGen(R), ANG
John H. Cushman
Tom Dolan
Michael B. Donley
Administrative Staff
Joe Ferrara
Paul A. Gido, Col, USMC
Michael R. Harrison, COL, USAR
Francis G. Hoffman
Michael T. Hovey
Paul R. Ingholt
Donald P. Loren, CAPT, USN
Lois Miller
Jane C. Overslaugh
Joseph M. Price
William Fedorochko
Merle Freitag
Bruce Gudmundsson
Paul W. Hanley
Fred S. Hoffman
Randolph E. Jayne
James R. Locher, III
George T. Raach
Edward A. Rice Jr., Col, USAF
William G. Rosenau
Gregory L. Shaw, CAPT, USCG
John D. Shaw, CAPT, USN
Richard W. Weitz
Stephen A. Winsor, COL, USA
Jack B. Wood, COL, USA
Steven J. Wright, COL, USA
John Moxley
Abram M. Shulsky
Gary L. Sojka
Frank Tapparo
Herbert Temple, LTG(R), ARNG
Gayden Thompson
Raymond M. Walsh
Armie N. Nelson, Deputy Director for Administration
Michelle R. Angeli, SRA, USAF
Elizabeth Downing
Terry D. Gates, SPC, USA
Derrice E. Harris
Ladona S. Kirkland
Stuart F. McAuley, SSgt, USAF
MicheUe R. Ringquist, CTA3, USN
Sherry D. Strothers, YN2(SW/AW), USN
Geraldine Wade
Research Assistants
Terri A. Emmons
Brendan M. Harris, 2Lt, USAF
Joseph E. Schmitz, CDR, USNR
ErikKiefel
Randall G. Shriver
Preface
Preface
Almost everyone we talked to during the past year was sure of four things: First, that
America has the very best and most capable military forces in the world — the strength
of the U.S. Military lies in its ability to provide the right mix of air, land, and naval capa-
bilities to meet any threat. Second, that in the future, the U.S. Military will be called on to
perform a broader array of missions in more diverse contingency situations than they did
in the past while still maintaining a capability for large-scale regional conflicts. Third,
that information technologies, space, stealth, and precision-guided weapons will be in-
creasingly important to military success. And finally, that Defense funding will remain
limited.
In this context, three findings are particularly clear: first, that the Uruted States relies
on the regional commanders in chief to conduct the Nation's military operations. Second,
that America's combat forces are becoming increasingly accustomed to working together,
but more needs to be done. And third, that there are opportvmities for large-scale savings
from adjustments in the Defense infrastructure.
Our most important finding is that traditional approaches to roles and missions is-
sues are no longer appropriate. The context has changed significantly in the years since
the 1948 Key West Agreement addressed the question of who should do what in the U.S.
Military. Today, it is clear that the emphasis must be on molding DOD into a cohesive set
of institutions that work toward a common purpose — effective imified military
operations — with the efforts of all organizations, processes, and systems focused on that
goal from the very beginning.
The question is no longer "who does what," but how do we ensure that the right set
of capabilities is identified, developed, and fielded to meet the needs of imified com-
manders. The Services, the defense agencies, OSD, and the Joint Staff — who make these
decisions and develop these capabilities — are at the forefront of this effort.
What this means to those who read this report is that you are not going to see a list-
ing of roles and missions disputes among the Services, or sharp Commission recommen-
dations on how to resolve those disputes. You are not going to find a series of "put and
take" statements that rearrange U.S. forces from one Service to the other. To have ad-
dressed our task in that way would have perpetuated the narrow institutional perspec-
tives that iiJiibit development of a true joint warfighting perspective.
What you are going to read is our view of significant changes that need to be made in
order to develop a Department of Defense able to handle the challenges of an uncertain
and constantly changing future security environment. There are a few surprises in this
report. For example, as I have discussed our findings with many in the defense, aca-
demic, and business communities, I found them very surprised by our finding, for exam-
ple, that while DOD needs to increase jointness throughout the system, it is necessary to
place a high value on broad Service competition. To some this is a counter-intuitive find-
ing. But competition among the Services produces innovation in weapon systems, forces.
Directions for Defense
doctrine, and concepts of operations that yield the dramatically superior military capa-
bilities we need. America must not lose that edge. At the same time, DOD must find
ways of reducing the costs of maintaining that competition — through early decisions on
which competing ideas should be developed.
As you read this report, I believe you will find it properly focused on the future, with
a realistic appreciation of past and current improvements.
I want to express my thanks to Congress for the unique and far-reaching opporhmity .
they gave this Commission. I am especially grateful to Secretary of Defense William J.
Perry for the opportimity to chair this Commission and to work with some of our nation's
brightest and most capable private citizens, our Commissioners, and a staff of first-rate
defense professionals. Finally, thank you to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
John M. Shalikashvili and the many members of DOD, the Joint Staff, and the Military
Services whose cooperation made our job so much easier.
The imique, informed but different perspectives brought by the ten who joined me on
the Commission ensured a deep and penetrating look at the Nation's defense establish-
ment. They also provided the wealth of experience needed to ensure that we resisted tra-
ditional approaches to roles and missions questions, and, I believe, allowed us to offer a
contribution more enduring than would otherwise have been possible.
We have dedicated this report to the late Secretary Les Aspin. In many ways, Les
was a guiding force for our work. Any who know his work will see evidence of his ideas
throughout this report. We are all especially grateful for the privilege of serving with
him, and for all that he taught us not only on the Commission, but throughout his long
and distinguished career of public service. Les was a strong supporter and participant in
the Commission's efforts and endorsed our final report. It is our firm hope that this re-
port reflects the spirit of Les Aspin's dedication to the Nation and his quest for excellence
in defense. The Nation will miss his contributions and we will miss him as a friend.
I am compelled to say a few words about the quality of staff I have been privileged to
work with. There is not time or room here to say enough about each individual member
of the staff. Their performance has been superb, and confirms that every Service and ele-
ment of DOD offered the Commission its most capable men and women. The same is
true for those who joined the staff from industry, research firms supporting our efforts,
and academia. In each case, we had only the best to work with. This staff exhibited the
kind of joint purpose, cooperation, and trust that make successful unified military activity
possible.
John P. White
24 May 1995
Washington, D.C.
Contents
Summary ES-1
Chapter 1. A Commission on Roles and Missions 1-1
The Design of this Report 1-1
Was a Commission Needed? 1-2
Our Perspective on Contemporary Roles and Missions
Questions 1-3
Congressional Charge to the Commission: Fix the Current
Force; Shape the Future Force 1-4
The Commission's Approach 1-5
What has Changed? The Context for Roles and Missions of
the Future 1-6
The Three Themes of Our Analyses 1-9
Chapter 2. Effective Unified Military Operations 2-1
Create a Unified Vision for Joint Operations 2-2
Create a Functional Unified Command Responsible for Joint
Training and Integration of Forces Based in the
Continental United States 2-9
Develop and Implement Joint and Future Readiness
Indicators 2-11
Review the CINCs' Geographic Responsibilities 2-12
Prepare for Changing Mission Priorities 2-13
Concentrate Service Efforts on Military Core Competencies
and Their Support of the CINCs 2-20
Further Integrate the Reserve Components 2-23
Review Capabilities in the Aggregate 2-26
Set Aside Outdated Arguments 2-28
Support the Commanders in Chief 2-31
Chapter 3. Efficient and Responsive Support 3-1
Increase Reliance on Market Solutions: Outsource
Commercial Activities 3-2
Objections 3-5
Depot Maintenance 3-6
ix
Contents (Continued)
New Systems 3_7
Fielded Systems 3.8
Depot Facilities 3,g
Materiel Supply Management 3.9
Medical Care , 3_2g
Other Outsourcing Opportimities 3-13
Family Housing 3.I3
Finance and Accounting 3_14
Data Center Operations 3-14
Education and Training 3.I4
Base Management and Infrastructure 3-14
Reengineering DOD Support Activities 3.14
Streamline Central Logistics Support 3-15
Streamline Acquisition Organizations 3-16
Streamline Aviation Infrastructure 3.17
Aviation Acquisition Support 3-17 ,
Aviation Inter-Servicing 3-20
Operational Support Airlift Aircraft 3-21
Streamline Acquisition Oversight 3-22
Restructure Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity
Management 3.25
Conclusion 3_27
Chapter 4. Improved Management and Direction 4-1
Current Practices and Resulting Problems 4-2
Management Structure and Functions 4-2
, Decision Support Processes 4-4
Major Decision Support Information Frameworks 4-7
I
/
Contents (Continued)
Improve Decision Support Processes and Management
Structures: Directions for the Future 4-8
Improve Planning and Direction for the Defense
Program 4-8
Restructure the PPBS 4-10
Improve Other Decision Support Processes 4-13
Biennial Budgeting 4-15
Improving Incentives 4-16
Improve Information for Decision Support 4-17
Improve DOD's Management Structure 4-21
Restructure the Military Department Staffs 4-23
Improve Civilian Personnel Quality 4-25
Summing Up 4-27
Conclusion: The Future
Glossary
Appendix A. Inplementing Legislation
Appendix B. List of Acronyms
xi
Summary
Overview
The central purpose of the Department of Defense is to conduct effective
military operations in pursuit of America's National Security Strategy. The cen-
tral message for DOD from the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces is in the 21st century, every DOD element must focus on supporting the opera-
tions of the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Everything else DOD
does — from furnishing health care to developing new weapons — should sup-
port that effort. The recommendations made throughout our report seek to con-
centrate all of DOD's activities toward that end.
In establishing the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,
Congress told us to "review . . . the appropriateness ... of the current allocations
of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report
on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current
definition and distribution of those roles, missions, and functions."*
Our view of the future gives urgency to this effort. If America's experience
since the end of the Cold War is instructive, America's future will be marked by
rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets, and a broad range of
missions to support evolving national security policies. Providing military
capabilities that operate effectively together to meet future challenges is the
common purpose of the military departments, the Services, the defense agencies,
and other DOD elements. All must focus on DOD's real product — effective
military operations.
Military operations are performed by geographic and functional CINCs un-
der the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense. To
be successful, the CINCs must mold effective unified forces from the diverse ar-
ray of capabilities provided to them by other organizations. This means that the
CINCs must have a role in helping determine the capabilities that will be avail-
able; it also requires the close cooperation of the military departments and the
Services, support agencies, and decision-makers in DOD. The Department has
strengthened its capabilities for unified operations considerably since passage of
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. But, that job is not yet
done; further efforts to ensure the effectiveness of joint operations are essential
to a successful and secure future.
* National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, PL 103-160, 30 November
1993 (as amended).
ES-1
Directions for Defense
Our recoixunendations are designed to better focus DOD's traditional mili-
tary functions, management and decision-making processes, and support ele-
ments more directly on effective imified military operations. In short, we must
accelerate the process of thinking differently about defense. Military operations
are planned and conducted by joint forces under the direction of the CESfCs, not
by the Military Services, defense agencies, or Pentagon staffs.
We began our inquiry by listing the global realities we expect to be promi-
nent through the first two decades of the next century. We anticipate the con-
tinuation of regional threats and instabilities; proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; demand for military operations focusing on preventing conflict, pro-
moting stability, and expanding U.S. influence; greater importance of informa-
tion warfare; limited defense budgets; and rapid technological advances.
To deal with these realities, we identified six attributes of a successful DOD
in the future. They are
• responsiveness to requirements that change over time — sometimes rapidly;
• reliability in delivering predictable, consistent performance;
• cooperation and trust, the sine qua non of unified operations;
• innovation in new weapons, organization, and operational concepts;
• competition directed toward constructive solutions to complex problems; and
• efficiency in the use of resources.
Our recommendations encourage the development of these attributes. They
are designed to
• improve the ability of the Secretary of Defense to provide unified strategic
and programmatic direction to DOD;
• expand the role of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the CINCs in ensuring better joint doctrine, training, weapons plan-
ning, and support;
• focus the military departments on providing the right mix of capabilities for
unified military operations;
• improve capabilities to deal with new challenges of the post-Cold War
world; and
ES-2
Summary
• reduce the cost of the support infrastructure through increased outsourcing
and better management — while increasing responsiveness to the needs of
the CINCs.
Adjusting Perspectives
In the context of effective, unified military operations, our most surprising
conclusion is that it is a mistake to take the traditional view of roles and missions
issues — a view that concentrates on the allocation of rotes-among the Military
Services. Broadly ^speaking, existing problems with Service roles are symptoms
of the need for DOD to concentrate more intensely on unified operations. That
is, do the CINCs have the set of capabilities they need to fulfill their missions?
We group our recommendations under three broad themes: the unified mili-
tary operations themselves, productive and responsive support, and improved
management and direction.
Effective Unified Military Operations
Our recommendations emphasize the roles of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CINCs' joint "core competency" in preparing for,
and conducting, imified operations.
We recommend that the Chairman of the JCS propose a unified vision for
joint operations to the Secretary of Defense to guide force and materiel develop-
ment; integrate support to CINCs in such critical areas as theater air/missile de-
fense and intelligence; improve joint doctrine development; develop and
monitor joint readiness standards; and increase emphasis on joint training. We
recommend larger roles for the CENCs in structuring and controlling command,
control, and intelligence support, joint training, and theater logistics. We also
emphasize the role of the geographic CDSJCs in preparing for coalition opera-
tions.
Joint Operations
We recommend a new, functional unified command responsible for joint
training and integration of all forces based in the Continental United States. Un-
der the direction of the Secretary of Defense, this new command would train and
provide the joint forces required by the geographic CINCs' operational plans.
The command would work with the geographic CDsTCs in developing appropri-
ate plans and trairung programs for joint and combined operations.
ES-3
Emerging Mission Priorities
Our examination revealed several emerging mission areas that demand im-
mediate attention from the Federal Government generally, not just from DOD,
These mission areas provide significant security challenges and opportunities in
the years ahead.
• Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). We recom-
mend that the Vice President lead an interagency task force to better organ-
ize U.S. defense against these insidious threats. We also recommend
organizational changes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, and better integration of the fimctional unified commands into overall
plarming for combating WMD,
• Information Warfare. We recommend a high-level interagency effort to im-
prove America's information warfare capacity. DOD's capabilities for this
emerging warfighting mission need to be improved, and our civil and mili-
tary information vulnerabilities must be reduced.
• Peace Operations. Currently, DOD regards peace operations as a subset of the
broad category of operations other than war (OOTW). However, peace op-
erations hold the prospect for preventing, containing, or ending conflict.
They have the potential to preclude larger, more costly U.S. involvement in
regional conflicts. We recommend differentiating peace operations to give
them greater prominence in contingency plarming.
• OOrW. We must in addition be prepared to engage in the wide range of re-
maining OOTW tasks, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
For these we recommend limiting the use of military forces to military tasks
where practical; broadening non-DOD capabilities for some OOTW func-
tions; and improving interagency coordination. We must also ensure rapid
reimbursement of DOD for unplanned peace operations and OOTW to pre-
vent readiness problems among forces not engaged.
For all the missions highlighted above, DOD must expand capabilities but
without sacrificing its ability to fight the Nation's wars. DOD also must main-
tain a hedge against the possibility that another country could attain sufficient
military capabilities to threaten our Nation.
The Military Departments should sharpen their focus on their particular ca-
pabilities, or "core competencies." While the CINCs concentrate on planning
and training for joint operations in the near term, the Military Departments must
have a larger view that embraces long-term force development and materiel ac-
quisition.
ES-4
Summary
Other Key Service Functions
Overseas presence is a core competency of all the Services. Each Service has
important, sometimes unique capabilities for presence. Current practices should
be challenged to find innovative ways of meeting those objectives, such as inter-
mittent or surge deployments and various combinations of forces.
Additionally, we recommend specific adjustments in some Service functions:
Make the Air Force the Executive Agent for Combat Search and Rescue. Assign
management of sea-based pre-positioning programs to the Marine Corps and
management of land-based pre-positioning programs to the Army. Have the
Army provide ground-based area air defense, heavy engineering, and supple-
mental logistics support to the Marine Corps. Assign the Air Force primary re-
sponsibility for acquiring and operating multiuser space systenas. Transfer
operational support airUft aircraft (except for Department of the Navy C-9s) to
the Air Force for management by the U.S. Transportation Command.
Congress asked us to examine Reserve Component roles and missions in
DOD's future Total Force. Our recommendation is to size and shape Reserve
Components more consistently with national strategy needs, integrate the Re-
serve Forces better with the Active Duty Forces, improve training and evalua-
tion, and elinunate reserves not needed.
From our review of the deep attack mission, we conclude that DOD needs a
better mecharusm for determining the proper size and mix of deep attack capa-
bilities in the requirements development process. We recommend a DOD-wide
study to determine the best mix of these systems for the future. Furthermore, we
recommend including bombers in that study and delaying a final decision on B-2
bomber funding until the industrial base portion of DOD's bomber study is com-
pleted and reviewed thoroughly.
"Problems'' that are not Problems
Our study identifies three perceived roles and missions problems that
proved to be nonissues. In each case, improvement is needed — but not a reor-
dering of roles or fimctions. Putting outdated roles and missions issues such as
these into proper perspective — and therefore, to rest — is an essential step to-
ward concentrating attention on the broader changes needed. In particular.
Army and Marine Corps capabilities are complementary, not redundant; ineffi-
ciencies attributed to the so-called "four air forces" (i.e., each Service has aircraft)
are found mostly in the infrastructure, not on the battlefield; and more joint
training, not fewer Services, is needed to ensure effective close air support.
ES-5
Directions for Defense
Productive and Responsive Support
DOD should reduce the cost of support to help fund higher priority needs.
Infrastructure accounts for more than half of its budget, and big opportunities
for savings are available within that infrastructure.
Outsource Some Activities to Private Companies
Our approach is to outsource activities that need not be performed in the
government and reengineer support activities that must remain in the govern-
ment to protect the public interest. Implementation of some of our recommenda-
tions will require legislative relief from laws that inhibit efficiency.
More than a quarter of a million DOD employees engage in commercial-type
activities that could be performed by competitively selected private companies.
Experience suggests achievable cost reductions of about 20 percent. DOD should
outsource essentially all wholesale-level warehousing and distribution,
wholesale-level weapon system depot maintenance, property control and dis-
posal, and incurred-cost auditing of DOD contracts. In addition, many other
commercial-type activities, including those in family housing, base and facility
maintenance, data processing, and others could be transferred to the private sec-
tor. Finally, DOD should rely on the private sector for all new support activities.
Giving beneficiaries of DOD health care more choice between military and
civilian care at equal cost may reduce long-term demand for peacetime military
medical personnel and facilities. The resulting reductions would yield net sav-
ings and sharpen the military medical establishment's focus on readiness to meet
operational requirements.
Reengineering Support Activities
Support activities that remain in the government should be reengineered to
improve performance and reduce cost, and they should adopt private-sector
management tools that increase efficiency.
We rejected a monolithic new acquisition organization independent of the
Services because it could undermine core combat capabilities. Instead, we con-
centrated on improving the infrastructure that supports buying and maintaining
military equipment.
Reengineering the military aircraft support infrastructure has the highest po-
tential payoff because it costs so much and there is clear duplication among the
Services. This redundancy within the aviation support structure is an important
part of the true "four air forces" issue; reducing it should be given high priority.
ES-6
We recommend reengineering DOD's centralized contract audit and over-
sight functions, including greater use of private-sector audits and electronic
auditing wherever possible. Furthermore, the Defense Contract Management
Command and the Defense Contract Audit Agency should be combined. More
generally, DOD needs relief from laws and regulations that prevent using
proven commercial business processes, such as activity-based cost accounting
and international quality assurance standards.
Many of the defense agencies and field activities that provide the bulk of
DOD's centralized support must become more efficient and responsive to their
customers. We recommend establishing a board of directors for each defense
agency and major field activity. These boards should include customer repre-
sentatives and be supported by expert consultants to promote adoption of inno-
vative management practices. Their purview should extend beyond financial
accounting matters to address the full range of customer needs.
We recommend collocating the Military Departments' aircraft program man-
agement offices and consolidating common business and engineering activities
that support the program managers! Matrix support will reduce overall person-
nel costs by assigning experts to individual Service program offices only as
needed. This should also increase aviation interoperability and commonality
over time.
To streamline logistic support of aircraft already in service, we recommend a
single manager for support of fixed-wing aircraft, and another for helicopters.
These single management elements (SMEs) should direct the most efficient mix
of inter-Service support for all military aircraft. As more "wholesale-level" sup-
port for DOD weapon systems is outsourced, the SMEs will also manage con-
tracting with private-sector providers.
Improved Management and Direction
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
The Department of Defense's budget and program decisions are central to
our concerns because they often result in the de facto allocation of roles, mis-
sions, and functions. Improved performance requires changes, to the planning,
programming, and budgeting system; a new information framework; and adjust-
ments to headquarters organizations.
The Department's planning and budgeting system is the best of its kind in
the Federal Government, but it can be improved. Among the system's needs are
unified strategic direction, more attention to front-end planning, fewer program
changes late in the process, and less attention to unnecessary detail.
ES-7
Directions for Defense
We recommend a Quadrennial Strategy Review (QSR) at the beginning of
each Presidential term and whenever else events dictate. That review would be
an interagency effort directed by the National Security Council.
The QSR should consider recent and anticipated geopolitical and policy
changes, technological developments, opportunities for shaping the security en-
vironment, the plausible range of DOD budget levels, and a robust set of force
and capability options. We also suggest a different force planning concept that
evaluates various force/capability mixes possible at each of several different
fimding levels to determine relative value across the spectrum of possible
contingencies.
We recoixunend a thorough restructuring of the existing DOD planning and
budgeting system. Taking its initial direction from the QSR, the system we pro-
pose features more orderly treatment of issues, stronger program and budget di-
rection by the Secretary, and greater stability. We also believe that our system
will provide better focus on important issues by senior officials and require con-
siderably less staff effort devoted to detail.
The Department's decision-making information support framework — the
Future Years Defense Program — is too "input" oriented. We recommend a
mission/output-oriented information framework to better enable the assessment
of forces and capabilities to perform missions derived from the National Security
Strategy. The new framework would include improved metrics for measuring
and tracking performance.
The Department's process for acquiring weapons systems can be improved
by considering joint warfighting concems, including interoperability and com-
monality of support when "requirements" are first established. This implies a
greater ability and willingness of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
QROC) and OSD to address DOD needs in the aggregate, and earlier involve-
ment in tradeoffs of cost versus performance by civilian acquisition executives.
Organizational Changes
Changes are necessary in DOD's "corporate headquarters." The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the Secretary of De-
fense. The Chairman's advice should include a comprehensive "joint vision" de-
veloped with the CINCs and the Services. In addition, we recommend
strengthening the charter of the JROC (chaired by the Vice Chairman) over joint
requirements formulation, and increasing the technical and analytic capacity of
the Joint Staff to better assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
Elements in OSD are frequently preoccupied with managing, and sometimes
advocating, particular programs or functions. We recommend reducing OSD's
ES-8
Summary
functional management responsibilities so the staff can concentrate on giving the
Secretary of Defense policy advice and analytical support.
A new OSD "integration" function should be developed to assist the Secre-
tary in assessing diverse and competing recommendations and providing uni-
fied. direction for the defense program.
We recommend several other organizational changes, including giving
mission-oriented charters to elements of the Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy organization and combining the staffs that support the Military Department
Secretaries and the Service Chiefs.
Finally, to strengthen the quality of DOD's civilian leadership, we recom-
mend a new management concept, improved opportunities for advancement
and growth for career civilians, and limitations on the number of DOD political
appointees.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the challenge is to shape our military institutions so that they
are better prepared for a changing and uncertain future; this means ensuring ef-
fective urufied military operations. It is time to complete the work begun by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act by making joint thinking and acting a compelling reality
throughout DOD.
ES-9
Chapter 1, A Commission on Roles and Missions
Chapter 1
A Commission on Roles and Missions
The Design of this Report
The Department of Defense
faces an unclear future marked by
rapid change, diverse contingen-
cies, limited budgets, and a broad
range of missions to support
evolving national security poli-
cies. Providing military capabili-
ties that operate effectively
together to meet future challenges
is the common purpose of the
Military Services, defense agen-
cies, and other DOD elements. AH
must focus on DOD's real
product — effective military op-
erations.
Military operations are per-
formed by geographic and func-
tional Commanders in Chief
(CINCs). To be successful, the
CINCs must select from an array
of capabilities and mold them into
a unified force. This overarching
responsibility requires the close
cooperation of the Services, sup-
port agencies, and decision-
makers in DOD.
Definitions
♦ Roles are the broad and enduring pur-
poses specified by Congress in law for
the Services eind selected DOD compo-
nents.
♦ Missions are the tasks assigned by the
President or Secretary of Defense to the
combatant commanders.
♦ Functions are specific responsibilities as-
signed by Congress, by the President, or
by the Secretary of Defense to enable
DOD components to fulfill the purposes
for which they were established.
♦ Capability is the ability of a properly or-
ganized, trained, and equipped force to
accomplish a particular mission or fimc-
tion.
Simply stated, the role of the Services (and
the U.S. Special Operations Command) is
to provide capabilities (forces organized,
trained, and equipped to perform specific
fimctions) to be employed by the combatant
commander in the accomplishment of a
mission.
There is a need to increase DOD's efforts to ensure the effectiveness of joint
operations in the context of traditional military functions. But, it is more impor-
tant to extend this concept further into DOD by focusing management and
decision-making processes and support structures more directly on effective uni-
fied military operations. In short, we must accelerate the process of thinking dif-
ferently about defense. Military operations are planned and conducted by joint
forces under the direction of the CINCs, not by Military Services, defense agen-
cies, or Pentagon staffs.
1-1
Directions for Defense
This is the Commission's basic message for DOD in the 21st century: every
element of DOD must focus on supporting the unified military operations of the
combatant CESTCs. The recommendations contained throughout this report seek
to concentrate DOD's activities on the real product — effective military opera-
tions.
In this first chapter, we describe our perspective for studying DOD's alloca-
tion of roles, missions, and functions beginning witli the definitions contained in
the box labeled "Definitions." The later chapters of the report provide our spe-
cific recommendations for the types of changes needed to ensure DOD's ability
to conduct effective military operations in the future.
Was a Commission Needed?
America's Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard are the
best trained, best equipped, and most capable military force the world has ever
known. The men and women who serve today are better educated, better
trained, and more skilled than ever before. No other military force in the world
could have ternunated the Cold War, deployed halfway around the world to
lead an allied coalition to victory in the Gulf War, and then gone on to execute
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations that span the globe. They have en-
forced restrictions on military action in Iraq — delivered food and medical sup-
plies in Somalia and Rwanda — helped their fellow citizens fight forest fires and
recover from earthquakes and floods — and restored order in Haiti.
If the U.S. Armed Forces are so good, why do we need a Commission on
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces? Why did Congress charter us to re-
view the allocation of roles, missions, and functions today and for the future?
Ironically, it is precisely because DOD has been so successful that Congress
called for this Commission. Termination of the Cold War changed the interna-
tional environment just as surely as did the tremendous victory in World War II.
Today, as then, America must prepare its military forces for a new world. How-
ever, instead of focusing military attention on contairunent and deterrence of one
preeminent adversary, America must prepare for a world dominated by regional
threats, uncertainty and change, and new mission priorities (such as peace op-
erations, information warfare, and combating nuclear proliferation).
The Department of Defense's future success, and the Nation's future security,
depend on building the forces needed for an uncertain and changing world.
And that is why the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
was created. Congress believes that changes are required in the allocation of
roles and missions, today and for the future, to ensure that the Nation will have
properly prepared military forces for the challenges ahead.
Chapter 1, A Commission on Roles and Missions
While the international security environment may be new, the debate on
roles, missions, and functions — who does what within the military establish-
naent — is not. In fact, this debate began long before the National Security Act of
1947 created what became the Defense Department. In large part, this debate is
about how best to mold America's air, land, and sea forces into a unified combat
team that makes the best use of each Service's particular strengths today and for
the future.
In many ways, our charter also reflects congressional concern with the pace
and breadth of DOD's reductions in costs and other adjustments to the new se-
curity environment. Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, summarized congressional concern in a now famous ad-
dress to Congress irt 1992:
We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our Cold
War forces. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles
and missions that characterized the past forty years. We must reshape,
reconfigure, and modemize our overall forces — not just make them
small. We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the fu-
ture that is not boimd by the constraints of the roles and missions out-
lined in 1948.
Senator Nurm and his colleagues went beyond asking for a review of the
chronic roles, missions, and functions problems of overlap, duplication, and pa-
rochialism in the Services. They called for a complete review of DOD's post-Cold
War direction and the means to realize that direction.
Our Perspective on Contemporary Roles and Missions
Questions
Judging from the reactions to our work, some in the defense community
expected — and others feared — that our report would revisit and revise the
1948 Key West Agreement (see Glossary). But our review led us to conclude that
the traditional approach — who gets to do what — is no longer the right ques-
tion. While the Key West Agreement has changed very little since 1948, the
whole context in which it exists has changed fundamentally.
When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at Key West in 1948, roles, missions, and
functions all meant the same thing. The differentiation in terms that we offer on
page 1-1 of this report evolved or\ly as DOD matured. In 1948, there was no
need to differentiate among roles, missions, and functions, because whatever
those terms meant, the Services did them all. The Service Chiefs, sitting as the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, were responsible for establishing unified commands and de-
ciding which Service would be their Executive Agent for each command. Orders
were transmitted to each unified coimnander by a Service Chief. Our current
1-3
Directions for Defense
organization, with combatant commands responsible to the Secretary of Defense
and the President for the missions assigned to them, has evolved as a result of
experience, including lessons learned in military operations around the globe,
and as a result of executive and legislative branch initiatives. Today, we reaffirm
the role of the CINCs that has evolved in law and in practice: they are responsi-
ble for conducting America's wars. We reaffirm the role of the Services in pro-
viding the military capabilities essential to fighting and winning the Nation's
wars.
Perhaps our most surprising conclusion is this: fimdamentally, it is a mistake
to take the traditional "who gets to do what" view of roles and missions that
concentrates on the Military Services. Rather, the emphasis should be "who
needs what" in terms of joint military capabilities. That is, do the CINCs have
the set of capabilities they need to fulfill their missions?
From this perspective, the Services are properly aligned and focused on the
right set of roles and functions. Each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver
to the CINCs the best possible set of its specific air, land, and sea capabilities. A
conventional criticism of the Services — unrestrained parochialism and duplica-
tion of programs — is overstated. This is not to say there is no parochialism or
duplication; there is. But our investigation persuaded us that these issues are
largely a result of insufficient focus on the real product of the
department — effective joint military operations.
Viewed from this perspective, some perceived roles and missions problems
are not problems at all. We reached this conclusion concerning the combat capa-
bilities of the Marine Corps and the Army (i.e., the "two land armies" issue); the
assignment of Close Air Support (CAS) functions; and the so-called "four air
forces" question (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). In each case, our analysis of
core competencies, assignment of functions, and the needs of the unified CDSICs
found that popular perceptions of large-scale duplication among the Services are
wrong. We are firmly convinced that putting old "who gets to do what" argu-
ments like these into proper perspective — and therefore, to rest — is an essen-
tial step toward focusing on joint military capability.
Congressional Charge to the Commission: Fix the
Current Force; Shape the Future Force
Congress looks to this Commission for recommendations in three broad
areas: military roles and missions, civilian management and support of the De-
partment, and a process that would allow adjustments to meet future challenges.
Our charge from Congress flows from two basic concerns. The first is a tradi-
tional roles and missions concern focused on identifying current wasteful redim-
dancies among the Military Services and other DOD components. The second
1-4
Chapter 1, A Commission on Roles and Missions
concern is for what will be required of U.S. forces in the post-Cold War period
and into the early part of the next century. While a straightforward, issue-by-
issue review of the allocation of responsibility would satisfy the first concern, it
could not satisfy the second. The Commission was also charged with recom-
mending a framework for DOD's use in allocating future roles, missions, and
functions — so that another Commission or similar outside activity would not be
required again.
The Commission's Approach
To accomplish the broad charter outlined by Congress — fixing the roles and
missions problems of today, facilitating changes in the assignment of roles and
missions to deal with an uncertain future, and providing a framework for the fu-
ture adjustment of roles and missions — we identified several primary tasks.
These are:
• characterize the future international environment,
• determine the array of missions to be accomplished by DOD,
• determine what institutional attributes DOD should emphasize, and
• recommend the paths DOD should follow.
Accomplishing these tasks required two primary efforts: (1) consultations
with a wide range of defense professionals, academicians, government and busi-
ness leaders, and others who could provide the necessary breadth of perspective;
and (2) an analytic effort to assess DOD's current operations, infrastructure, and
management — and to determine how they should be changed.
To understand the array of perspectives, ideas, and opinions about roles and
missions allocations inside and outside DOD, we interviewed soldiers, sailors,
airmen. Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and their commanders around the world.
We met regularly with DOD's military and civilian leaders; received briefings
and written materials from all the Services, the Joint Staff, the CINCs, OSD, and
the defense agencies; met with a range of experts and executives from defense
firms and industry associations; held discussions with key foreign military lead-
ers; spoke with academicians, commentators, joumalists, and experts from a va-
riety of "think tanks" and other institutions; and consulted with members of
Congress. The ideas we heard informed our deliberations; many will be found
throughout this report.
In addition to consultations on a wide variety of subjects, we developed and
applied a mission-driven analysis and other screening techniques that assisted in
1-5
Directions for Defense
identifying and assessing specific roles and missions issues. Our exploration
was divided into three areas:
• Military operations and operational support
• Infrastructure and central support
• Management and decision-making processes.
To identify candidate issues for detailed analyses, we focused on the under-
lying question: What can be done to better align efforts with the needs of the Na-
tion? Then we applied one or more of the following criteria to select issues for
study:
• The issue is important and change may be necessary.
• Appropriate use of associated DOD capabilities must be defined better.
• Operational effectiveness would be significantly enhanced.
• Innovation would be encouraged.
• Efficiency would be increased substantially.
By screening the many potential issues with these criteria, we created a list of
about 25 issues that warranted serious attention. The issues we identified are dis-
cussed throughout this report, but principally in Chapters 2 and 3.
To adequately review current problems and establish future directions, we
had to place our review in the context of the future that we anticipate our forces
will face, the broad mission areas DOD must be prepared for, and the character-
istics required for continued success in the future. Our recommendations reflect
this framework and are consistent with our overarching goal — to improve the
Nation's ability to accomplish future military missions successfully through joint
operations.
What has Changed? The Context for Roles and
Missions of the Future
Our national security strategy is evolving to reflect world changes. The Cold
War strategy, dominated by the importance of containing communism, estab-
lished nuclear and conventional deterrence as the primary role of our military
forces. DOD emphasized aspects of military power most useful for those
purposes — instantaneous readiness of nuclear bombers, combined with land-
and sea-based missile forces; large-scale, forward-deployed forces in Europe and
Chapter 1, A Commission on Roles and Missions
Northeast Asia; and reinforcements ready to deploy from home. While other
risks were also considered, the Soviet threat dominated our planning, prepara-
tion, and funding.
Today's national security chal-
lenge is considerably different.
There is no longer a single domi-
nant enemy. While we are still
charged with providing capabili-
ties to fight two major regional
conflicts, our attention is increas-
ingly drawn to smaller contingen-
cies. Instead of focusing on
containment and deterrence, the
National Security Strategy now
emphasizes promoting democracy
and economic advancement worldwide. The military component of this strat-
egy supports creating and maintaining the stability required to allow democ-
racy and economic growth to flourish, and staying ready to protect our
interests and those of our allies and friends on short notice.
Elements Governing Defense Planning
Understanding changes in the international security environment should en-
able us to better define how DOD's roles, missions, and functions must change
to meet new challenges. The key elements of our view of the future — the ones
that we think should govern defense planning — are summarized below.
National Security Considerations
• Regional threats will continue and instabilities will threaten international sta-
bility and U.S. interests for a host of national, ethnic, religious, and economic
reasons.
• New types of threats will develop and may arise with little warning.
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction^ and the means for delivering
them will remain a major concern in the future.
^ Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
that can be used for large-scale and indiscriminate attack on populations. There are
really two concerns here: the weapons themselves and the means to deliver them. The
tragic attack on the Tokyo subway system using Sarin, a chemical agent, demonstrates all
too clearly that neither the weapon itself nor the means of delivery is necessarily techni-
cally sophisticated or difficult to produce.
"No analysts in history immediately com-
prehend the logic of their own situation in
periods of transition; a long epoch of diso-
rientation and confusion is usually neces-
sary to learn the necessary rules of the new
era. Observers of the contemporary period
of military transformation are no excep-
tion."
— Professor Paul Bracken, unpublished
paper for the Joint Staff
1-7
Directions for Defense
• A complex array of formal alliances, bilateral treaties, and temporary coali-
tions like the one that defeated Iraq will continue to require U.S. leadership
and support — and can play an important legitimating role.
• Peace operations, other operations to promote intemational stability, and hu-
manitarian and disaster rehef efforts will continue to place demands on U.S.
forces.
• The effectiveness of the global economy will remain a national priority.
Domestic Pressures and Priorities
• Lack of imminent threats and major enemies may result in reduced public
support for defense needs.
• There will be continuing pressure on the defense budget, given the compet-
ing demands for resources.
Technology Trends
• Rapid changes in technology may work in the Nation's favor by advancing
DOD's capabilities, but adversaries may also benefit — either by achieving
technical advances that nullify U.S. capabilities or by developing a new capa-
bility before it is available to DOD.
• DOD will have to build even stronger ties to civilian research institutions
and irmovative businesses to ensure that it has access to emerging technolo-
gies, many of which will be developed outside its traditional "sphere of in-
fluence."
• Advances in technology that can revolutionize military affairs must be
adopted and coupled with equally revolutionary adjustments to concepts
and doctrine.
One additional factor carmot be overlooked. While our perspective on the
future does not envision another nation's achieving military capabilities equal to
those of the United States during the next 20 years, that possibility must be con-
sidered. A growing number of nations may have the economic resources needed
to achieve substantial military power — singly or in combination. Further, we
carmot ignore the possibility that former Soviet states, still armed with nuclear
weapons, could emerge as major military threats.
1-8
Chapter 1, A Commission on Roles and Missions
Some Broad Conclusions
On the basis of this view of the future, we drew two major conclusions: First,
recent history points to continued, and probably dramatic, change. Second, the
nature, location, scope, characteristics, and timing of military operations in the
future remain uncertain. Clearly, DOD must be prepared for a wide variety of
missions.
Attributes for DOD
On the basis of our assessment of the future and anticipated military mis-
sions, we identified attributes of a defense establishment best suited to succeed
during the next 20 years. They are:
• responsiveness to needs that will change, sometimes rapidly;
• reliability to perform in a predictable and consistent marmer;
• cooperation and trust that underpin urufied operations;
• innovation in new weapons, organizations, and operational concepts;
• competition to find constructive solutions to complex problems; and
• efficiency in delivering effective military operations at the least cost.
In picking these attributes, we do not intend to preclude others; these six rep-
resent our collective judgment of the qualities DOD must emphasize to succeed
in the changing world that we envision. In all cases, they are subordinate to the
overarching objective for the Department — the conduct of effective military op-
erations.
The Three Themes of our Analyses
As indicated above, we divided our analysis into three areas: unified mili-
tary operations, the support infrastructure, and the management and decision-
making processes. Our review yielded an overall theme for each of these areas:
• Strengthen unified operations by enhancing the joint structures that plan and
perform missions, and by sharpening the focus of the Services to provide ca-
pabilities (Chapter 2).
• Focus DOD infrastructure on effective support for unified military capabili-
ties (Chapter 3).
1-9
• Improve the processes that support decision-making in DOD and establish a
DOD-wide focus on missions (Chapter 4).
In the remaining chapters of this report, we offer our view of the directions
DOD must pursue to ensure military effectiveness in the future. The general di-
rections and specific recommendations that we make reflect our conceptual
framework. Certainly, not every recommendation aligns with every aspect of
our framework; but in terms of the general direction, we believe they are consis-
tent and properly balanced.
1-10
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
Chapter 2
Effective Unified Military Operations
The primary goal of DOD is to
achieve effective military opera-
tions. Improving joint military ca-
pabilities is the key to reaching
this goal. America has been mov-
ing in that direction since World
War II and now is the time to
make the necessary adjustments.
Future military operations will
call on the capabilities of all the
Services along with support from
the defense agencies, other gov-
ernment agencies, and non-
governmental organizations. Pull-
ing these capabilities together for
complex, dangerous joint military
operations is the responsibility of
the Commanders in Chief
(CINCs). They can fulfill this re-
sponsibility only if the Services
and other supporting organiza-
tions provide the capabilities
needed.
We reaffirm the role of the
CINCs that has evolved in law
and in practice: CINCs are re-
sponsible for fighting America's
wars and employing nulitary
forces in pursuit of national security objectives. CINCs must have greater in-
fluence over the processes and priorities used by DOD to acquire the capabili-
ties they need to accomplish their missions. But they must not be burdened
with responsibilities that could detract from their primary role of preparing for
and conducting military operations.
Our specific recommendations for im-
proving overall joint operational effective-
ness fall into twelve categories, which are
discussed in this chapter:
♦ Create a unified vision for joint opera-
tions.
♦ Strengthen joint doctrine.
♦ Strengthen support for the CINCs' mis-
sions.
♦ Improve joint training.
♦ Create a functional imified corxunand re-
sponsible for joint training and integra-
tion of forces based in the Continental
United States.
♦ Develop and implement joint and future
readiness indicators.
♦ Review CINCs' geographic responsibili-
ties.
♦ Prepare for changing mission priorities.
♦ Concentrate Service efforts on military
core competencies.
♦ Further integrate the Reserve Compo-
nents.
♦ Review capabilities in the aggregate.
♦ Set outdated arguments aside.
2-1
Directions for Defense
Create a Unified Vision for Joint Operations
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that the military capabilities devel-
oped separately by each of the Services are individually superb. But they do not
work well enough together. We believe this happens because, in the absence of a
unifying vision to guide their efforts, each Service develops capabilities and
trains its forces according to its own vision of how its forces should contribute to
joint warfighting. Not surprisingly, the Services' ideas about how to integrate all
forces reflect their own perspectives, typically giving the other Services a role
supporting the "main effort/'
Each Service's vision informs
and guides its internal decisions
on systems acquisition, doctrine,
training, organization, manage-
ment of forces, and the conduct of
operations. Forward . . . From the
Sea; Force XXI; and Global Reach,
Global Power are vision docu-
ments published by the Depart-
ments of the Navy, Army, and Air
Force, respectively. They are
valuable statements of how each
Service views its role. These Serv-
ice visions help form a joint vision, but collectively they carmot replace it.
Competing elements exist in these visions that must be reconciled. They are
also incomplete. There is no joint command and control or joint logistics. The
Service visions do not explain collectively how a joint force commander can
integrate Service capabilities to achieve the most effective mix for specific war-
fighting purposes.
Basically, competition among
warfighting visions is a strength.
Indeed, this is among the princi-
pal benefits of the uniquely
American organization for de-
fense. The variety of Service per-
spectives adds breadth, flexibility,
and synergy to military operations. Nevertheless, integrating their warfight-
ing concepts must receive more emphasis. Otherwise, the Services can only
work to develop the capabilities they need to fulfill their own particular vi-
sions.
We find a pressing need for a central vision to harmonize the Services' own
views. This vision should drive joint requirements and serve as a basis for
"No military task is of greater importance
than the development of strategic plans
which relate our revolutionary new weap-
ons and force deployments to national se-
curity objectives. Genuine unity is
indispensable at this starting point. No
amount of subsequent coordination can
eliminate duplication or doctrinal conflicts
which are intruded into the first shaping of
military programs."
— President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message
to Congress, 3 April 1958
Recommendation: The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should propose,
for the Secretary of Defense's approval, a
future joint warfighting vision to help
guide Service force development efforts.
2-2
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
elevating the importance of joint operations as an essential "core competency" of
all joint commands and agencies.
In addition to the general aim of providing an overarching guide for devel-
oping joint warfighting requirements, a unified vision will accomplish several
oth^r direct and indirect purposes. Among the direct aims are giving the Serv-
ices guidance regarding the capabilities they should supply to unified military
operations. With a common base of understanding, the CINCs and Services can
have congruent expectations of the capabilities of forces assigned to the CINCs
by the Military Departments. The unified vision will provide a framework for
the development of the common operational and organizational concepts
needed for "baseline" joint force headquarters, and a common base for assess-
ments of current and future joint capabilities. Indirect purposes include encour-
aging the Services to "mature" their own visions by incorporating an accurate
concept of how they contribute to DOD's total capabilities.
The unified vision for joint operations needs to be part of the overall vision
that should guide DOD's long-term plaiming. The development of such a vision
is also discussed in Chapter 4.
Strengthen Joint Doctrine
"At the very heart of war Ues doctrine. It
represents the central beliefs for waging
war in order to achieve victory."
-General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF
The Goldwater-Nichols Act
(1986) assigned responsibility for
developing doctrine for the joint
employment of the U.S. Armed
Forces to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since then, a
first generation of joint doctrine has been developed. In many cases, it repre-
sents a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts (of-
ten developed by one "lead" Service). Joint doctrine should be developed on
the basis of the unifying joint vision discussed above to better guide Service
efforts to build and integrate the capabilities needed for joint operations.
Recommendation: Revise the joint doctrine
development process. Make one joint
agency the leader for "capstone" doctrine.
The practice of designating
one Service to act as the lead agent
for the overarching doctrine that
broadly guides all Service activi-
ties — such as Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations, for which the Army took the lead
— can produce widely differing interpretations and confusion. To preclude
this problem in the future, we recommend revising the joint doctrine develop-
ment process. A joint agency should be designated to lead the process, thus
eliixunating use of one Service as lead agent for capstone joint doctrine. Serv-
ice participation in the development of capstone doctrine is still essential, and
2-3
Directions for Defense
assignment of Service lead agents is still appropriate for more narrowly fo-
cused doctrine.
"Doctrine provides a military organization
with a common philosophy, a common lan-
guage, a common purpose, and a unity of
effort."
—General George H. Decker, USA
We reaffirm the role of the
Military Services in developing
concepts, doctrine, tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures that de-
rive from their core competencies.
Ultimately, the Chairman of the
JCS must use his authority to lead
the joint doctrine process. Doc-
trinal products should be based on accepted principles and not rigid rules.
CINCs and Joint Force Conunanders should be given flexibility in applying
joint doctrine to specific circumstances.
The Joint Warfighting Center, established in June 1994, is responsible for as-
sisting the Chairman, the unified CINCs, and the Service Chiefs in conceptualiz-
ing, developing, and assessing current and future joint doctrine. We believe the
responsibilities assigned to the Joint Warfighting Center are important, and we
urge the Secretary of Defense to provide the people and money necessary for the
Center to fulfill these responsibilities. The Center also should assist the Chair-
man in developing training and equipment standards for core elements of joint
force headquarters to provide standardization and interoperability from theater
to theater. We urge the Services to assign their top warfighters to these efforts.
Disagreements over the specifics of doctrine are compounded by deeper dif-
ferences among the Services. They define and use doctrine differently. We be-
lieve that suitable joint professional military education and greater Service
cooperation in joint activities are fundamental to effective joint doctrine.
Strengthen Support for the CINCs' Missions
The CINCs must have greater influence over the processes and priorities
used to acquire the weapons, equipment, and forces they need to accomplish
their warfighting and other missions; but, they must not be burdened with re-
sponsibilities that could detract from the execution of those missions. The
CINCs must also have peacetime authority over forces, planning, and training
commensurate with their responsibility for unified military operations. This
authority should include peacetime mechanisms to ensure inter-Service coopera-
tion, which must be consciously — even aggressively - developed through bet-
ter joint training and greater attention to interoperability to ensure effective joint
operations.
2-4
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
To this end, several actions can be centralized to assist the CINCs in their in-
tegration of Service capabilities and to facilitate interoperability of joint forces.
We recommend that the Chairman of the JCS:
• In coordination with the CINCs, develop a near-term, integrated theater air
and missile defense concept with a corresponding doctrine and functional ar-
chitecture.
• Continue refinement of joint concepts, doctrine, and requirements for future
theater air and missile defense, fire support, deep attack, and other major
warfighting functions that cross Service boundaries.
• With CINC participation, develop an integrated architecture for command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C^I) to increase effec-
tiveness when operating across the boundaries among CINCs' areas of re-
sponsibility.
• Develop appropriate concepts, doctrine, organizations, and procedures to en-
hance joint logistics capabilities available to the CINCs, including integrating
national-level support and Service logistics support in the theater.
Recent management initiatives - such as the Expanded Joint Requirements
Oversight Council and its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
process — provide geographic and functional CINCs with better liTJ<:ages of
their operational needs to the decision-making and management processes that
develop, fund, and deliver the needed forces, equipment, and support essential
to successful operations. These initiatives should be strengthened, as discussed
in Chapter 4.
Command, Control, and Communications Support
The CINCs must participate in
the development of commuruca-
tions support systems to ensure
that their needs are met. In most
cases, this should be done through
the management system that we
recommend in Chapter 4. But, in some cases, the CINCs may need specific
authority. We recommend that geographic CINCs manage communications
resources (e.g., radio frequencies, bandwidth, power output, and capacity)
within their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs). Organizations that
perform this function already reside within the European and Pacific Com-
mand AORs, but they are assigned to the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) and only come under the CINCs' operational control in war-
time. To give the CINCs the ability to manage communications resources
Recommendations: (1) Better integrate C^
architectures and systems for CINC use. (2)
Give the CINCs more peacetime control
over theater communications resources.
2-5
Directions for Defense
within their theaters, these organizations should be placed under the CINCs'
control in peacetime as well. CINCs should also have authority to tailor solu-
tions specific to their AORs, consistent with DOD concepts, standards, and ar-
chitectures.
Intelligence Support
The CINCs need more influ-
ence over the establishment of in-
telligence requirements, setting of
collection priorities, and dissemi-
nation of intelligence products in their geographic or functional areas. The in-
telligence community can provide more timely and responsive intelligence
support to joint commanders during military operations by realigning roles
and responsibilities among the Services, combatant commands, and defense
agencies. Because the structure and functions of the entire U.S. intelligence
community are being reviewed by the Commission on Roles and Capabilities
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, we deferred to that group on most
intelligence-related issues. But our analyses led us to conclude that some steps
can be taken now to improve the support provided to the CINCs by intelli-
gence components within DOD. Accordingly, we recommend the following:
• The Secretary of Defense should centralize authority for developing intelli-
gence support capabilities within DOD under a senior military intelligence
officer with authority to review, evaluate, and revise intelligence programs.
This officer would advise the Secretary on intelligence organization, struc-
ture, and spending for all DOD-funded intelligence programs.
• The Chairman of the JCS should give unified commanders a greater voice in
the development of intelligence capabilities to support their planning and
operations.
• The Chairman of the JCS and the CINCs should ensure that operational unit
commanders have a feedback mechanism that tracks the status of their intel-
ligence collection requests.
Space-Based Support
Space-based systems are increasingly important to unified military opera-
tions and integral to the combat capabilities fielded by the Services. But the
availability of some critical space-based information is not controlled within
DOD; national systems under the control of the intelligence community provide
information that can multiply combat effectiveness.
2-6
Recommendation: Give CINCs more con-
trol over intelligence support.
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
Recommendations: (1) Increase DOD influ-
ence over space-based support. (2) Give
DOD a greater voice in satellite tasking.
Under current law, the Secre-
tary of Defense, through the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), acquires and operates
space-based reconnaissance systems to satisfy the requirements of. all elements
of the intelligence conununity. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) es-
tablishes intelligence collection requirements and priorities. Within DOD,
space programs are carried out by the NRO and the individual Services. An
integrated space program, using the best practices of the NRO, the Services,
and the civil and commercial sectors, would result in lower acquisition and
operational costs for space systems and improve responsiveness to all users of
space systems.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense integrate the management of
military and intelligence space activities; assign responsibility for developing an
integrated architecture for nciilitary and intelligence space systems to a joint-
Service office reporting to the Secretary; and assign the Air Force primary (not
sole) responsibility for acquisition and operation of multi-user space-based sys-
tems. The implementation of this reconunendation should preserve and extend
the streamlined acquisition practices of the NRO.
The committee structure under the DCI that manages the tasking of satellites
should be made more responsive to the CINCs' requirements. The process for
requesting and obtaining intelligence products should be simplified and stan-
dardized among the system-specific review conairuttees, which should be con-
solidated. There should also be greater DOD access to comiruttee meetings that
review CINC requests and make tasking decisions.
Coalition Interoperability Support
Recommendation: Expand plaiming and
preparation for coalition operations.
Many future military opera-
tions will be conducted with coali-
tion partners. The CINCs need to
expand their plaiming and prepa-
ration for such operations. Consequently, we reconunend that the Secretary of
Defense:
Assign CINCs the responsibility for ensuring* that current information on
likely partners — including commurucations systems, procedures, and infra-
structure — is available for contingency plannirig.
Encourage the CINCs to train with potential coalition partners.
Provide for coalition liaison teams to enhance operations with likely coalition
partners. These teams would train and operate with coalition command
2-7
Directions for Defense
elements to provide access to U.S. intelligence; command and control; com-
bat support; and, where appropriate, logistics.
• Ensure the availability of equipment (particularly communications gear) to
facilitate the work of coalition liaison teams in enabling coalition partners to
participate in peacetime combined exercises and actual operations.
• Substantially increase funding for the International Military Education and
Training Program and the Military-to-Military Contact Program from the
current levels of $27 million and $12 million, respectively.
Improve Joint Training
Training is the key to maintaining Service core competencies and joint train-
ing is critical to the success of unified military operations. Joint training is not
being done as well as Service training. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recently noted, this is a chronic problem: "... When you look at joint train-
ing .. . it's an embarrassment to me. I have gone to more joint exercises and
walked away from them more embarrassed than anything else.'^
//2
Recommendations: (1) Fully fund joint
training. (2) Give the CINCs more author-
ity over the joint portions of Service com-
ponent training budgets.
Emphasis on joint training
throughout DOD must be in-
creased. To this end, we recom-
mend that joint training be fully
funded in DOD's budget and that
the CINCs be given more control
over the portions of Service component training budgets that are integral to
joint training. In particular, they should have authority to disapprove the di-
version of Service funds from joint training. The CINCs also need improved
simulation techniques, more rigorous training readiness standards, and better
tools for conducting and evaluating joint training.
Recommendation: Extend joint evaluation
to the unit level.
We endorse the development
of urufied command-level "Joint
Mission Essential Tasks Lists" and
we recommend extending this
concept to tactical-level Service units. This would mean, for example, that
Army maneuver units would be evaluated on their ability to integrate fixed-
wing close air support into their tactical plans; Marine units would be judged
on their ability to integrate Army Multiple Launch Rocket System units. Fail-
ing to demonstrate proficiency for any reason, including the inability of an-
other Service to provide the necessary people or equipment, would cause a
degraded readiness rating. This should cause the appropriate CINC to direct a
-General John M. Shalikashvili, speech to the Association of the United States Army
Land Warfare Forum, 1 September 1994.
2-8
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
higher priority for this type of joint training by Service component command-
ers.
Other changes are necessary:
Joint training should be increased
for close air support, and for all
elements of theater air and missile
defense forces, even at the expense of some Service-unique training. Core joint
task force headquarters elements should be identified and exercised. Intelli-
gence systems should be used during joint exercises, along with the battle
management systems and command, control, and communications equipment
needed to ensure cormectivity of joint task forces. The functional CINC re-
sponsible for joint training and integration of U.S.-based forces (discussed be-
low) should have the funding needed to develop enhanced joint training
techniques within the revised DOD management system that we recommend
in Chapter 4.
Recommendation: Increase joint trairung
activities.
Create a Functional Unified Command Responsible for
Joint Training and Integration of Forces Based in the
Continental United States
The National Security Act of
1947 provided for the operation of
the Armed Forces under unified
control and "for their integration
into an efficient team of land, air,
and naval forces."^ The
Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the
CINCs authority over the forces
assigned to their commands, in-
cluding all aspects of military op-
erations, joint training, and
logistics. It also gave them specific authority to organize and employ assigned
forces as they deemed necessary.^ Therefore, every CINC is responsible for
training and integrating assigned forces.^ Most U.S. military units are now sta-
tioned in the Continental United States (CONUS), although they can be appor-
tioned to, and employed in, the area of responsibility (AOR) of any geographic
CINC. A recent example is the deployment of the Army's 25th Infantry
^ Public Law 253 - 80th Congress, Section 2, 26 July 1947.
nOU.S.C 164(c).
^"Assigned" means that a force has been placed under the command authority of a
CINC by direction of the Secretary of Defense. "Apportioned" means that the force has
been made available for planning purposes to another CINC or several CINCs (including,
possibly, the CINC to which the force is assigned).
"One of the lessons which have most
clearly come from the costly and danger-
ous experience of this war is that there
must be unified direction of land, sea, and
air forces at home as well as in all other
parts of the world where our Armed Forces
are serving."
— President Harry S Truman, Message to
Congress, 19 December 1945
2-9
Directions for Defense
Division from its base in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR to Haiti,
which is in the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) AOR.
"This important proposal would make
CINCACOM responsible for ensuring that
forces that will fight together also train to-
gether."
- Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, letter to
^ Senator Sam Nunn, 29 March 1993
This flexibility in deploying
units to any CINC's AOR puts
even more emphasis on joint
training. American forces must
have the appropriate knowledge,
training, and interoperability for
adapting quickly to the different
CINCs' warfighting needs. A
command that concentrates on preparing the forces stationed in CONUS for
joint operations, to include deployment planning, is of particular importance.
Therefore, we endorse the assignment of the functional mission of preparing
joint forces to the U.S. Atlantic Command in October 1993. However, ACOM's
new capacity as "joint force integrator" has not been adequately developed.
This function must be better defined, understood, and accepted by all the
CINCs. We also find that ACOM^s geographic AOR detracts from its func-
tional responsibilities. Therefore, "~
we recommend that the President
and Secretary of Defense do the
following:
Recommendation: Create a functional com-
mand responsible for joint training and in-
tegration.
Separate the geographic and functional "joint force integrator" missions cur-
rently assigned to ACOM - creating a functional unified command.
Assign all CONUS-based general purpose forces, including West Coast
forces assigned to PACOM, and Reserve Component forces, to the resulting
functional unified command.
Give the CINC of this functional unified command specific responsibility to
► assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in integrating the require-
ments of the geographic CINCs that flow from their individual contin-
gency plans;
► provide forces to geographic CINCs and ensure those forces are trained
and integrated as joint forces and are capable of carrying out the tasks
assigned to them;
► support the joint training requirements and in-theater exercises of all
unified CINCs and, through this process, provide an overarching input
to the. Chairman on joint warfighting requirements based on "lessons
learned" during training;
► train and assess the readiness of CONUS-based Active Duty and Re-
serve Component forces to meet integrated operational requirements;
2-10
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
► assist in the development of tools for conducting and evaluating joint
training, such as better joint training readiness standards and measure-
ment techniques, and greater use of simulation techniques; and
► assist in the development and validation of future joint warfighting con-
cepts that will guide long-term force structure and modernization plans.
Develop and Implement Joint and Future Readiness
Indicators
Unified commanders do not have an effective mechanism for assessing the
joint readiness of the forces assigned to them in peacetime, much less for assess-
ing the readiness of forces that are apportioned to them for planning purposes,
but which are assigned to other CINCs.
Readiness has two dimensions: (1) the readiness of individual force elements
to perform assigned tasks and (2) the ability of these force elements to integrate
into the unified command structure to accomplish their portions of the joint mis-
sion. The first of these two dimensions is the responsibility of the Services; indi-
vidual force readiness should be assessed against standards derived from the
particular contingency plan(s) to which each force element is apportioned.
While Service assessments highlight strengths, weaknesses, and risks for all
their forces, there are differences in methodology among the Services. Moreover,
they do not evaluate the joint readiness of major force "packages" designed for
contingency plans. And they do not provide estimates of future urut readiness,
since they cannot forecast readiness as a function of resource projections.
Recommendation: Develop a joint readi-
ness assessment system.
A measurement system should
be developed to determine and
forecast the joint warfighting ca-
pabilities of forces assigned to the
CINCs. The geographic CINCs need joint readiness assessments to plan for
the employment of forces not assigned to them in peacetime. Perhaps more
importantly, the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense need these
assessments to help them plan future forces.
The information from such a measurement system should be factored into
the up-front assessment and budget planning processes recommended in Chap-
ter 4.
2-11
Directions for Defense
Review the CINCs' Geographic Responsibilities
We believe that the Unified Command Plan (UCP) should reflect the regional
focus and new missions emphasized in the National Security Strategy. Adjust-
ments are needed to foster more rapid adaptation to changing threats and better
align the unified command structure with the national security strategy. Specifi-
cally, we believe that the AORs of the geographic CINCs should be adjusted to
eliminate "seams" that may impede joint operations between military theaters of
operation and better align CINC responsibilities with regional strategies and
strategic interests.
We recommend that periodic reviews of CINC missions and forces apply six
broad principles:
• The geographic responsibilities of the CINCs should correspond to areas of
recognized or likely strategic interest to the United States.
• The size of each AOR should accommodate the CINCs representational obli-
gations and other responsibilities. The CINCs spend much of their time in-
volved with politico-military dealings with security officials of countries in
their respective AORs; the number of those countries is a major factor in the
CINCs ' 'span of control." Other significant factors include the political, eco-
nomic, religious, and cultural diversity of the region; its physical size; and
the presence of strategically important areas of conflict (or potential conflict)
such as territorial disputes or other hostilities among countries.
• Seams between CINCs' AORs should be reviewed to ensure that they do not
split areas of strategic interest or exacerbate existing political, economic, re-
ligious, or cultural differences.
• Sufficient land area, sea area, and airspace should be included in each AOR
for the CINC to carry out assigned missions and, if necessary, wage an effec-
tive unified military campaign against any plausible adversary.
• The distinction between geographic and functional CINCs should be pre-
served (i.e., functional CINCs should not have AORs).
• The responsibilities assigned to the functional CINCs should be reviewed pe-
riodically for overlap and consolidated where practical.
We evaluated opportunities to consolidate unified commands. In all cases,
we found potentially high costs associated with the CINCs' span of control and
only limited cost savings. The continuing requirement for global military leader-
ship, and increased demands for the attention of U.S. military leaders from more
nations, may argue for exactly the opposite — in favor of more geographic
CINCs with smaller AORs or more extensive use of sub-unified commands.
2-12
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
Northeast Asia typifies the need for continual review based on the principles
stated above. The economic vitality of the region and its position as a major U.S.
trade partner represent vital strategic interests of the United States. Northeast
Asia lies entirely within PACOM's AOR, with politico-military affairs managed
by PACOM and its two subunified commands in Korea and Japan. PACOM's
AOR is the largest, in terms of area, and contains several points of strategic inter-
est that compete for the attention of U.S. authorities. Once tensions have been
reduced on the Korean peninsula, the warfighting responsibilities of the penin-
sula's U.S. command may dimirush sufficiently to consider whether it is more
desirable to reallocate resources and establish a unified command for Northeast
Asia, or to retain an integrated view of Asia in PACOM.
Another example of how these principles could be applied involves the cur-
rent placement of India in PACOM's AOR and Pakistan in the Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM). Tensions between these two coimtries and their nuclear
potential might argue for assigning responsibility for them to the same unified
command (the State Department has both countries under a single bureau).
Movement of the seam between India and Pakistan, however, would necessarily
create a new seam elsewhere, either between India and China or between Paki-
stan and its Islamic neighbors. Furthermore, putting India and Pakistan in either
PACOM's or CENTCOM's AOR would decrease the span of control of one
CINC, but perhaps not as sigruficantly as it would increase the span of control of
the other.
The responsibility for making these tough choices is rightfully vested by
Congress in the President, with the advice of the Secretary of Defense and Chair-
man of the JCS. In Chapter 4, we propose a strategy review at the beginning of
each Presidential term that could provide the appropriate timing and means for
reviewing questions about the assignment of AORs and the UCP in general.
Prepare for Changing Mission Priorities
Congress specifically told us to identify emerging or "new" missions to en-
sure that the Nation will have the military capabilities necessary for the future.
Based on our view of the future, we conclude that four areas demand immediate
attention from the Federal Govemment generally, not just from DOD. The four
areas discussed below will provide significant security challenges and opportu-
nities in the years ahead. While they demand higher priority treatment from
DOD, we caution that they should not replace preparation for fighting major
conflicts as the single most important priority of the Department. The four areas
we nominate for concerted attention are combating proliferation, information
warfare, peace operations, and the collection of other activities known in DOD as
"operations other than war."
2-13
Directions for Defense
Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires the
combined resources of a variety of law enforcement, technical, intelligence, dip-
lomatic, and defense organizations to identify proliferation threats and deal with
them effectively. The range of needed activities includes diplomatic and com-
mercial efforts to prevent the proliferation of commercial technologies essential
to developing WMD; intelligence and domestic and intemational law enforce-
ment capabilities to identify and intercept proliferation; diplomatic actions to re-
dress proliferation; and military capabilities to deter and, if necessary, remove
proliferation threats. These functions span many organizations.
The President has declared Wi'^^^^^^^^^^i'^^^mm^^^ mmmmmmmmmmmmm^
combating proliferation a national Recommendations: (1) Put the Vice Presi-
emergency. We recommend put- dent in charge of integrating a national ea-
ting the Vice President in charge pability to combat proliferation,
of an interagency effort for inte- | (2) Increase the CINCs- role. |
grating national capability to com-
bat proliferation until an effective process is in place. Furthermore, we
recommend establishing an interagency working group (IWG) of the National
Security Council with broad responsibility for all aspects of the proliferation
mission — from diplomatic efforts to military action. A multi-agency, inter-
disciplinary planning staff should be established to support the IWG.
We endorse the Secretary of Defense's recent assignment to the geographic
CINCs of responsibility for planning, targeting, and executing specific regional
activities to combat proliferation — along with the ongoing preparation of a
DOD directive on combating proliferation, which will communicate departmen-
tal policy, assign responsibilities, and establish procedures. To further enhance
DOD's efforts to combat proliferation, we recommend the following:
• The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should set up a DOD "combating
proliferation coordinating comnnittee'' to coordinate policy and all adminis-
trative activities (e.g., funding, research and development, coordination, and
mission support).
• The Chairman of the JCS should develop a procedure for integrating the ca-
pabilities of the functional CINCs into DOD's overall planning for combating
proliferation.
Information Warfare
In the past, victory in war hinged on ability to dominate airspace, land, and
the oceans. Today and in the future, major strategic and tactical advantages can
be gained by controlling an adversary's access to information while protecting
2-14
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
one's own information — and capitalizing on the difference. The growing
worldwide dependence on digital communications and data storage, much of
which is vulnerable to manipulation and destruction, creates both dangers and
opportunities for the United States and its allies.
In information warfare (IW), vulnerabilities are exploited through electronic
means, psychological operations, and other measures designed to manipulate,
deceive, disable, or destroy an opponent's information systems. Current and po-
tential U.S. adversaries are vulnerable. IW techniques carried out during war-
time or other periods of conflict can disrupt a state's leadership of troops, its
allies, or its own population.
Like other forms of warfare, IW has a flip side. It is just as important to take
effective measures to prevent an adversary from exploiting one's own vulner-
abilities. Its heavy reliance on digital communications and control systems, cou-
pled with a tradition of openness, makes the United States a particularly rich
target for an opponent capable of waging IW. Such an adversary could cripple
major civil and military support functions — financial, transportation, and com-
munications — without even entering the country. America's clear conventional
military superiority may cause opponents to see IW and other nontraditional
forms of power as available means to achieve their goals.
A wide variety of IW activities r^^~*™'"^~'*^^~*'™™'"~— "
are underway within the U.S. "Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do
Government. During the past few "^^re damage with a keyboard than with a
years, IW efforts, both offensive bomb."
and defensive, have received a — Computers in Crisis, Report of the National
great deal of official attention. But Research Council
the U.S. Goverrmient, as in the ^ii^^— — — — ^
case of combating proliferation, lacks a comprehensive, integrated approach to
the problems and opportunities raised by the explosive growth in reliance on
information technology. In short, there is no overarching, government-wide
concept for using IW to promote and protect U.S. national interests. An exam-
ple is the statutory separation of responsibilities for protection of Federal gov-
ernment information systems between the National Institute for Standards
and Technology and the National Security Agency. A more intense focus on
resources, policy, and interagency cooperation on information security is
needed. Therefore, we focus our recommendations on reducing U.S. informa-
tion systems' vulnerability while leaving the exploitation of the potential of of-
fensive warfare to the appropriate DOD activities.
Peace Operations
The President's National Security Strategy is clear about peace operations,
stating that, "We must prepare our forces for peace operations ... in some cases
2-15
Directions for Defense
their use will be necessary or desirable and justified by U.S. national interests."^
The central purpose of peace operations — to prevent, halt, or contain conflict -
requires combat-ready military forces sufficient to accomplish the mission.
Peace operatioris share characteristics of both warfighting and other conflicts.
They are a vital part of the National Security Strategy. We must not underesti-
mate the difficulty of these efforts:
Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the diffi-
culty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either
to succeed, policy makers must still spell out their interests, set priori-
ties among cases, and balance goals with resources. The President
will still need to educate the American people about the rationale be-
hind a policy and convince them of the need for. action. Absent well-
defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable
costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict preven-
tion simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.^
Peace operations have the potential to deal with precursor instabilities and,
thus, to prevent conflicts from reaching a stage where U.S. forces could be thrust
into an active combatant role at considerably more expense and greater risk. De-
spite their value as investments in stability, and the continued likelihood of these
occurrences in the next decade, military planners now treat peace operations as a
subset of the "Operations Other Than War'' (OOTW) category.^ This treatment
ignores the full range of approaches to resolving conflicts by assuming that mili-
tary forces exist only to "fight and win nation's wars." While that notion may
deter some conflicts, others are not affected.
The challenges here are as follows: First, identify conflicts that might be de-
terred or mitigated by peace operations and are of sufficient U.S. national inter-
est to warrant comrrutment of forces. Second, determine how best to integrate
peace operations into operational planning and training regimes. Third, deter-
mine how best to organize DOD and non-DOD assets to conduct these opera-
tions. Fourth, ensure that peace operations are paid for without undermining
the readiness of forces not directly involved in them to effectively respond to
other contingencies.
Lack of expeditious funding for peace operations degrades overall force
readiness. The lag between conducting operations and receiving reimbursement
forces DOD to deplete operations and maintenance (O&M) funds that had been
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995, p. 16.
^Stedman, Stephen John, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive
Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995.
^In categorizing military operations, DOD uses the term "operations other than war"
as a convenient way of grouping together military activities required to accomplish objec-
tives that do not have combat or the military defeat of an enemy as their central purpose.
Included in this category are those civil, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other activities
that are increasingly occupying the Nation's Armed Forces.
2-16
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
programmed for trainirig and maintenarice, and some force modernization ef-
forts.
The question for DOD and the
government is not whether the
Arm^d Forces will conduct these
operations — each case will de-
pend on choices made by policy
makers — but how they can be
plarmed and carried out with a minimum of disruption to DOD's core mission
of preparing for and fighting the Nation's wars. Peace operations are integral
to the roles of all Services and an important mission for the geographic CINCs.
They warrant appropriate training and equipping. While the overall size of
the current force is adequate to meet the current level of peace operations, ad-
ditional forces uniquely applicable to such operations could be needed if these
missions increase in frequency or intensity.
To give U.S. forces the capabilities to conduct these operations successfully,
we recommend the following:
• The Secretary of Defense should change DOD directives and planning guid-
ance to acknowledge the value of peace operations, align them with contin-
gency planning rather than as part of the general, all-inclusive category of
OOTW, and assign them an appropriate priority.
• The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the JCS should reflect the likely
use of the Military for peace operations in programming and contingency
planning guidance and provide for suitable training and selected equipment
stockage.
• All concerned should continue to support streamlined funding mechanisms
to provide necessary funds promptly. Continued use of emergency supple-
mental appropriation requests appears preferable to creating special contin-
gency funds or requiring advance congressional approval of any nonroutine
movement or use of military forces.
Operations Other Than War
Our discussion above deals with peace operations, which DOD currently
considers a part of operations other than war (OOTW). But in recent years, the
Services also have been called upon to perform a spectrum of operations short of
traditional combat operations — such as restoring civil order and providing hu-
manitarian relief. The limited use of DOD forces for these operations will con-
tinue to be appropriate in circumstances where speed is essential or other
Recommendations: (1) Assign proper pri-
ority to peace operations. (2) Integrate
other agency resources. (3) Ensure funding
without degrading readiness.
2-17
Directions for Defense
capabilities are not available. This is also true for some domestic natural disas-
tiers and humanitarian efforts.
Recommendation: DOD should integrate
-OOTW capabilities into overall mission
planning and assign proper priorities.
The challenge is to integrate
the military capabilities required
to perform peace operations into
the DOD mission set, assign
proper priorities, and develop
training and other support activities to avoid degrading the readiness of U.S.
forces for major combat operations.
Whether in the aftermath of U.S. combat operations, such as in Grenada and
Panama, or during peace operations, as in Somalia and Haiti, one of the more
difficult tasks once the shooting has stopped and a semblance of order has been
restored is to hand over responsibility for law enforcement to other authorities.
In the course of each of these military operations, civilian law and order broke
down and no agency took responsibility for its restoration. A particularly con-
tentious aspect of the debate was the issue of creating a local public security or
"constabulary" force to maintain order after U.S. forces departed.
We expect DOD will continue to be called upon to carry out law enforcement
operations in the future. Our recent experience in Latin America, the Caribbean,
and Africa shows that there are no civilian agencies capable of short-notice law
enforcement operations and trairung in hostile, demanding environments. By
default, these missions — like other OOTW missions, such as large-scale delivery
of food, water, or medicine into hostile areas — fall to the Military.
Recommendations: (1) Remove legislative
impediments to the training of foreign po-
lice by U.S. Armed Forces. (2) Assign the
lead to the Army for short-term constabu-
lary training.
For constabulary activities per
se, we recommend that DOD for-
mally acknowledge its emergency
law enforcement and short-term
constabulary training functions.
The Secretary of Defense should
assign these tasks to the Armed
Forces, including the Reserve Components. The Army should have lead re-
sponsibility for organizing, training, and equipping U.S. forces to conduct law
enforcement-related activities, although longer-term training should remain a
civilian agency responsibility. Finally, legislation that restricts the ability of
the Federal government to conduct constabulary trairung (e.g.. Section 660 of
the Foreign Assistance Act) should be amended to allow greater DOD partici-
pation.
We also recommend the following:
The President should limit the use of military forces in both peace operations
and OOTW to tasks that cannot be more appropriately assigned to others.
2-18
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
• The Secretary of Defense should propose to the National Security Council a
Presidential Decision Directive ordering executive branch agencies to take
the necessary steps to broaden the base of resources for peace operations and
OOTW by planning for the extensive use of military reservists and other gov-
ernmental agencies, contractors, and non-governmental organizations for
tasks in their areas of competency. We specifically recommend action to im-
prove the ability of a U.S. civilian agency to conduct longer-term law en-
forcement training.
An effective model for OOTW is the U.S. Coast Guard. While an agency of
the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is a branch of the Armed
Forces. Its military characteristics (e.g., chain of command, discipline, and
24-hour response capability) enable the Coast Guard to perform maritime safety,
law enforcement, and marine environmental protection roles — and still meet its
national security mission. The Coast Guard s success in meeting its multi-
mission responsibilities results from effective coordination of all aspects of
operations — from planning through execution — with DOD and other Federal,
state, and local agencies.
Summary
In recommending these approaches to the emerging mission areas outlined
above, we recognize some limitations on the ability of DOD and the NSC process
to develop successful policies and programs. First, many agencies have roles in
these areas, but at the same time have other priority tasks. Second, in areas
where many departments have strong interests and responsibilities - informa-
tion warfare is a prime example — there is often reluctance to share information
or be subordinate to others. Finally, effective new programs and efforts require
funding, at a time when budgetary pressures are severe for the entire executive
branch.
For all of these reasons, there is a premium on leadership within the NSC
system — by the President, the Vice President, and other principals. We have
tried to be specific about how various interagency efforts should come together,
and we have identified specific leadership roles where appropriate. In all four of
these mission areas, it is quite logical to assume that an effective interagency
process will lead to new programs and responsibilities for various agencies; the
Administration must be ready to restructure budgetary priorities to execute
these initiatives.
2-19
Directions for Defense
Concentrate Service Efforts on Military Core
Competencies and Their Support of the CINCs
We reaffirm the roles of the Services that have evolved as DOD has matured.
The Services provide the military capabilities essential to the accomplishment of
missions assigned to the CINCs. They develop tactical concepts; manage re-
search and development; acquire weapons and supporting systems; recruit, edu-
cate, and train personnel; develop leaders; and organize, train, and equip the
specific forces that the CINCs need to accomplish their assigned missions. The
Services' planning horizon extends well into the future, while the CINCs, of ne-
cessity, focus on near- and mid-term planning.
We recommend reemphasizing traditional Service functions, sharpening the
boundaries in some areas where unneeded overlap occurs, and relieving them of
responsibilities that detract from their core competencies.
The "core competencies" of
each Service are the heart of the
warfighting capabilities essential
to effective unified military opera-
tions. A prerequisite to improved
joint military effectiveness is en-
suring these Service capabilities.
However, many elements of each
Services' core competencies must
be carefully integrated across
Service boundaries. This is espe-
cially true for Service capabilities
that need to be interoperable with
other Services' capabilities. Other
areas common among the Service
component commands assigned
to each CINC also must be inte-
grated.
Interoperability applies to
more than just the obvious func-
tions, such as communications. It
is important for operational flexi-
bility in munitions, other expend-
ables, electronic support, and
elsewhere. In the long term, inter-
operability can be enhanced
through greater attention to com-
monality early in the
What Are 'Core Competencies'?
Core competencies are the set of specific ca-
pabilities or activities fundamental to a
Service or agency role. They define the
Service's or agency's essential contributions
to the overall effectiveness of DOD and its
unified commands.
As viewed by the Commission, Service core
competencies include the following: for the
Air Force, air superiority, global
strike/deep attack, and air mobility; /or the
Army, mobile armored warfare, airborne
operations, and light infantry operations;
for the Navy, carrier-based air and amphibi-
ous power projection, sea-based air and
missile defense, and anti-submarine war-
fare; for the Marine Corps, amphibious op-
erations, over-the-beach forced entry
operations, and maritime pre-positioning;
and for the Coast Guard, humanitarian op-
erations, maritime defense, safety, law en-
forcement, and environmental protection.
Among the core competencies of joint or-
ganizations are planning and conducting
joint and combined military operations.
2-20
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Militan/ Operations
requirements-generation process, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the near term,
it is important to support specific interoperability initiatives, such as
• upgrading the Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B force to meet all DOD airborne
electronic stand off jamming needs;
• equipping enough Air Force KC-135 aircraft and replacement tankers with
multipoint capability to refuel Navy, Marine, and coalition aircraft; and
• ensuring that all munitions, especially the growing inventory of laser-guided
bombs and other precision munitions, are useable by the combat aircraft of
all Services.
Presence
Each Service is a major contributor to achieving the objectives of peacetime
overseas presence — influencing nations and events, reassuring friends and al-
lies, deterring would-be aggressors, and responding promptly to emergencies
with combat forces. The President's National Security Strategy places a high pri-
ority on maintaining continued engagement overseas and the National Military
Strategy calls on capabilities provided by all Services to meet the CINCs' over-
seas presence objectives.^
Recommendation: Revise the process for
determining the CINCs' overseas presence
requirements.
Overseas presence is challeng-
ing because it is difficult to relate
specific results to the efforts ex-
pended by the Military. Never-
theless, in a changing world, DOD
must look for more efficient and effective ways to achieve the objectives of
presence. We agree with the assessment of the Deputy Commander in Chief
of U.S. Atlantic Command that 'Tt is time to reconsider what is really required
and what has simply become automatic." The CINCs must state realistic re-
quirements for presence and look at innovative alternatives to traditional
types of presence. One option would be to give each geographic CINC a no-
tional presence "budget."
In addition, inter-Service com-
petition should yield significant
benefits. The possibilities have
been suggested by the Chairman:
"Maybe I don' t need to deploy the
Recommendation: Experiment with new
approaches for achieving overseas pres-
ence objectives.
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995; and Na-
tional Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective En-
gagement, 1995.
^° Vice Admiral H.W. Gehman, Jr.; letter to Dr. John P. White, "Overseas Presence," 1
December 1994.
2-21
Directions for Defense
same capability all the time. Maybe I can build my forward presence around
an Aegis cruiser . . . and the air ... I forward deploy and put on the ground."^^
We recommend a vigorous experimentation program to encourage innovation,
exploit the full range of Service capabilities, and evaluate alternative methods
and mixes of forces to adequately achieve presence objectives. The functional
CINC responsible for joint training and integration of CONUS-based forces
should take the lead in this effort, in coordination with the geographic CINCs.
Alternatives developed through this experimentation must provide forces ca-
pable of achieving the objectives of the geographic CINCs, particularly
combat-ready forces to respond to crisis situations.
As stated in connection with cultivating potential coalition partners, we be-
lieve that many military-to-military contact and other foreign military interac-
tion programs are a low-cost, but effective means for developing American
influence in other nations. We encourage measures to further integrate and co-
ordinate these programs within DOD and with other government agencies. In
particular, we recommend that DOD, in coordination with the Department of
State, give high priority to adequately fimding military interaction programs.
Combat Search and Rescue
The requirement for combat
search and rescue (CSAR) support
in peace operations and opera-
tions other than war is likely to
arise quickly, and it may generate
steady-state requirements in more
than one theater at a time (which has been the case recently). Too frequently,
uniquely trained special operations units are called upon to provide day-to-
day CSAR support, at the expense of their readiness to perform special opera-
tions activities.
Our focus on core competencies leads us to recommend that the Secretary ex-
pand the Air Force's executive agent responsibilities for escape and evasion to
include responsibility for CSAR. Furthermore, in light of the persistent require-
ment for CSAR support, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Air Force to
provide CSAR capability sufficient for ongoing operations without using special
operations forces.
" General John M. Shalikashvili, "Readiness: It's a Balancing Act," Air Force Times, 2
January 1995.
Recommendations: (1) Give the Air Force
Executive Agent i-esponsibility for CSAR.
(2) Air Force increase availability to meet
needs of ongoing operations.
2-22
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
Further Integrate the Reserve Components
Since establishing the Total Force policy in 1973, DOD has endeavored to
make better use of Reserve Component forces. DOD should continue its efforts
to ensure that the Reserve Components contribute as much as practical to execut-
ing the national strategy. Significant savings and public goodwill can be gener-
ated by using Reserve forces wherever and whenever they can provide a
required military capability.
There are ways that DOD can make better use of the Reserve Components.
Some reserve forces are not orgaruzed, trained, or equipped appropriately for the
types of operations they are likely to face in the future. In particular, the Army,
which has the largest Reserve Components, has a combat structure that exceeds
requirements for fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. At
the same time, the Army reports shortages in deployable support forces.
We recominend the applica-
tion of five general principles for
sizing, shaping, and employing
the Total Force to better integrate
Reserve Components:
Recommendations: Size and shape the Re-
serve Component forces according to prin-
ciples reflecting Total Force needs.
First, the Total Force should be sized and shaped to meet the military re-
quirements of the national security strategy.
The Reserve Components should be assigned all tasks that they can accom-
plish within the mobilization and deployment times envisioned in the Na-
tional Security Strategy. Maximum reliance on the Reserve forces conserves
resources for other critical needs and involves the American people more
broadly with their Armed Forces.
All units should be evaluated on the basis of their readiness to accomplish
assigned tasks within the time frames specified.
The Secretary of Defense should clarify the extent to which the following Re-
serve Component tasks are intended to determine force requirements:
► Warfighting and forward presence
► General support forces and mobilization capability
► Strategic reserve or reconstitution
► General military service, including National Guard (militia) forces for
domestic operations (e.g., disaster relief, civil disturbance, and border
control) to the extent that these forces are funded by the Federal Govern-
ment.
2-23
Directions for Defense
• Second, because not all units need to maintain the same level of readiness,
the Secretary of Defense should fully implement the policy of "tiered" re-
source allocation. Units that are scheduled to deploy early and frequently
should have higher priority for training resources, personnel, and equip-
ment. DOD should allocate resources appropriate to the planned mission
and the response time required. This will correct situations where some late
or nondeploying units have funding priorities equal to, or higher than, early
deploying units. However, planners should keep in mind that tiered re-
sourcing deliberately leads to tiered readiness. Forces that get less resources
are less ready, and less capable.
More specifically, the Army should resolve the question of the readiness of
National Guard "enhanced readiness brigades/' Although the Army is com-
mitted to the readiness of these units, many in DOD doubt whether these 15
brigades can be ready in time to meet deployment schedules associated with
the two major regional conflict scenario. We believe that designated Reserve
Component imits can be ready in time if policies are changed and sufficient
resources are provided — for example, by raising the percentage of full-time
leaders, active duty advisors, and skilled technicians in each unit. Providing
many qualified advisors to the enhanced readiness brigades will place addi-
tional demands on active forces that are already fully committed. The
Army's leadership must balance these competing demands.
• Third, Reserve Component forces with lower priority tasks should be elimi-
nated or reorganized to fill force shortfalls in higher priority areas. For ex-
ample, the Army has eight National Guard combat divisions with
approximately 110,000 personnel spaces that were required for possible war
with the former Soviet Union, but they are not needed for the current na-
tional security strategy.^^ At the same time, the Army estimates that there is
a shortage of 60,000 combat support and combat service support troops to
adequately support the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in two regional
conflicts. The Secretary of Defense should verify this shortfall and direct the
Army to restructure its combat divisions to provide the additional support
forces needed.^^ This would still leave the Total Army with about 50,000
more combat spaces than required. The excess should be eliminated, from
the Active or Reserve Components.
These Army National Guard divisions are not used in any major regional conflict
currently envisioned in DOD planning scenarios. The conflicts would be finished long
before the National Guard divisions can be ready. The Bottom-Up Review did assign
these eight divisions secondary missions such as providing the basis for wartime rotation,
serving as a deterrent hedge to future adversarial regimes, and supporting civil authori-
ties at home. We believe eight divisions is too large a force for these secondary missions.
We recognize that there are equipment implications. Some imits will not need sig-
nificant reequipping when they are restructured, such as a division artillery that transi-
tions to a nondivisional field artillery brigade. Other units would need significant
reequipping, such as an infantry unit being converted to an ammunition handling unit.
2-24
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
This principle should be applied to all Reserve Components of all the Serv-
ices.
• Fourth, the Services should ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve
Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans and ac-
tually used in the execution of those plans. We have concluded that accessi-
bility to Reserve forces is adequate. There is sufficient authority to call on
them when needed, and the last two Presidents have used it. Reserve Com-
ponents should participate in actual contingency operations commensurate
with their training, demonstrated readiness, and availability.
• Fifth, greater integration and cooperation is required between Active and Re-
serve Components. Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve sup-
port of the Total Force. The most effective Reserve units have strong,
recurring association and cooperation with the Active components.
Reserve Component units should be trained to perform specific tasks to the
same standards as the Active component units, though they might not train
to the same spectrum of tasks. For instance. Reserve Component units may
specialize in a particular area (such as desert operations) or task (such as rear
area security) and may defer more complex tasks for post-mobilization train-
ing.
All Reserve Component units in the United States should be assigned in
peacetime to the unified command responsible for the joint training and inte-
gration of U.S.-based forces (discussed above). That CINC should oversee
the training and readiness of all assigned forces — Reserve as well as Active
— to fulfill statutory responsibility for the preparedness of the command to
carry out assigned missions. The Active components — given appropriate
authority to establish standards and conduct evaluations and inspections —
should be held responsible for Reserve Component training readiness.
Other useful mechanisms to encourage Active /Reserve integration include
joint training, common management information systems, personnel ex-
changes for professional development and experience, and making duty with
the Reserve Components career-enhancing for active duty members of all
Services.
Finally, where significant uncertainties or differences of opinion exist, we
recommend that DOD establish a series of tests, experiments, and pilot pro-
grams to determine whether Reserve Component units can perform to stan-
dards and whether different organizational and training arrangements
would be more effective. This program will help match Reserve Component
forces to requirements; identify the broadest set of opportunities for Reserve
Component participation; clarify the resource levels needed to meet
2-25
Directions for Defense
operational standards; and encourage innovation in the structure and use of
the Reserve Component.
Review Capabilities in the Aggregate
Fixing Responsibility
The traditional "who gets to
do what" view of roles and mis-
sions is fundamentally flawed.
The question should be "who
needs what" and the emphasis
should be on the needs of the
CINCs. That is, does the full set of
available capabilities include eve-
rything they need to fulfill their
missions? In the absence of a uni-
fying concept for joint warfight-
ing, each Service is fully engaged
in trying to deliver to the CINCs
what the Service views as the best
possible set of its specific capabilities — without taking into account the simi-
lar capabilities provided by the other Services. When we reviewed the tradi-
tional roles and missions issues in the context of what the CINCs need to
accomplish their missions, rather than what the Services need to fulfill their
own visions of themselves, the results were enlightening.
"Strategy, program, and budget are all as-
pects of the same basic decisions. Using
the advice of our scientists and our intelli-
gence officers, we must make the wisest es-
timate as to the probable nature of any
future attack upon us, determine accord-
ingly how to organize and deploy our mili-
tary forces, and allocate the available
manpower, materiel, and financial re-
sources in a manner consistent with the
over-all plan."
- President Harry S Truman, Message to
Congress, 19 December 1945
Deep Attack
Perhaps the best-remembered argument among the Services over who gets
to do what was the 1949 debate over whether to fund a Navy "supercarrier" or
an Air Force bomber. That debate centered on long-range delivery of nuclear
weapons. Today, the nuclear aspect is less central, but the debate continues.
For the purposes of our
evaluation in this area, we defined
deep attack as encompassing all
actions that can apply force out-
side the area of close combat. In a
world with weapons of mass de-
struction and sophisticated air de-
fense systems, there is great value
in fighting from as far as possible
beyond an enemy's reach. The
'\ . , Until long-range bombers are devel-
oped capable of spanning our bordering
oceans and returning to our North Ameri-
can bases, naval air power launched from
carriers may be the only practicable means
of bombing vital enemy centers in the early
stages of a war."
- Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Department of
the Navy Press Release, 6 January 1948
2-26
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
CEsFCs have available several different weapon systems that can attack land
and sea targets at varying ranges. The Services field a mix of land-based bal-
listic missiles, sea-based cruise missiles, and a growing inventory of precision-
guided weapons and standoff weapons delivered by aircraft. All of these ca-
pabilities are useful. In the Gulf War, all were used. No CINC that we talked
to proposed eliminating any of these capabilities, and it is almost inconceiv-
able that one ever would, because they allow the Joint Force Commander to
bring force to bear in a near simultaneous manner against the full array of en-
emy capabilities and sources of strength.
However, it is not clear that DOD has the correct balance of these various
weapons. Currently, no one in DOD has specific responsibility for specifying
the overall number and irux of deep attack systems. This is a primary example
of the need for a unified vision as discussed earlier in this chapter. It also il-
lustrates the more general problem discussed in Chapter 4 of the lack of a
comprehensive process to review capabilities and requirements in the aggre-
gate. It is of particular importance here because of the large number and high
cost of deep attack systems. We believe that process improvements recom-
mended in Chapter 4 provide the means for addressing this and similar issues
in the future.
Moreover, DOD may have
greater quantities of strike aircraft
and other deep attack weapons
systems than it needs. Overall
deep attack capability is increas-
ing with the refocus of the
bomber force on conventional op-
erations, growing inventories of
improved precision-guided muni-
tions, and procurement plans for stealth aircraft (which can provide a deep at-
tack capability equivalent to that of many nonstealth aircraft in many
instances). Because hostile states have available modern surface-to-air missile
systems, stealth can be especially important. Precise standoff weapons that
improve capability in high-threat environments are expensive, and non-
stealthy aircraft require support from other aircraft to attack heavily defended
targets.
Capability improvements based on stealth and precision technologies por-
tend major changes in force size and structure in the future. Consequently, we
recommend prompt initiation of a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study focused
on finding the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack capabilities
currently fielded and xmder development by all Services. Only by approaching
capabilities in the aggregate, from the CINCs' perspective rather than the Serv-
ices', can this particular "who needs what" question be answered.
Recommendations: (1) Conduct an assess-
ment of all Services' deep attack systems to
detemune appropriate force size and mix.
(2) Defer decision on B-2 bomber funding
pending analyses of the industrial base im-
pact. (3) Accelerate funding for precision-
guided munitions.
2-27
Directions for Defense
At congressional direction, we examined whether production of the B-2
bomber should be stopped, as planned by DOD. The answer to this complex
question requires a broad examination in the context of DOD's overall deep at-
tack capability.
The Commission's staff reviewed more than 20 studies addressing bombers.
We were briefed on the most recent study prepared for the Secretary of Defense
by the Institute for Defense Analyses. From these studies, briefings, and our
own assessments, we reached two conclusions.
First, in the context of the force-sizing scenario of two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts (as currently defined by DOD), we agree that the pro-
duction of additional B-2s would be less cost effective than buying additional
precision weapons for existing bombers and other strike aircraft, or otherwise
improving the conventional warfighting capabilities of existing bombers.
Our second conclusion is based more on our review of DOD's overall plan-
ning in the deep attack area (or more precisely, the lack of such overall planning)
than on individual bomber studies. We recommended above that the Secretary
of Defense immediately institute a broad-based review of the Nation's planned
inventory and mix of weapons and platforms for deep attack, to include bomb-
ers. We also believe that no final decision should be made on further B-2 fund-
ing until the industrial base portion of the OSD bomber study has been
completed and reviewed. Our reasoning is that a final, concrete decision to halt
B-2 funding should be made only when the full ramifications of the decision are
understood. No bomber development program is currently underway. As has
been the case with the B~52, the B-2 will likely be in service for 40 to 50 years. It
is not possible to predict what requirements will exist that far in the future, and
we are concerned that tomorrow's CINCs should not be deprived of adequate
numbers of bombers because of a decision made today without the most careful
deliberation.
While further study of deep attack capabilities and B-2 bomber funding is
warranted, the capabilities provided by precision-guided munitions are proven.
We recommend accelerating funding for the precision-guided munitions most
needed by the CINCs.
Set Aside Outdated Arguments
Viewed from our distinct perspective, some perennial roles and missions
problems are not problems at all. As stated in Chapter 1, we reached this conclu-
sion concerning the aggregate combat capabilities of the Marine Corps and the
Army — the "two land armies" question; the assignment of Close Air Support
functions; and the "four air forces" issue. In each case, our analysis of the aggre-
gate capabilities available to the unified CINCs proved that popular perceptions
2-28
Chapter 2, Effective Unified Military Operations
of large-scale duplication are wrong. We are firmly convinced that putting old
"who gets to do what" arguments like these into proper perspective — and
therefore, to rest — is an essential step toward focusing on joint military capabil-
ity.
Two Land Armies
Perhaps no issue illustrates the need to move beyond thinking about roles
and missions in terms of who gets to do what as vividly as the question of
whether the Army and the Marine Corps unnecessarily duplicate each other.
The Conference Report leading to the 1952 legislation that wrote the Marine
Corps' role into law specifically stated "there is no intention of converting the
Marine Corps into a second land Army." We found that the Marine Corps has
never been structured to be a second land army, yet the "two land armies" issue
persists. We believe that 50 years is long enough. It is time to put outdated ar-
guments like these aside.
We endorse the core compe-
tencies of both the Army for sus-
tained land operations and the
Marine Corps as the landward ex-
tension of naval force. In areas of
apparent overlap, such as forced
entry, the two Services provide
complementary rather than dupli-
cative capability. The CINCs —
and the Nation — need both.
However, we believe DOD may
improve military operational ca-
pabilities and reduce Army and Marine Corps field headquarters structure
through better integration.
We recommend enhancing the command, control, and communications ca-
pabilities of Army corps and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters so
that either can command and support forces from both Services. These enhance-
ments should provide enough flexibility to permit headquarters reductions and
other efficiencies.
We find, for example, that the Army's core competence in ground-based area
air defense is duplicated, in part, in the Marine Corps. Once the command and
control enhancements recommended above are in place, we recommend retiring
the Marine Corps' Hawk missile units and giving the Army responsibility for
ground-based area air defense for all land forces operating beyond the range of
naval air and missile defense systems. The Marine Corps should retain its low-
altitude, ground-based air defense weapons and the command, control, and
Recommendations: (1) Enable Army and
Marine Corps field headquarters to com-
mand and support forces of both Services.
(2) Eliminate Marine Corps ground-based
medium-altitude air defense capabilities;
rely on the Army's core competency. (3)
Relieve the Marine Corps of non-
expeditionary engineering responsibilities.
(4) Assign responsibility for afloat pre-
positioning to the Marine Corps and ashore
pre-positioning to the Army.
2-29
Directions for Defense
communications capabilities to support an integrated joint air and missile de-
fense system.
We also find that efficiencies can be achieved by consolidating heavy engi-
neering capabilities, which perform infrastructure construction and maintenance
during sustained land operations. We recommend assigning this responsibility
to the Army, and focusing the Marine Corps' engineering capability on tasks
supporting expeditionary operations. We also recommend single management
of afloat pre-positioning by the Marine Corps and single management of ashore
pre-positioning by the Army to improve support to the unified CINCs.
Close Air Support
Another perennial roles and missions issue concerns Close Air Support
(CAS) — the use of aircraft to attack enemy targets in close proximity to friendly
forces. Today, CAS is performed by all Services. In our view, this is appropriate.
CAS is a vital capability that complements other fire support options. It is essen-
tial to the combined arms force that underpins U.S. military success.
Close Air Support is only one
of many functions performed by
both fixed- and rotary-wing avia-
. tion. Combat aircraft are not ''sin-
gle use" weapons. The helicopters
and attack, fighter, and bomber
aircraft provided by the Services
perform a range of critical combat
functions, only one of which is CAS. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated
the value of multi-mission aircraft. It is clear that no significant savings would
result from removing the CAS function from one or more of the Services un-
less inventories of multi-mission aircraft were reduced. It is equally clear that
overall capabilities would decrease and the forces in the field would be weak-
ened. CAS is an important and demanding function. We recommend in-
creased joint CAS training for all the Services' pilots and ground forces.
Four Air Forces
The central aviation issue is not the existence of "four air forces," but
whether the Services provide the appropriate mix and quantity of combat and
support aircraft meet the unified CINCs' requirements and accomplish national
objectives. Aircraft provided by all the Services permit versatile air operations in
support of the Joint Force Commander's overall warfighting objectives. The inte-
gration of the particular capabilities provided by all the Services gives the Joint
"Fortunately, during Desert Storm, the en-
emy did not choose to attack often, but in
those cases where he did, the use of CAS
was absolutely critical to the outcome of
the battle."
— General H. Norman Schwarzkopf
2-30
Chapter 1, Effective Unified Military Operations
Force Commander a highly prized degree of flexibility and synergism on the bat-
tlefield.
The successful initial attacks of the Gulf War demonstrate how these sepa-
rate capabilities can be integrated to accomplish the CINC's objectives. In the
first, attack. Air Force stealth fighters surprised vital command, control, and
commimications targets in Baghdad, while Special Operations Command (SO-
COM) Pave Low helicopters led Army attack helicopters against two air de-
fense facilities to clear a path for other allied aircraft. That first rught, the mix
of aviation capabilities from all the Services — cruise missiles, bombers based
in the United States, deployed
fighters, and a host of important
support airplanes — produced a
highly effective attack.
While we conclude that the
''four air forces" question is not a
real issue, we also note that, as
with deep attack, there are impor-
tant questions about whether the
Nation has too much combat
aviation capability overall, and
whether the current mix of com-
bat aircraft is the right one. That
is, do we have the right mix of
aircraft in terms of stealth, range,
basing (land- and sea-based), air-
to-air and air-to-ground, and all-
weather capabilities?
In Chapter 3, we address various aviation infrastructure efficiencies, the key
aspect of the true "four air forces" problem. The more efficient we can make the
infrastructure that supports the "four air forces," the smaller will be the cost pen-
alty of preserving this valuable flexibility. Our specific recommendations in the
next chapter should enable significant cost reductions.
Support the Commanders in Chief
Setting outdated "who gets to do what" arguments aside is an essential step
toward focusing on joint military capability. The real question is whether the
sets of capabilities developed by the Services to fulfill their individual visions
provide, in the aggregate, the right set of capabilities to enable the CINCs to ac-
complish their assigned missions. We address the means for resolving such
questions in Chapter 4 with our recommendations for changes in requirements
2-31
"Military air power consists of Air Force,
Navy, and Marine corps air power • . » " —
Unification and Strategy: A Report of Investi-
gation by the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, 81st Congress,
1 March 1950.
"America has only one Air Force . , . The
other Services have aviation arms essential
to their specific roles and functions but
which also work jointly to project Ameri-
ca's air power It is a potent combination,
proven over and over in combat."
— General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions,
and Functions of the Armed Forces of the
United States
Directions for Defense
and budgeting processes. But first we discuss ways of making DOD's extensive
support establishment more efficient to customers.
2-32
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
Chapter 3
Efficient and Responsive Support
During the Cold War, the United States assembled a highly capable military
force and equipped it largely by funding specialized industrial and support ac-
tivities. This "military-industrial complex" fielded the world's finest weapon
systems. It also consumed more than half of the Defense budget annually. Many
of these public- and private-sector defense support activities now use inefficient
practices because the laws, rules, and habits that have governed them over the
years are no longer appropriate. As a result, in many activities in which the De-
partment was once a leader, it has fallen behind private-sector technologies and
management techniques.
In our effort to increase efficiency and save money, we reviewed the full
spectrum of central support activities: logistics, medical, training, personnel,
headquarters, acquisition management, and installations and facilities. We con-
clude that there are major opportunities to reduce the cost of DOD's infrastruc-
ture while enhancing its effectiveness. This chapter presents specific
recommendations to that end. These specific recommendations are the result of a
review process that should continue to be used to ensure sound management
practices and responsiveness to changing circumstances.
DOD can benefit by adopting more of the innovative business practices used
in the private sector. These practices can drive down the cost of activities sup-
porting required defense capabilities and free money for needed readiness and
modemization programs. The Department can benefit from these practices by re-
lying more on the private sector for goods and services, and by pursuing these
practices in its own facilities. Our recommendations address both approaches.
Our proposed improvements are generally consistent with the Vice President's
National Performance Review competition initiatives but are focused more on
improving the Department's responsiveness and innovation. Some will require
changes in the legislation and policies that govem these activities.^
Two major opportunities should be pursued aggressively: implementing the
long-standing national policy of relying primarily on the private sector for serv-
ices that need not be performed by the government, and reengineering the re-
maining government support organizations.
^The specific legislative changes are summarized in Appendix A. While the nature of
the changes in the DOD infrastructure that flow from these recommendations could be
large enough to warrant additional rounds of formal Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) reviews, phased transitions and the need for enabling legislation preclude any
conflict with the current BRAC review or prior BRAC decisions.
3-1
Directions for Defense
Increase Reliance on Market Solutions: Outsource
Commercial Activities
Despite long-standing policy
to the contrary in Title 10 and
elsewhere, goverriment employees
perform work that could be done
as well in the private sector. The
Department of Defense annually
reports to Congress that at least
250,000 civilian employees are
performing commercial-type ac-
tivities that do not need to be performed by government personnel.^ This num-
ber exceeds the Department's estimates of the number of people who do
comparable work for DOD in the private sector.
"The Federal Government will not start or
carry on any commercial activity to pro-
vide a service or product for its own use if
such product or service can be procured
from private enterprise through ordinary
business channels."
— Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 55-4, 1955
Categories of DOD Commercial Activities
Social services
RDT&E support
Education /training
Data processing
Real property
maintenance
Health services
Base maintenance
Installation services
Product manufacturing
Other operations
Equipment maintenance
The primary path to more effi-
cient support is through "mean-
ingful competition,"^ which
typically lowers costs by 20 per-
cent for the types of commercial
activities that DOD routinely re-
ports to Congress (shown in the
box at the right). ^ In the United
States, this has been true both
when meaningful competition
was used in a previously sole-
source area and in the few cases
where private-sector companies
competed with government organizations. The British Ministry of Defence
achieved similar cost reductions during the last decade with its "market test-
ing" programs."*
We are confident our recommendations for greater use of private market
competition will lower DOD support costs and improve performance. A 20 per-
cent savings from outsourcing the Department's commercial-t5^e workload
^Department of Defense, Report on the Performance of DOD Commercial Activities,
Washington, D.C., 30 January 1995, p. 5.
^"Meaningful competition" is generally defined as that generated by a competitive
market including significant numbers of both buyers and sellers.
** Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Enhancing Government Productivity
Through Competition: A Nezu Way of Doing Business, August 1988; also Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA), Issues Concerning Public and Private Provision of Depot Maintenance, CRM
94-65, April 1994.
^ For example, see Uttley, "Competition in the Provision of Defense Support Services:
the UK Experience," in Defense Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1993.
3-2
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
would free over $3 billion per year for higher priority defense needs, such as the
equipment modernization required in the next decade.
Recommendation: Outsource all commer-
cial type support activities.
We recommend that the gov-
ernment in general, and the De-
partment of Defense in particular,
return to the basic principle that
the goverrunent should not compete with its citizens. To this end, essentially
all DOD "commercial activities'' should be outsourced, and all new needs
should be channeled to the private sector from the beginning. Congress will
need to remove the legislative impediments to full implementation of this
long-standing policy. These impediments (see Appendix A) range from arbi-
trary allocations of depot workloads to a legislated requirement for full and
open competition that conflicts with the proven private business standard of ef-
fective competition .
Outsourcing involves contracting with a private firm to supply goods and
services previously provided "in-house." It has gained popularity in the private
sector as companies focus on their own core competencies and shed ancillary ac-
tivities. A growing number of companies are providing these services — includ-
ing computing systems, payroll, security, maintenance, transportation, and the
like. While DOD already outsources many activities, the availability of a robust
market indicates that more can be done.
Outsourcing is not a universal remedy. Not everything should be done in the
private sector. The conditions for successful outsourcing are not always present,
and the government must retain certain core functions to protect the public
interest. These functions are sometimes described as "inherently governmental"^
or as those the "government must command [because they] represent the exer-
cise of sovereign power. "^ Further, there may be some specialized activities
where no private capability exists or can be reasonably developed. Such activi-
ties are obviously poor candidates for outsourcing. Finally, expanding the De-
partment's use of contract support also requires improving DOD's abilities to
create and administer those contracts, and to morutor contractor performance.
Outsourcing candidates include activities that range from routine commer-
cial support services widely available in the private sector to highly specialized
support of military weapons. For example, jarutorial companies might perform
facilities maintenance, replacing goyerr\ment custodians; or commercial software
engineering firms might upgrade computer programs for sophisticated aircraft
electronic countermeasures equipment, replacing government software special-
ists. Some of this work is contracted to the private sector already. Much more
could be.
^Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), section 7.301.
^Testimony of Dr. Donald Kettl, Senate Budget Committee, 7 March 1995.
3-3
Directions for Defense
Government activities that do not depend on specialized, defense-unique
equipment are prime candidates for early outsourcing. Included in this group
are base security, facilities maintenance and installation management services,
overhaul of widely used equipment, warehouse operations, formal classroom
training, and a broad range of other normal business support activities now per-
formed by government employees (financial services, payroll, data processing,
etc.). Most of these have little direct association with combat forces and could be
moved to private-sector markets where competition for the government's busi-
ness ensures adequate cost control.
DOD already has a very wide base of experience with outsourcing of labor-
intensive workloads — almost 200,000 work years of contracted support are re-
ported annually. For example, at the space and missile test ranges, private com-
panies run essentially all of the day-to-day infrastructure support, including
security, fire protection, real property maintenance, and related activities.
The government also has experience with contracting for support from pri-
vately owned capital-intensive support activities — not just by DOD, but also by
the Department of Energy and NASA — such as shipyards, weapons laborato-
ries, and a portion of the military's family housing. Not all of this experience has
been positive, in large part because of the difficulties in structuring appropriate
contracts and establishing meaningful competition in some specialized situa-
tions. Nevertheless, over the long term, we believe the government will benefit
from private financing, modernization, and efficient operations if it relies pri-
marily on the private sector for its capital-intensive support needs in the United
States.
Of course, these changes cannot be made overnight. Expanding the special-
ized contracting and oversight skills will require thorough planning and exten-
sive training. Some transition plans might involve interim steps in which the
government owns the facilities but contractors operate them for a fixed period
before full divestiture,
Our recommendations also require a concentrated effort by DOD to care for
its current work force. Displaced government workers must have reasonable op-
portunities for employment in the private sector, and employee pension and
benefit equities must be considered. Equally important, government profession-
als responsible for overseeing the performance of private-sector support deserve
advanced education and rewarding career paths. The Defense Acquisition Work-
force Improvement Act has produced education and career improvements for
those who manage large weapon systems programs where there is a long history
of reliance on private industry. Similar consideration will need to be given to
other government management professions, including financial management.
3-4
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
Objections
In consulting with DOD managers, we heard many objections to out-
sourcing. Often, they offered reasons why their particular areas should remain in
the government — usually accompanied by assertions of cost savings. These ob-
jections were not a surprise. Similar objections are raised inside most other or-
ganizations — public and private — when outsourcing is proposed. The
continuing growth of outsourcing in private markets and the results of academic
studies provide clear evidence that such concems are usually misplaced.
Another objection to policy-based outsourcing is an asserted "right" of gov-
ernment employees to "compete" for government work. Over the years, this con-
cept evolved into a rigid requirement for detailed and lengthy cost-based
justification before outsourcing any activity involving more than 10 government
employees. This requirement, embedded in OMB's ''A-76" Circular and in law,
is inconsistent with the basic policy preference for private enterprise. It stifles
initiative and hamstrings efforts to streamline operations.
Government procedures for public/private competitions have not resolved
the "apples to oranges" problem inherent in comparing private and government
support activities. Detailed comparisons of the likely costs of future activities be-
tween public and private entities still founder on the lack of comparable ac-
counting systems, incompatible profit/loss mechanisms, and the uncertainty of
future workloads.^ Additional objections include allegations that contracted sup-
port is too unreliable. Our research indicates that these concerns are not well
founded. When suitable contracts are used, private industry is just as reliable as
goverrunent operations.
Finally, the largest practical obstacles to outsourcing involve community
fears that these initiatives will disrupt lives and economies. For this reason, we
emphasize the need to plan carefully and to fully consider the interests of gov-
ernment employees and communities.
Recommendation: Outsource new support
requirements.
After careful consideration of
the objections presented to us, we
urge the Department to proceed
without delay to make reliance on
private-sector support activities a central tenet of the Department's policies.
The Secretary should direct outsourcing of existing commercial-type support
activities and all new support requirements, particularly the depot-level logis-
tics support of new and future weapon systems.
^Coopers and Lybrand, Preliminary Case Studies of Public Versus Private Competition,
July 1994: Also the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance
Management, April 1994.
3-5
Directions for Defense
DOD managers at all levels
must be empowered to make
sound business decisions based
on broad poliq^ guidance, rather
than on detailed rules. Therefore,
we also recommend that (1) OMB
withdraw the A-76 Circular; (2)
Congress repeal or amend specific
legislative restrictions summarized in Appendix A; and (3) the Secretary ex-
tend to all commercial-type support activities where there is adequate private-
sector competition DOD's current policy of avoiding formal public/private de-
pot competitions.
We make more detailed outsourcing recommendations in the following
pages.
Depot Maintenance
Even after the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure actions, the Services will
own and operate some 20 depots and shipyards to perform 70 percent of the in-
dustrial work required for depot-level periodic maintenance, remanufacturing,
or modification of U.S. military equipment.
These depot practices date back to times when only government arsenals had
the technical ability to produce and maintain sophisticated defense equipment.
Since World War II, however, private-sector capabilities have increased signifi-
cantly and the Department of Defense has relied on the private sector for pro-
duction of most new major weapon systems. The growth of this capability,
together with the strength of the U.S. industrial base, makes it possible to rely far
more heavily on the private sector for efficient and effective depot-level mainte-
nance.
However, the collection of
laws, regulations, and historic
practices developed to protect the
government's depot maintenance
capacity has stymied outsourcing.
One impediment is how the Services set ''core" requirements for in-house
maintenance capacity. In many cases, their methodology would set "require-
ments" that exceed the real needs of the national security strategy. This prac-
tice artificially supports the current legislatively protected government depot
capacity.^
^Service Briefings to the Commission on Roles and Missions Staff, December
1994 -January 1995.
Recommendation: OMB withdraw Circu-
lar A-76; Congress repeal or amend legisla-
tive restrictions; DOD extend to all
commercial-type activities a policy of
avoiding public/ private competition where
adequate private-sector competition exists.
Recommendation: DOD move to a depot
maintenance system relying on the private
sector.
3-6
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
With proper oversight, private contractors could provide essentially all of the
depot-level maintenance services now conducted in government facilities within
the United States. This includes any "standby" surge capacity that may be
needed. Private competitive practices (including market-driven innovation)
should reduce operating costs and provide equal or greater responsiveness.
Private contractors have always provided depot-level support for weapon
systems early in their life cycles and, in some cases, from "cradle to grave." Al-
though "surging" of depot repair activity is no longer planned as a major factor
in assuring sufficient equipment for our combat forces, private depot contractors
and subcontractors have demonstrated responsiveness when asked. Desert
Storm provided examples of contractors' abilities and willingness to surge their
U.S. depot support for the Navy's Tomahawk missile program and the Army's
Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR).
We recommend that the Department make the transition to a depot mainte-
nance system relying mostly on the private sector. DOD should retain organic
depot capability only where private-sector alternatives are not available and can-
not be developed reasonably. The latter case may include existing weapon sys-
tems with only short service lives remaining.
New Systems
We recommend that Congress
remove the impediments to con-
tracting with private firms for lo-
gistics support of all new weapon
systems. In some cases, long-term
support can be included in original, competitively awarded contracts. The
Army has had good experience with such support for its Mobile Subscriber
Equipment, and the Navy with its Tomahawk missiles.
In most cases, the government will need to establish a "level playing field"
for competing depot support between the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) and other potential suppliers. To this end, DOD policy must ensure the
early purchase of the technical data rights required for competition. Ensuring
that prime contractors provide access to essential technical data should be the re-
sponsibility of the defense acquisition executive who has milestone decision
authority for the weapon system.
Recommendation: Direct support of all
new systems to competitive private con-
tractors.
^°Data rights refers to the ownership of the data required for production or repair of a
specific weapon system. Frequently, portions of such data are proprietary. To conduct a
competition for maintenance, the appropriate data must be available to all potential com-
petitors — otherwise there can be no meaningful competition.
3-7
Directions for Defense
Fielded Systems
When DOD owns sufficient technical data to permit private / private compe-
tition, a time-phased plan should be established to shift ongoing DOD depot
support to the private sector for systems already in use. For some systems that
are in or past the production phase, data rights issues or the cost of needed tool-
ing may prohibit the full benefits of competition. In these cases, DOD should at-
tempt to acquire the needed technical data rights, including taking appropriate
legal action.
In those few cases where es-
tablishing competition between
private facilities would be too
costly, the alternatives are either
to establish competition between
the government depot and the OEM, or to compete the private management
and operation (or ownership) of the non-proprietary portions of the existing
government depot, as discussed below.
Public-private competitions, however imperfect, are generally preferable to
non-competitive sole source contracts, public or private, for long-term support.
To permit more equitable competition between public and private sectors for
those few cases where private/private competition cannot be established (and to
improve cost management), DOD must develop a financial accounting system
that permits accurate comparisons of total costs between existing depots and
OEMs and must recognize that the fundamental disparity between public and
private profit/loss mechanisms precludes a fully level playing field.
Recommendation: Establish a time-phased
plan to privatize essentially all existing
depot-level maintenance.
Depot Facilities
The privatization-in-place concept recognizes the value of a highly skilled
work force at heavily capitalized military depot facilities as assets in the com-
mercial market place. Effective transitions will be difficult, but the benefits will
be worthwhile. These transitions could involve an outright sale to a private
buyer or could include an interim fixed period of government ownership and
contractor operation (GOCO), or possibly some form of employee ownership.
Because these "privatized" depots would have significant expertise, they may
compete successfully for other types of work and become successful businesses.
DOD is experienced at closing
facilities through the Base Rea-
lignment and Closure (BRAC)
process, but it has little experience
with privatizing facilities and
Recommendation: Create an office xinder
the ASD (Economic Security) to oversee
privatization of depots.
^ving federal employees to the private sector on the scale envisioned here.
3-8
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
Therefore, we recommend establishing an office under the Assistant Secretary
for Economic Security to ensure that appropriate legislation is prepared and
that policies and procedures are established, and to oversee the DOD-wide fa-
cility privatization effort.
Materiel Supply Management
The materiel supply segment of the overall DOD logistics support infrastruc-
ture includes the processes required to acquire and deliver supplies to the oper-
ating forces. This major industrial support enterprise involves the
wholesale-level management of inventories in excess of $77 billion and annual
direct spending of more than $22 billion ($4 billion for operations, $18 billion for
inventory purchases). Major activities include estimating required quantities,
purchasing and storing inventories, processing orders, distribution, and dispos-
ing of excess materiel.
In the commercial world, competitive pressures and customer demand are
causing private companies to optimize logistics support processes. This routinely
results in shorter cycle times, as shown in Figure 3-1, and inventory reductions
of 25 percent. This is much better than DOD has done. Currently only about a
quarter of DOD's operating expenses in this area go to the private sector, and
most of that pays for transportation. There is significant opportunity to take
greater advantage of private-sector efficiencies, including the provision of any
needed "surge" capacity.
100
90 -
80 -
70
I 60
I 50
• 40
• 30
20
10
0
WORLD CLASS BENCHMARK
48 Hour Guarantee
98% Reliability
DOD HIGH PRIORITY
3 Day Standard
Avg 1 1 Day Performance
■ llllliiiiiiii ■■■■■■
^ 0 Days Elapsed ^0
30
Wholesale Supply System Performance
for High Priority, In-Stock Repair Parts
Figure 3-1. Wholesale Supply System Performance for High Priority,
In-Stock Repair Parts
Delaney, R., Cass Logistics Inc., "It's All About Time," Fifth Annual Conference, Na-
tional Press Club, 6 Jime 1994,
3-9
Directions for Defense
Actions to outsource additional materiel supply operations should center on
the residual functions likely to remain "in house" after wholesale logistics sup-
port of weapon systems is shifted to the private sector. The Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) is pursuing initiatives to improve its response to customers and
reduce the cost of managing the 15 percent of the Department's materiel value
within its purview. These initiatives focus on reducing supply cycle times
through a variety of contemporary management techniques such as electronic
cataloging, order tracking, and direct delivery to DOD users by private suppli-
ers. They also include additional reliance on the private sector. For example,
DLA plans to increase the use of direct delivery from private suppliers to DLA's
customers from 25 to 50 percent of the value of DLA's "sales."
Recommendation: Outsource selected ma-
terial management activities.
Despite the Department's ini-
tiatives, current plans still call for
over 20,000 government employ-
ees to continue to operate about 40
separate cataloging activities, inventory management activities, and ware-
houses after the turn of the century. Operation and eventual ownership of
most of these activities and facilities should be shifted to the private sector in
the same manner that we recommend for maintenance depots.
Medical Care
Providing superior medical
support to our military forces is
the "core competency" of the De-
partment's military medical estab-
lishment. Inadequate medical care
can compromise combat opera-
tions. Serious deficiencies were
documented in the medical capa-
bilities deployed during the Gulf
War,^^ and there is recent evidence
that these medical readiness prob-
lems persist. Accordingly, operational readiness must be the unequivocal top
medical priority. Our recommendations are designed to facilitate structuring a
military medical system that ensures wartime readiness, keeps the fighting
force healthy in peacetime, maintains expertise in military-related medical
specialties, attracts and retains high-quality medical professionals, and still
meets the Department's commitments to the beneficiaries.
Recommendation: Any changes in the
military medical program must adhere
strictly to the principle that the total DOD
medical system must ensure high accessi-
bility to quality care for all beneficiaries
(including the Medicare- eligible) at no cost
to active duty personnel, at no increased
cost on average to active duty families, and
at reasonable cost to retirees and their
families.
^^The shortfalls in medical readiness revealed during Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm included ill-prepared bum units, lack of field training of doctors and nurses, major
equipment shortages, and outdated drugs and other supplies, as reported by the DOD In-
spector General and G AO.
3-10
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
In pursuing these goals, and in recognizing that the current peacetime medi-
cal establishment is larger than is needed to support likely wartime require-
ments, DOD should maintain military medical manpower and facilities at or
above a level that should be established by determining the total resources
needed to support either planned wartime needs (currently two nearly simulta-
neous MRCs) or projected routine peacetime operations, whichever is greater.
Recommendation: Reemphasize the pri-
macy of medical support to military opera-
tions.
If the "two MRC criterion is
used, calculations would include
estimating manpower and facili-
ties to support theater require-
ments, sufficient capacity in the
United States to support nondeployed forces and returning casualties, and
continued support of families located outside the country and in remote areas.
If the "peacetime operational missions" criterion is used, calculations would
include estimating medical resources to support active duty personnel, whether
deployed or in the United States; active duty families located outside the country
and in remote areas; training, including appropriate graduate medical education;
and a rotation base.
Recommendation: Establish uruforai proce-
dures for sizing the Department's opera-
tional medical needs.
We recommend that the Secre-
tary establish uniform procedures
to guide the Services in determin-
ing their medical needs to support
operational requirements. Care should be taken to ensure that the remaining
system can recruit and retain the mix and skills of medical specialists needed
for operational missions.
Medical care for the families of U.S. military personnel and for retirees and
their families is extremely important, but it does not have to be provided solely
through military facilities (and historically it has not been). These beneficiaries
now rely on a mix of direct and private care. We believe this practice should con-
tinue, but with greater choice provided to the beneficiaries. If beneficiaries
choose to use more private care, as most surveys suggest they would, reduced
demand for military care would permit downsizing the peacetime military medi-
cal establishment — but not below the operationally driven "floor" discussed
above.^^ This shift in workload would allow increased attention to wartime
medical readiness by the military medical establishment.
^^The Department of Defense, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, "733" War-
time Medical Requirements study reported a maximum requirement for 6,000 active com-
ponent physicians. Under the current FYDP, there will be 12,500 physicians on active
duty in FY 2001. In a January 1995 meeting of the military medical community, the Joint
Staff representative referred to the 6,000 physician requirement as a ceiling, not a floor.
"RAND Military Health Care Survey, done in conjunction with the "733 " study.
3-11
Directions for Defense
When the use of private-sector medical facilities is expanded, the needs and
desires of the families of active duty personnel, and of retirees and their families,
must receive attention. This is in the best interest of the beneficiaries and the
govemment. However, v^e also believe that any changes in the military medical
program must adhere strictly to the principle that the total DOD medical system
must ensure high accessibility to quaUty care for all beneficiaries (including the
Medicare-eligible) at no cost to active duty personnel, at no increased cost on av-
erage to active duty families, and at reasonable cost to retirees and their families.
In peacetime, military medical personnel should be assigned first to care for
the active duty population and active duty families in remote areas and outside
the United States, and second to training and military-specific research. Even if
medical manning approached the minimum level discussed above, the number
of medical personnel required to maintain the health of the active component
and provide a rotation base, coupled with managed-care principles, will make it
possible to provide direct care to some non-active duty beneficiaries. In the long
term, we expect more medical care to be provided by civilian sources, with the
DOD medical establishment being reduced accordingly. The legislative changes
needed are summarized in Appendix A.
We strongly endorse the Department's TRICARE program as an important
step to a total quality medical program that places increased reliance on civilian
providers to improve access for military families and other beneficiaries.^"* How-
ever, TRICARE currently does not provide the degree of choice needed to estab-
lish a competitive environment that will foster more efficient health care. Nor
does it provide sufficient access and choice to beneficiaries living outside Mili-
tary Treatment Facility catchment areas or to those who previously used military
facilities closed by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. We rec-
ommend that DOD expand TRICARE by sponsoring a competitive civilian
health care plan (such as the options offered by the Federal Employees Health
Care Benefit Program) at equal cost to the beneficiary in order to increase access
and choice and decrease the demand for direct care.
Increasing efficiency while re-
sponding to the needs of benefici-
aries requires an environment that
rewards appropriate consumer be-
havior. Experience shows that offering services free of charge, as DOD does,
will increase consumption of those services regardless of whether they are es-
sential. Conversely, offering the same services for a modest fee reduces discre-
tionary use of nonessential services.^^ This system also allows providers to
TRICARE is the Department of Defense-managed health care program that offers
beneficiaries three options — a Military Treatment Facility-based HMO type, traditional
CHAMPUS, or a CHAMPUS Preferred Provider Plan.
^^RAND Health Insurance Experiment, J.P. Newhouse and Insurance Experiment
Group, Harvard, 1993.
Recommendation: Increase access to
private-sector medical care.
3-12
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
estimate more accurately the amount and type of care required to support the
covered population.
Recommendation: Require users of DOD
care to enroll, set a fee structure, and insti-
tute a medical allowance for active duty
families.
We recommend that DOD re-
quire beneficiaries who choose to
use ;nnilitary medicine to enroll in
the DOD-sponsored health care
plan of their choice. This will in-
crease efficiency without limiting
access. In addition, we recommend establishing a reasonable fee structure for
care received by non-active duty beneficiaries through all DOD-sponsored
sources. To offset fees for active duty families, we recommend providing a
regular medical allQwance equal to the average out-of-pocket costs to a family.
We recognize that shifting families and retirees from direct medical care to
more fully support military operational needs will require a major cultural
change. Cor\sequently, we urge a measured approach to build trust and commit-
ment within the military community.
Other Outsourcing Opportunities
The outsourcing candidates discussed above were the main focus of our re-
search into the benefits of increasing reliance on the private sector. We also iden-
tified several other opportunities that should be pursued by the Department.
Family Housing
The operation and mainte- l ^^^^™™™*"
nance of military family housing Recommendation: Outsource family hous-
is similar to the operation of any "^S' ^"^^^^^ accounting, data center
large rental facility -an activity operations, education and training, and
for which there is a large and || base infrastmcture operations.
competitive market. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, actual ownership of housing could be productively
transferred to the private sector to help finance badly needed repairs and up-
grades. Actions in this area must not undermine confidence in the Departmen-
t's commitment to provide access to affordable housing. In this regard we
endorse the Department's recent legislative proposal and the efforts of the
Secretary's Task Force on the Quality of Life to actively pursue this irutiative.
3-13
Directions for Defense
Finance and Accounting
Many large businesses today contract for their finance and accounting opera-
tions because specialized firms can do the work more efficiently. Several of these
functions are manpower-intensive, such as payroll and pension benefit distribu-
tion. The private sector has achieved significant productivity gains through auto-
mation. We recognize that this idea has been studied before and that reforms to
DOD processes and data bases may be necessary before outsourcing competi-
tions can be held. Nevertheless, the Department should begin.
Data Center Operations
The Department maintains extensive computer operations capability, in ad-
dition to numerous computer support and software development activities. The
Defense Information Systems Agency is making strides towards eliminating su-
perfluous capacity and redundant systems but is still planning to keep several
government "mega centers'' conducting commercial-type activities. We believe
that the Department can more rapidly accelerate the use of private-sector com-
puter expertise for data support operations and software development. There is a
large and growing private-sector move for outsourcing information systems, and
the results have been positive. For example, British Petroleum recently reported
a 25 percent savings two years after outsourcing its information systems.
Education and Training
The Department retains a large in-house education and training infrastruc-
ture to conduct training in unique military skills. The Military Services have out-
sourced some training, including some specialized functions such as pilot
training and aircraft simulator operation and maintenance. We believe that more
should be done.
Base Management and Infrastructure
Managing a military base requires a number of routine, non-military infra-
structure functions that are better left to the private sector. Several legislative
impediments — such as prohibitions on outsourcing security and firefighting
tasks — should be eliminated.
Reengineering DOD Support Activities
Some DOD support functions must remain in the government to protect the
public interest (such as overseeing the contracting for outsourced and privatized
3-14
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
work) or because the support involves combat dangers (such as deploying ele-
ments of operational support airlift).
While performance has improved over the years, DOD support activities can
still benefit from private-sector management irmovations. Many of these changes
are characterized by ''buzzwords" such as TQM, business process reengineering,
and risk management. Behind the buzzwords are feats of real, change docu-
mented by the Department of Commerce Baldrige Quality Awards, the National
Performance Review, and a host of business publications.
Some DOD elements are engaged in reengineering already, but much more
can be done. At a minimum, existing impediments to the Department's efforts at
"reinventing'' its support organizations should be removed, including Federal
personnel regulations that prevent managers from adopting irmovative manage-
ment systems. Furthermore, DOD should accelerate introduction of management
techniques proven in the private sector, such as benchmarking^^ and integrated
product/process teams.
Streamline Central Logistics Support
DOD has five logistics systems — one each for the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA), the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force. DLA buys and
manages the $12 billion inventory of fuel, clothing, food, and other "consum-
able" supplies and repair parts used, by all the Services. The Services have re-
sponsibility for buying the $65 billion inventory of high-value repair parts
(radars, jet engines, etc.) needed to support their respective weapon systems.
The management systems and performance data used by DLA and by the
Services are sufficiently different to make detailed assessments of the relative ef-
fectiveness of their management practices impractical. However, in general, the
DLA, with centralized authority over purchasing, stocking, and delivery, has
been more able than the Services to apply modern integrated product/process
team management methods (including standardized information systems).
These techniques have helped improve DLA customer responsiveness in terms
of shorter cycle times and lower total costs.
The Services, with decentralized organizations using different information
systems, and with separate responsibilities for key parts of the process, appear to
be making relatively less progress in achieving industry performance bench-
marks. Their repair depots generally try to level the workload, while the trans-
portation system tries to minimize its costs by batch-loading. Managed in
isolation, these factors drive up inventory costs for the most expensive types of
supplies. Only in cases where the Services have contracted with private vendors
^^Benchmarking is the use of the best that is being done by other organizations per-
forming a similar function.
3-15
for "turnkey'' support have the benefits of a fully integrated logistics process
been realized. Examples of such successes include the Army's Mobile Subscriber
Equipment (MSE) radios, the Navy's Tomahawk missiles, and the Air Force's
U-2s.
Past studies of this issue raised the possibility that transferring the responsi-
bility for managing the inventory of high-value parts to DLA could save signifi-
cant inventory costs through better integration of inventory and transportation
management. We did not attempt to make a specific estimate of such potential
savings. Furthermore, increased centralization of wholesale logistics support,
unless carefully managed and responsively implemented, could run counter to
our primary recommendation that in the future, essentially all weapon systems
wholesale-level support be provided by the private, sector.
The latter point leads to a central dilemma whose resolution is very impor-
tant to DOD's future efficiency. That dilemma is the assigrunent of organiza-
tional responsibility for life-cycle support of weapon systems. On one hand,
"turnkey" contracts for prime equipment such as for the Army's MSE, managed
by Service long-term Program Management Offices, have proven to be highly ef-
ficient and responsive. Arguments that cite the advantages of the buying power
of centralized support organizations such as DLA certainly dominate for bulk
supplies such as fuel. They are less persuasive for the expensive parts that are
largely unique to Service weapon systems and that need to be managed as part
of a life-cycle program of periodic maintenance and planned upgrades. On bal-
ance, we believe the potential benefits of outsourcing essentially all wholesale-
level support for weapon systems should receive greater priority than consolida-
tion of the management of just their repair parts.
However, real opportunities exist for the early streamlining of support for
many weapon systems within the existing organizational arrangements. Some
specific recommendatioris are provided in the Aviation Infrastructure portion of
this chapter. Other elements of the organizational problem are addressed in
Chapter 4.
Streamline Acquisition Organizations
Activity levels in the defense acquisition system have dropped dramatically
since the end of the Cold War, as have inventories of fielded equipment. Budget
authority for procurement fell by 55 percent in six years, from $99 billion in Fis-
cal Year (FY) 1988 to $46 billion in FY 1994. The Department's acquisition work
force declined by only 25 percent in the same period and is not scheduled to
reach a 40 percent reduction until 2001. In addition, the private sector of the de-
fense industry has uridertaken large-scale reorganizations, mergers, and divesti-
tures to accommodate decreased workload.
3-16
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
However, there has been r\o corresponding reduction in the number of DOD
acquisition organizations. The Military Departments continue to maintain re-
dundant staffs and facilities for many types of common acquisition support ac-
tivities. Further, the existence of separate Service-unique acquisition
organizations encourages Service-unique programs at the expense of promising
joint approaches.
We considered consolidating all acquisition functions into a unified organi-
zation but found that separating those functions from their operational elements
would introduce additional risk for only modest gain. Instead, we recommend
collocating similar program offices and consolidating those particular acquisi-
tion support activities where there is the widest duplication across Service
and/or agency lines, the highest potential savings, and the greatest opportimity
to encourage cooperation. The Department's aviation acquisition organizations
constitute the prime candidates for this initiative, as discussed later in this chap-
ter.
Streamline Aviation Infrastructure
The putative, "four air forces''
issue is often cited as an example
of unnecessary duplication among
the Armed Forces. The opera-
tional aspects of this question are
discussed in Chapter 2. Here, we
address the opportimities to cut
the cost of the duplicative aircraft
support systems. If the DOD avia-
tion infrastructure supporting the
operational aviation imits were more efficient, then we could retain the mili-
tary benefits from operating aircraft in each Service without the current cost
penalty.
Our specific recommendations for reengineering the Department's aviation
support activities are provided below.
Aviation Acquisition Support
As noted earlier, consolidating
the support to aviation acquisition
projects will save money and en-
courage cooperation. We recom-
mend the collocation of all Army,
Navy, and Air Force program management offices responsible for
"Another source of economy will be the
pooling of facilities and personnel in locali-
ties where at present both Services have to
operate, but where from the nature of the
circumstances, facilities and personnel are
not fully used."
— President Harry S Truman, Message to
Congress, 19 December 1945
Recommendation: Collocate aircraft pro-
gram management offices, and consolidate
aircraft procurement support.
3-17
Directions for Defense
development, production, and support of military aircraft and related equip-
ment. Common acquisition support needs such as engineering, contracting,
and cost estimating would be met from a consolidated-pool of support person-
nel assigned to program offices as needed. Personnel for this consolidated
pool would be transferred from the Services' materiel and systems commands,
with a net savings expected after a period of transition.
Three key elements of this recommendation are illustrated in Figure 3-2.
First, although collocated, existing aviation acquisition organizations would re-
tain their Service ties to preserve the links between the users and the providers.
Second, program managers would continue to reside in their respective Services
but be able to draw from a common pool of technical and procurement support.
And third, while we recommend estabUshing a joint office to handle administra-
tive matters, its specific functioning would be worked out by the Service Acqui-
sition Executives and their Aviation Program Executive Officers. There would be
no intervening layer of management between program managers and their sup-
port organization.
This consolidation of technical support and collocation of program manage-
ment offices will achieve the following:
• Cut overhead. Maintaining separate organizations in different locations inevi-
tably involves overhead that DOD cannot afford.
• Further streamline the chain of command. The 1986 Packard Commission recom-
mended a streamlined acquisition chain of command that shifted responsi-
bility from the Service materiel commands to the Program Manager (PM),
Program Executive Officer (PEO), and the Service Acquisition Executive
chain. Moving the Program Manager's technical and business support per-
sonnel into this chain would be another step toward fully implementing the
Packard Commission recommendations.
• Encourage joint approaches. The lack of common equipment and subsystems
across the Services has long been seen as excessively costly. On the other
hand, the Department's record with joint programs is also poor. Dictating re-
quirements from the top failed in the TFX/F-111 program. Purely coopera-
tive approaches have also failed repeatedly, in part because having
separately supported Service acquisition organizations encourages the devel-
opment of Service-unique requirements. This recommendation facilitates
joint approaches to satisfying operational requirements, because the same set
of experts will support all Service aircraft programs and the program offices
will be physically closer together. It should also lead to increased interoper-
ability and lower support costs among the Services through increased com-
monality in the many subsystems that require parts and service in the field.
3-18
• Take advantage ofBRAC actions. The BRAC process has already approved relo-
cation of the Naval Air Systems Command, and DOD's proposed relocation
of the Army Aviation and Troop Command is currently being considered by
BRAC 95.
Army SAE
Navy SAE
AF SAE
Program
managers
Program
managers
Program
managers
Common Support and Technical Services
Joint Administrative Office
Figure 3-2. Common Support for Collocated Service Aviation Agencies
We believe that similar advantages could be gained from the collocation of
program offices and consolidation of support of other multi-Service programs
such as tactical ground attack guided weapons, surface-to-air guided weapons,
and ground and airborne radar and electronic surveillance systems.
Finally, this organizational redesign would not inhibit long-term research
and development innovation. But it would encourage cross-fertilization of ideas
and wider dissemination of the most successful approaches.
An extension of this concept would be not merely to collocate, but to consoli-
date more program offices of systems that cross Service lines. This would further
reduce some overhead, improve planning and scheduling, and further encour-
age the use of common mission equipment. Retaining Service funding and repre-
sentation would maintain the link to the Service users.
A logical place to begin implementing this concept is the C-130 program.
Currently, the Air Force (and its Reserve components), the Marine Corps (and
its Reserve), the Navy Reserve, the Coast Guard, and SOCOM all use the
3-19
Directions for Defense
aircraft. As a pilot program, the
Department should create a joint
C-130 program office to oversee
all aspects of that aircraft pro-
gram.
Recommendation: Consider collocation
and consolidation of other weapon system
program offices.
Aviation Inter-Servicing
In addition to the opportunities for reengineering the elements of the avia-
tion infrastructure that support the acquisition of new aircraft, there are opportu-
nities to streanaline the support of aircraft already in service. In particular, this
applies to the planning and management of depot-level maintenance, which is
now largely managed independently by each Service.
Although aircraft maintenance management activities in the Services do not
always deal with identical systems, there is sufficient similarity in several areas
to warrant increased inter-Servicing (i.e., the support of one Service's aircraft by
another Service's depot). For example, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
fixed-wing depots and depot support contractors have similar repair capabilities
for aircraft components, avionics, engines, and airframes.^^ Yet, inter-Servicing
is currently practiced on only 8 percent of the workload identified as available
forit.^^
Lack of trust and reliance on ip==a^=Bs=s=^sssa^s^s=ss!
consensus among participating Recommendation: Establish single man-
Services have limited the efforts to agement elements for planrung and allocat-
attain the full benefits of inter- routine fixed-wing and rotary-wing
Servicing. In order to reduce these aircraft maintenance,
barriers, we recommend that the liiB^^BasBaB^^sBBSBaB^^Bsa
Secretary of Defense designate single management elements (SMEs) to oversee
servicing of specific categories of aircraft.
Although there are several possible organizational forms for the SME, we
recommend designating an SME for fixed-wing aircraft depot-level maintenance
and an SME for rotary-wing depot work. The SMEs should have authority, de-
fined by the Secretary, to determine the location of routine maintenance work
and the extent of the investments and divestments in equipment and facilities,
and to develop incentives and performance measures to ensure responsiveness.
SME decisions should be treated as authoritative in the Service planrung and
budgeting process.
^® Working Group Report, Joint Working Group on Fixed-Wing Aviation Depots,
6 June 1994.
Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy,
Programs and Resources, 7220.9 Database.
3-20
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
A small staff, including Service representatives, should support each SME.
Control of funding, requirements, facilities, and weapon systems management
processes need not be changed in order to implement the SME concept. As
DOD's outsourcing of depot maintenance proceeds, the management focus of
the SME would shift from allocating work among public facilities to contract
management and oversight of private farms.
Finally, we note that depot maintenance management is only one element in
the DOD's aviation infrastructure where the SME concept would yield benefits.
As the concept matures, the Department should consider expanding the SME
concept to other support activities, such as test and evaluation.
Operational Support Airlift Aircraft
Another element of the Department's aviation infrastructure, the operational
support airlift (OSA) fleet, is overdue for streamlining. While concern about the
size, ownership, and employment of the OSA fleet is not a new issue, all previ-
ous attempts to reduce the OSA fleet, or even limit its growth, have been unsuc-
cessful.
But some Services say they
need even more OSA aircraft. OSA
aircraft are used by the Services
for day-to-day support and execu-
tive travel, exclusive of those
maintained in the 89th Airlift
Wing, which supports the legisla-
tive and executive branches. The
Department's policy is that OSA
aircraft must be justified on the
basis of wartime requirements;
but during peacetime they can be
used to provide essential training
for operational personnel, cost-
effective seasoning of pilots, and other logistic needs.^^ While the number of
OSA aircraft is supposed to be based on wartime requirements, we find no
evidence that this policy is being followed. Today there are too many OSA air-
craft because of the lack of inter-Service cooperation, congressional enthusi-
asm for the purchase of additional specific aircraft not requested by DOD,
"hiding" these aircraft in categories other than OSA, and "wartime require-
ments" estimates that greatly exceed recent wartime experience. We recom-
mend changes to eliminate excess capacity and save money.
Department of Defense Directive 4500.43, 30 October 1985; p. 1.
3-21
"Currently, about 500 aircraft operated by
aU four Services and the Coast Guard are
dedicated to OSA ... the size of this fleet
and the overlap in support functions com-
pelled us to look for a way to achieve fur-
ther cost savings . . . OSA aircraft are in
excess of wartime needs and should be re-
duced."
— General Colin Powell's, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles and Mis-
sions and Functions of the Armed Forces,
February 1993
Directions for Defense
Current OSA inventory is 10 times that of
AOR Desert Storm use
Current OSA
Inventory
Actual Desert
Storm Use
551
59
100%
10.71%
But some Services say they need even more
OSA aircraft
All 551 OSA aircraft (whether
referred to as OSA or by any other
Service-unique term or definition)
with the exception of the Navy
C-9s should be assigned to the Air
Force. USTRANSCOM should
manage and schedule the result-
ing OSA fleet in support of all the
Services and the CINCs, and coor-
dinate the scheduling of Navy
C-9s, to ensure optimum use of
the entire OSA fleet. We also recommend that, in order to minimize hardships,
the Services plan a period of transition for Army and Navy and Marine Corps
pilots whose current aircraft are being transferred to the Air Force. We further
recommend that, after consolidation, the Air Force and the Navy reduce the
size of the OSA fleet to a level required by realistic estimates of wartime needs,
or for the seasoning of aircrews for Air Force strategic airlift, tanker, and
bomber aircraft, whichever is
larger. We also recommend the in-
creased use of Air Reserve Com-
ponents in OSA operations to gain
further savings.
Recommendation: Assign all OSA aircraft
(except Navy C-9s) to the Air Force imder
TRANSCOM management; reduce the fleet
to real wartime needs.
Streamline Acquisition Oversight
As now carried out, oversight of acquisition programs costs too much and
drives up the price of contracts for goods and services.
The Admirustration has undertaken a major irutiative to reform the defense
acquisition process to reduce the cost of doing business and increase DOD's ac-
cess to commercial products, services, and technology. We strongly support this
initiative and do not recommend additional changes to the acquisition process
other than those in Chapter 4 directed toward improving the requirements proc-
ess. However, we believe that there are major opportunities for streamlining the
existing contracting and audit processes.
The Department of Defense contracts annually for nearly $50 billion in goods
and services. Professional management of this spending is an important respon-
sibility that must be performed largely by government employees to protect the,
public interest. However, many regulatory and oversight processes produce
more burden than benefit. In particular, many requirements are driven by legis-
lation that directs DOD to conduct business using rules different from those
3-22
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
followed by private industry. The result is an estimated 18 percent^^ increase in
the cost of products and services purchased by the Department, compared to
similar products and services purchased by private buyers. We therefore recom-
mend that DOD revise its acquisition regulations and practices to encourage
greater acceptance of private business management practices while still provid-
ing adequate protection of the public interest.
The DOD contracting process
is governed by the Federal Acqui-
sition Regulation (FAR), the De-
fense FAR Supplement (DFARS),
and implementing and supple-
menting regulations of the Military Departments and defense agencies. Over
the years, the Federal regulations have built up, one upon another, each per-
haps reasonable in itself, but in total producing an excessively burdensome
structure — despite efforts at streamlining in recent years. We believe that a
new ''zero based" review would help eliminate rules not required by statute or
needed to ensure adequately standardized government business practices.
In addition to reducing the burden on the private sector through the stream-
lining of the Department's contracting rules and practices, there are opportuni-
ties to reduce the direct cost of government oversight.
Over 21,000 people are employed by two separate defense agencies to ad-
minister and audit the Department's contracts with private industry.
• About 16,000 are in the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC),
inspecting and accepting products and processes, authorizing payments to
contractors, and performing a wide variety of other contract admirdstration
activities, mostly in contractor facilities. These are in addition to the numer-
ous government program management personnel.
• The balance, about 5,000, are in the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA),
providing accounting and financial advisory services to all DOD procure-
ment and contract administration activities. Additional persormel in the
Service audit and Inspector General (IG) offices, in the DOD IG offices, and
in GAO also perform acquisition oversight functions.
All organizations aim to ensure that the government obtains the best value for its
money, but we believe that these functions can be reduced without impairing ef-
fectiveness.
This is the average estimate of increased contractor's costs (i.e., total costs minus
materiel costs) as a result of government-unique oversight. The DOD Cost Premium: A
Quantitative Assessment, December 1994, Coopers and Lybrand and TASC.
3-23
Recommendation: Conduct a zero-based
review of the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions.
Directions for Defense
DOD should take the following steps:
• Centralize acquisition audit planning. Currently, multiple Federal agencies of-
ten audit or review the same data. Redundant requests for information can
be reduced through improved coordination, particularly if the coordination
is enhanced through the use of electronic planning and auditing techniques.
• Coordinate the work of government auditors with the work of contractors' internal
and external auditors. Contractor and government auditors do significant
amounts of similar work, much of which is not considered by the other party
in audit planning and execution.
• Permit defense contractors to use modem commercial activity-based cost accounting
systems to meet the government's needs for cost data. This would allow managers
to make more informed decisions and help the government deal more easily
with the allocation of costs to DOD contracts.
• Establish "stretch'' goals for further reducing oversight and audit resources to below
currently planned levels. Current staffing plans assume that the existing regu-
latory environment will continue unchanged. Although oversight staffs are
generally coming down, the reductions reflect declining procurement activ-
ity only. However, DOD's new initiatives, and the proposals contained in
this report, should permit improvements in productivity. An additional
2 percent per year reduction in oversight auditing and regulatory staffs ap-
pears to be a suitable initial target.
• Apply cost-benefit analysis to any new or additional procurement oversight/auditing
activity that may be proposed. The cost of oversight to both the government and
the contractor is often unrecognized. Cost-benefit analysis should be re-
quired, to balance the potential benefits of new oversight with its potential
costs. Taking this step would help promote a more cost-effective "risk man-
agement" approach while reducing inefficient "risk avoidance" procedures.
Additionally, costs could be reduced by relying on the private sector for
those oversight support services that do not require performance by govemment
employees to protect the public interest. This shift would achieve the benefits of
competition and allow more flexibility to better match resources with changing
workload requirements. A prime candidate for outsourcing is DCAA's incurred-
cost audit function, which represents 35 percent of that agency's workload and
can be performed by commercial auditing firms. Other candidates include ele-
ments of DCMC's quality assurance, engineering support, production support,
and property management fxmctions.
Finally, in examining the DOD management structure that governs the fore-
going activities, we found that the acquisition auditing and oversight functions
in the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract
3-24
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
Management Conunand (DCMC) could benefit from consolidation. Both main-
tain large staffs in contractor plants as well as regional and national headquar-
ters.
We therefore recommend con-
solidating DCAA and DCMC into
a single organization reporting to
the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology [USD(A&T)]. Consolidation should simplify the
oversight of contractors and move toward DOD's long-standing goal of pre-
senting "a single face to industry."
Recommendation: Consolidate DCAA and
DCMC under USD(A&T).
Restructure Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Management
Central Support Agencies and Field Activities
The reliance of the CINCs, the Services, and other elements of DOD on the 16
defense agencies and nine DOD fifeld activities has grown substantially over
time. Most of these institutions were established to increase efficiency in com-
mon support, hsome cases they were created to provide specialized services to
some or all DOD components. On balance, these efforts have succeeded in low-
ering overall costs to DOD, primarily through standardization of processes and
economies of scale. At the same time, many people expressed concerns to us
about the responsiveness of these organizations to their primary customers, the
increasing requirement for line management attention by the Secretary's staff,
and the need for additional budget discipline.
These three concerns, and our desire to accelerate DOD's use of the best in
modem business practices, lead us to recommend new organizational arrange-
ments for these institutions.
Responsiveness to Customers
Recommendation: Create boards of direc-
tors to help oversee defense agencies.
To increase responsiveness to
customers, we recommend estab-
lishing boards of directors to help
manage each defense agency and
the larger DOD field activities. The board of directors' role would include re-
viewing and approving strategic objectives, plans, programs, interna! manage-
ment structures (including the make-or-buy decision process), and budgets.
Board membership would include all major direct customers, with the Joint
Staff representing the CINCs. Private-sector experts should also be considered
for membership (in an advisory capacity) to stimulate innovation. Boards
would be chaired by the appropriate OSD staff principal.
3-25
Directions for Defense
The powers of each board of directors should approximate those of a public
company's board of directors to the extent feasible in the DOD context.
Since most defense agencies generally support the CINCs and the Services,
adopting this recommendation would ensure that agency programs and budgets
fully reflect customer needs. Direct customer input on performance and costs
should improve agency responsiveness and efficiency while encouraging inno-
vation.
These recommendations are not intended to reduce the Secretary's responsi-
bility or authority for organizing the Department. The recommendations of all
boards would remain subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense.
In establishing the boards, we recommend that the Secretary's guidance in-
clude three specific mandates:
• Establish a program for outsourcing and transferring work to the Services
wherever appropriate, and eliminate programs that are no longer required.
• Design measurable performance ''stretch" goals based on best practices and
innovative incentives to cut costs.
• Improve mechanisms for providing support to combat forces.
Furthermore, the boards should assess agency and field activity performance
annually, on the basis of improvements in customer satisfaction and established
objectives.
When the recommended boards are first created, the Secretary of Defense
should direct them to conduct a bottom-up review of their agencies, addressing
the extent to which the agency functions should be privatized, performed by the
agency or by a Military Department, or not performed at all. The results of this
review should be reported to the Secretary and Congress one year after the
boards are created.
We expect that these boards of directors will prove sufficient to move de-
fense agencies and major field activities closer to their customers and increase
their use of best business practices. However, the Secretary of Defense should re-
view their reports to determine whether further change is warranted.
If the Secretary determines
that more direct management at-
tention is needed, we would rec-
ommend placing the
business-oriented support agen-
cies and activities in a Defense Support Organization (DSO) with a senior mili-
tary or civilian director. Basic responsibilities of the DSO would be similar to
Recommendation: Create a Defense Sup-
port Organization if the Secretary needs
more management assistance.
3-26
Chapter 3, Efficient and Responsive Support
those enumerated for the boards of directors above. Shifting these agencies
from their present reporting relationships to OSD staff sponsors would also al-
low the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to whom the agencies now
report to focus more sharply on their primary responsibilities. More generally,
the establishment of a Defense Support Executive would help arrest OSD's in-
creasing shift toward line management and functional advocacy (discussed in
Chapter 4).
Conclusion
Full implementation of the recommendations in this chapter should eventu-
ally free up several billion dollars per year to meet higher priority needs. Fur-
thermore, as more and more work passes to the private sector, and as the
goverrunent is authorized to use more commercial practices to manage residual
in-house work, there will be a continuing need to revise and fine-tune the De-
partment's management processes. The next chapter presents recommendations
to improve those processes.
3-27
Chapter 4, Improved Manas^emmt and Direction
Chapter 4
Improved Management and Direction
The Department of Defense has two primary management channels: the op-
erational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
warfighting CINCs, and the management channel for "all other" elements of the
Department's business, of which the planning and budgeting process is one of
the most important.
The operational chain was discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter discusses
the need ifor improvements in the management structures and decision support
processes that determine DOD's requirements development and budgeting and
therefore drive the actual allocation of roles, missions, and functions in the De-
partment. These structures and processes suffer from inadequate definition of
functions; duplication of responsibilities; parallel structures; and fragmented, in-
compatible mixtures of line and staff responsibilities.
Our review of the Depart-
ment's deep attack capabilities il-
lustrates how current processes
can create a roles and missions is-
sue. In this case, the Army's de-
ployment of the Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) gives
the groimd commander a capabil-
ity to attack targets otherwise ac-
cessible only to aircraft and cruise
missiles. While initiation of
ATACMS was considered appro-
priate in the Cold War context and
is consistent with the Army's core
competency in long-range artil-
lery, deployment of the system generated a contentious roles and missions is-
sue. The new capability futher complicates battlefield coordination, and it
raises a question about whether our total capabilities for deep attack are larger
than necessary.
This situation results from a set of institutional practices that allow the Serv-
ices to develop and field new weapons without a rigorous, DOD-wide assess-
ment of the need for these weapons and how they will be integrated with the
other elements planned for our arsenal.
"We don't have an annual roles and mis-
sions conference . . . but in the budget de-
velopment ... we essentially mold the roles
and missions so they do evolve and they do
change .... This is a roles and missions
shift in a sense, but we are doing it not in
the context of meeting and discussing it,
but getting on with what do we need to
fight our forces better and, out of that, roles
and missions changes are taking place."
— Admiral James Watkins, CNO, Testimony
to SASC (1983), quoted in SASC Staff Report,
Defense Organization: The Need for Change
4-1
Directions for Defense
We believe the Department's existing management structures and decision
support processes must be changed to reduce such problems. This section of the
report describes problems in these areas and recommends improvements.
Current Practices and Resulting Problems
In shaping DOD's program and budget, the Secretary of Defense must
choose among differing, and often sharply conflicting, views of requirements
and priorities. Ultimately these decisions determine who will do what — roles,
missions, and functions — among the Services, the CINCs, the OSD staff, the de-
fense agencies, and the Joint Staff.
Lower budgets and the uncertain international security environment place a
premium on operational effectiveness and management efficiency. Furthermore,
the rapid pace of technological change has expanded each Service's capabilities
and, as our deep strike example shows, has blurred the distinctions between tra-
ditional roles and functions. In order to provide unified direction, the Secretary
needs a responsive management system, high-quality staff support, accurate in-
formation, and timely assessments. We believe that these needs are not well
met in several areas — largely because of shortcomings that have developed
over the years.
The Secretary's ability to make the Department effective and efficient de-
pends on three interrelated factors, namely:
• the management structure that defines the basic responsibilities, functions,
and relationships of major organizational elements;
• the decision support processes used to foster productive interaction and inte-
gration of effort; and
• the information framework available to senior decision-makers.
Management Structure and Functions
Organizational effectiveness depends on a clear understanding of the re-
sponsibilities assigned to various components and of the relationships intended
among those components. This is especially true in organizations as large and
complex as DOD. The responsibilities of DOD components have changed in
the past 45 years in four important respects:
• Authority has been centralized under the Secretary of Defense and a large,
functionally oriented OSD staff. This staff assists the Secretary and
oversees — and in some cases manages — the operations of 16 Defense
4-2
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
agencies and nine DOD field activities. Some portions of OSD have become
proponents for their functional areas.
• Defense-wide support has grown so that today the Defense agencies and
other centrally managed activities accoimt for about one-quarter of the total
Defense budget.
• As discussed in Chapter 2, joint entities, including the Chairman, the CINCs,
and the Joint Staff, have been strengthened as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.
Most importantly, the role of the Chairman has been strengthened and ele-
vated above that of the Service Chiefs. The previous practice of consensus
decision-making hais been replaced by the clear responsibility and authority
of the Chairman. No longer is he the "first among equals"; he has become
the principal military advisor to the Secretary and the President. Further,
and just as important, the Joint Staff has been assigned solely to the Chair-
man, and a Vice Chairman has been added to assist him. Of course, elevat-
ing the Chairman also reduced the influence of the Service Chiefs in joint
matters. Additionally, Goldwater-Nichols gave the CINCs a stronger voice
in the resource allocation process and greater authority over their Service
component commanders.
• The operational influence of the Military Departments and Services has been
reduced, but they continue to provide the fundamental building
blocks — or core competencies — for all military operations (as discussed in
Chapter 2).
Over this time, the role of the OSD staff has become blurred because that
staff has acquired an increasingly fimctional orientation. In other words, many
of the OSD staff offices now focus primarily on what is being done in their broad
functional areas (such as logistics, personnel management, etc.) at the expense of
their primary role of providing objective advice to the Secretary. This makes in-
tegration of the defense program more difficult and constrains the Department's
ability to adjust and respond to new missions.
The growth in defense agencies has placed an increased premium on inte-
grated Department-wide management of support functions. OSD executives are
responsible for important portions of this management, along with the Defense
agencies themselves, the Military Departments, and the functional CINCs.
Additionally, while joint commands and staffs have been strengthened by
Goldwater-Nichols to better support the Chairman and the CINCs, similar im-
provements have not taken place in OSD. The consequent mismatch needs to be
corrected by improving OSD's effectiveness. The relationship between the Joint
Staff and OSD in particular remains inadequately defined and too dependent on
informal contacts. Their respective roles in shaping a unified vision for DOD,
coordinating solutions to complex political-military problems, and supporting
4-3
Directions for Defense
streamlined management processes must be clarified. There is also duplication
between the activities of the OSD staff and those of the Military Departments.
Finally, the Military Departments, the largest and most complex components
of DOD, require a combination of civilian and military leadership. But there are
unproductive overlaps in the responsibilities of the Secretariat and Service staffs
within the Military Departments.
Decision Support Processes
Four decision-making support processes are important in determining roles,
missions, and functions. Two support the Chairman and are managed by the
Joint Staff — the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the weapons-
oriented "requirements generation" system process. The other two support the
Secretary and are managed by the OSD staff — the weapons-oriented Acquisi-
tion Management System and the Plarming, Programming, and Budgeting Sys-
tem (PPBS). These processes share a conunon objective: to field the best possible
mix of forces, materiel, and support to accomplish national security objectives
within the Department's budget.
• The Chairman's Joint Strategic Planning System was restructured in March
1993 to provide for better military advice for the PPBS and to help meet the
increased statutory responsibilities of the Chairman, other members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CINCs. When fully developed, the restructured
system is intended to review the national security environment and U.S. na-
tional security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess whether existing or pro-
posed Service and defense agency programs are adequate to accomplish the
established strategy; propose alternative, affordable strategies, programs,
and forces to achieve national objectives; and provide a long-range vision of
the potential impact of technology on future doctrine, warfighting needs, and
organizations.
• The requirements generation process and Acquisition Management System were
also revised in the past four years. The new processes are designed to be
mutually supporting and integrated with the PPBS. They provide the frame-
work for identifying and examining possible deficiencies in capability that
may require a materiel solution, and technological opportunities that may
warrant exploitation. Their primary goal is to translate broadly stated mis-
sion needs into stable acquisition programs (to be executed by the Military
Departments) that meet the user's needs and can be sustained' within the
projected budget. The Services are the primary source of new "mission need
statements," which naturally enough reflect their preferred approaches to
warfighting. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), oversees requirements devel-
opment, while the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
4-4
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
Technology, supported by the Defense Acquisition Board, directs the acquisi-
tion management process.^
After deliberations during the requirements generation and acquisition proc-
esses, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, acting for the Secretary, decides
whether to start any new major defense acquisition programs. Acquisition
programs are reviewed at scheduled milestones and are subject to review un-
der the PPBS.
Most studies conclude, as we have, that the primary problems in weapon
systems acquisition are traceable to inadequacies in the early phase of the re-
quirements determination process. The lack of a unified concept and analy-
sis of warfighting needs is the critical underlying problem.
• The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) helps the Secretary
of Defense shape the defense program and manage defense resources. The
distinct but interrelated phases of this process — planning, programming,
and budgeting — establish a basis for deciding on future programs and al-
low for the reexamination of prior decisions as security requirements or fiscal
conditions change. The PPBS thus provides for formulating planning direc-
tion, translating this direction into program proposals, and developing de-
fense budget requests and long-term programs.
Although the current PPBS, highlighted in Figure 4-1, produces budgets on
time, it often fails to facilitate thoughtful debate on issues that affect roles,
missions, and fimctions and, more importantly, defense priorities.
^The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition
Board.
4-5
Directions for Defense
Current PPBS Process - and Problems
Defense Giddaoce lATE
PLANNING
PROGRAMMING
Program Dedslons LATE
Bcdget Request
BUDGETING
24MoQtbs
liq)ut focus
Inadequate unij^ng
Late dcciwans; loosdy coordinated plutfcs; ovcrlappiiig cycles ]
Figure 4-1. The Current PPBS Process
The PPBS phases operate semi-autonomously rather than supportively, creat-
ing unnecessary turbulence and encouraging revisiting of prior decisions. Guid-
ance to the Services and other DOD components for program and budget
development tends to lack specificity and be late. Major program decisions are
often delayed until the end of the budget development phase — cancellation of
the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile last December is a good example. This
way of doing business causes hurried and often inaccurate adjustments to budg-
ets and to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Frequently, long-term
modernization plans are disrupted during annual budget cycles, and minor de-
tails receive inordinate attention. Excessive debate and exacting study can focus
on the specifics of the future program — six years away — which are certain to
change with time. This procedure wastes effort and inhibits effective program
review as change occurs.
The other decision support processes also require improvement. The re-
cently restructured Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) does not yet do an
adequate job of linking force preparedness to meet the CINCs' operational plans
with resource allocation decision systems, nor does it yet provide a comprehen-
sive, long-range vision of the potential implications of technological change for
doctrine and organizations. The requirements generation and acquisition man-
agement processes suffer from the same sorts of problems.
The impact of the four decision support processes that have been described
transcends the formal assignment of roles, missions,' and functions. The Secre-
tary's ability to quickly resolve roles, missions, and functions issues will improve
4-6
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
when these processes are updated and better integrated. The Secretary should
assign a high priority to this effort, particularly to restructuring the PPBS.
The success of all four processes depends on the quantity, quality, and utility
of the information available to decision-makers. There are problems here as
well.
Major Decision Support Information Frameworks
Decision support information
frameworks collect and display
information for senior decision-
makers. The Department uses
three: The first two — the appro-
priation accounts and the
FYDP — support resource alloca-
tion decisions and transmit pro-
gram and budget information to
Congress. The third is the rela-
tively new Joint Warfighting Ca-
pabilities Assessment framework,
which supports the Joint Require-
ments Oversight Coimcil
(JROC — mentioned earlier and
discussed later in this chapter) by arraying military capabilities against war-
fighting challenges but does not address all defense capabilities or resources.
The Secretary's effort to develop and sustain unified program direction suf-
fers from the lack of a single, integrated framework. Current information frame-
works use different displays and terms of reference. They do not relate inputs
(e.g., the operations and maintenance costs of training) to outputs (e.g., the avail-
ability of trained forces to implement contingency plans), nor do they provide
for assessing how well current forces match defense missions. Without a coher-
ent information framework, senior leaders are severely hampered in making
timely decisions on forces and support. This problem is compounded by the dif-
fering views of current and future priorities presented by the CINCs, the Serv-
ices, the Joint Staff, and elements of the OSD staff, each operating under a poorly
defined set of functional responsibilities.
Competing information frameworks impair the Secretary's ability to develop
and sustain unified policy and program guidance across different management
processes and to track compliance. This problem is growing more complicated
as the Joint Staff develops its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)
framework in support of the Chairman, and as DOD's focus is drawn increas-
ingly to emerging priorities such as peace operations and information warfare.
"It must not be taken for granted that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as now constituted will
be as effective in the apportionment of
peacetime resources as they have been in
the determination of war plans and in their
execution. As national defense appropria-
tions grow tighter, and as conflicting inter-
ests make themselves felt in major issues of
policy and strategy, unanimous agreements
will become more difficult to reach."
— President Harry S Truman, Message to
Congress, 19 December 1945
4-7
Directions for Defense
Improve Decision Support Processes and Management
Structures: Directions for the Future
We propose the following four initiatives to improve the executive and legis-
lative branches' decision-making. Each builds on recent progress towards a
more integrated and effective defense establishment. Collectively they empha-
size missions and outputs while promoting innovation and constructive compe-
tition.
• Create a stable and enduring national strategy and spending plan every four
years to guide DOD's planning, programming, and force development.
• Restructure the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and
other decision support processes to improve integration and provide clearly
defined responsibilities for the various participants. This initiative includes
strengthening the Chairman's JWC A effort.
• Develop an integrated information framework that links inputs with outputs
to better focus decision-making on mission performance.
• Modify the DOD management structure to better support the Secretary, in
particular by strengthening OSD's ability to provide policy advice, analytical
support, and independent prespectives.
Improve Planning and Direction for the Defense Program
A unified, long-term national security strategy, with accompanying defense
policy and program direction, requires that planning and analyses be done be-
forehand. Feasible alternative solutions must be developed for evolving security
problems. These options should include various mixes of forces, materiel, and
support in the context of a balanced assessment that addresses threats to U.S. in-
terests, level of risk, and cost. Carrying out this process requires the ability to
quickly furnish ''roughly right" answers so that decisions can be made from a
range of alternatives. These assessments will be used in the planning and direc-
tion phase of the process to develop guidance to the Services and agencies.
4-8
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
We recognize that, when Ad-
ministrations change, defense
planning is subject to a turbulence
exceeded only by that resulting
from significant shifts in the inter-
national security environment. Accordingly, we recommend a comprehensive
strategy and force review at the start of each new Administration — a Quad-
rennial Strategy Review (QSR). This review should be an interagency activity
directed by the National Security Council (NSC). OSD and the Joint Staff
should lead the DOD effort. The QSR would incorporate the CINCs' apprais-
als of projected strengths and weaknesses, as well as their judgments on future
forces and capabilities under consideration.^
The QSR should be expansive. An overarching strategic plan that conveys
the essential purposes of the Department in the context of the Administration's
agenda is the foundation for guidance to the Department. Therefore, the QSR
should address international political and economic trends, changes in threats
and military technology, evolving opportunities for using military force to shape
the security environment, resources available for defense, possible adjustments
to existing national security policy or strategy, and a diverse set of military force
and program options.
In the past, the size of U.S.
forces was determined largely by
using one or two intentionally
stressful scenarios. Other potential
contingencies were considered
"lesser included'' cases, sometimes on the basis of explicit evaluations but of-
ten on untested assumptions. While this methodology, labeled
"Threat/Scenario-Driven Planrung," served us well in the past, the new envi-
ronment calls for a broader approach to force planning. For the QSR and any
similar reexaminations of the overall national defense program, we recom-
mend developing an array of various force mixes^ at each of several budget
levels and then testing each mix against a range of possible missions. Selec-
tion of the "best" force mix would depend on the probability that DOD would
have to perform the mission, relative force capabilities with respect to each
mission, and the risks and costs of failure — all evaluated across the full range
of prospective missions. This approach would address varying mixes of
forces and the trade-offs among other aspects of capability (e.g., near-term
readiness versus modernization). In addition, it would concentrate attention
^Preparatory work for such a review must start shortly after the Presidential election to
facilitate near-term budget changes and the issuance of Secretary of Defense direction for the
future. An earlier start would be desirable. "Pilot studies" of this sort have been done previ-
ously during the fourth year of a Presidential term.
^ Force mixes Would be varied in terms of land, air, and sea capabilities; active /Reserve
composition; and other factors.
Recommendation: Create a Quadrermial
Strategy Review.
Recommendation: Adopt mission-based
planning.
4-9
on ways in which our military forces could be used proactively to influence fu-
ture security conditions.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense adopt this new "Mission-Based
Planning" concept for use within DOD and for supporting the QSR. Further-
more, DOD participation in such a wide-ranging review needs to be led by the
Secretary or his Deputy.
A QSR would provide the foundation for a consistent military strategy, de-
fense force posture, and budget estimate for use in the Secretary's programming
direction to Defense components. It could in addition serve as a basis for devel-
oping a consensus between the executive and legislative branches on a four-year
DOD funding levef. A precedent exists in the 1990 Budget Summit Agreement.
Although the Budget Summit's Defense allocation was not predicated on the
type of rigorous process that we envision for the QSR, it gave the Department a
measure of budgeting stability for the next several years.
In addition, the QSR could obviate the current need for separate CJCS reports
on roles and missions, and perhaps on the Unified Command Plan. If our QSR
recommendation is accepted. Congress should consider abolishing these reports.
Restructure the PPBS
Recommendation: Restructure the PPBS.
The PPBS has served OSD and
the Services well for more than
three decades. However, to en-
able the Department to adapt its
capabilities, forces, and programs better in the future, the existing system must
be better focused on the needs of senior decision-makers.
The current PPBS reexamines the entire multiyear defense program annu-
ally, uses too many people, takes too long, goes into too much detail, and leaves
little time for reflection and creativity. We envision a restructured PPBS that re-
solves some major issues early and identifies altemative solutions to other is-
sues explicitly "held open" for further study. Our goal is to build consensus
among the Department's senior leaders, or get issues decided, before the staff-
intensive program and budget development process begins. The restructured
PPBS described below would facilitate orderly decision-making and adjustments
to roles, missions, and functions. These are prerequisites to improving DOD's
ability to respond to change.
A restructured PPBS, depicted in Figure 4-2, would consist of two major
phases: planning and direction (what is needed); and developing and reviewing
programs, budgets, and out-year plans (how to meet the needs).
4-10
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
NSC
Quadrennial Strategy Review
DOD
Planning and Direction by
SecDef
Front-End Planning
OSD and Joint Staff
Conduct Iront end" planning based on
results of SecDef-directed studies,
• mission, force, and suppwrt
assessments,
CJCS/CINC/Seivice inputs, and
"real world' budget execution
intonmation from Sen/ices and other
components
Development and Review of
Programs, Budgets, and Out- Year
Plans
Preparation
Review
OSD
Conducts
combined
program and
budget review
Services and Other DOD
Qqmpon^nts
Prepare program and budget
submissions, including options
for open Issues, based on
SecOef direction
SecDef
Decisions
Final
planning,
programming,
and
budgeting
Service Execution Review
of Current Budget
M ' A
Ju ' A
O ' N
Figure 4-2. Highlights of a Restructured PPBS Process
(Annual Budget Cycle)
Front-End Assessments
Recommendation:
sessments.
Conduct front-end as-
Integrated assessments are es-
sential for a rigorous and timely
Quadrennial Strategy Review. In
addition, they improve the Secre-
tary's ability to issue definitive program and budget direction to DOD compo-
nents in cycles not preceded by a QSR. These assessments would incorporate
the results of previously directed major studies and analyses, assessments of
the adequacy of proposed forces and support programs, reviews of changes in
the world, and evaluation of actual performance relative to budgets. The OSD
and Joint Staff would be the primary actors here, but all elements of DOD
would participate. (A "mission- and output-oriented assessment framework"
would greatly assist in framing resulting issues for decision by the Secretary
of Defense. We have developed an illustrative framework of this type and will
explain it in some detail later. Use of this assessment framework is mentioned
several times in our discussion of PPBS restructuring.)
To the extent possible, the Secretary of Defense would resolve issues result-
ing from the front-end planning effort before issuing program and budget direc-
tion; otherwise, issues would be designated as "open" for decision at the end of
4-11
Directions for Defense
the year. Additionally, the Secretary would identify issues of special
interest — perhaps relating to new or expanded missions, or to projected joint
operational needs — and direct the Military Departments and defense agencies
to submit alternative solutions for them. Priced options for all unresolved issues
would be developed by the Services and other DoD components during the pro-
gram and budget preparation phase.
Secretary of Defense Direction
Recommendation: Issue strong Secretary of
Defense program and budget direction.
The Secretary's initial program
and budget direction would be
based on the results of the QSR.
(The OSD integration element that
we describe later would draft
these instructions for the Secretary.) Programming and fiscal guidance would
be provided for each appUcable area of the assessment framework (e.g., force
readiness, nondeploying support to forces, etc.). Performance-oriented objec-
tives would be established for the near-, mid-, and long-term to allow imple-
mentation tracking. Subsequent Secretarial direction would address only
major changes from the QSR or the prior year.
Preparation and Review of Programs, Budgets, and Plans
Recommendation: Use an integrated plan,
program, and budget review process.
This phase would result in a
detailed budget request for one or
two years, with less detail for the
subsequent two or three program-
ming years and the six-year plan-
ning period. Most major issues still requiring resolution would affect the
programming years and beyond. The primary purpose of the six-year plan-
rung period would be to address strategic hedging options and explore the im-
plications of technology and other potential changes for joint doctrine,
employment concepts, and force structure. Projections of major forces, mod-
ernization programs, and resource levels would be included for each element
of our assessment framework.
Program /Budget Preparation
DOD components would submit their draft programs and budgets in the for-
mat required for congressional appropriations, with appropriate cross-references
4-12
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
to display this information in the new assessment framework and in the FYDP.^
These submissions would be based on the Secretary's direction, reviews of cur-
rent budget execution, the CINCs' program priorities, and the necessary balance
between long-term capital investment and near-term operational needs.
Integrated Review and Decisions
A combined program and budget review — organized for the Secretary by
the OSD integration element described later — would focus first on the cost and
performance status of current programs. In addition, it would incorporate as-
sessments of force readiness and reviews of unresolved issues and options re-
quested by the Secretary to address particular problems. Major program reviews
and decisions would focus primarily on the program years and on the subse-
quent planning period. These reviews would address operational needs and pri-
orities and consider a full range of alternatives before new acquisition programs
are initiated. Longer term plar\ning and assessment results would influence fu-
ture direction and, as appropriate, the program and budget years.
This approach would produce a bienrual or armual budget request, a pro-
gram with considerably less detail than today, and a long-range force and
spending plan.
Other major processes that support — and are supported by — the PPBS also
need attention.
Improve Other Decision Support Processes
Increased emphasis on front-end plarming is also required in the three major
decision-making support processes integrated with the PPBS. We recommend
continued improvement to the restructured JSPS to help the Chairman carry out
his resporisibilities to provide strategy advice and assess capabilities for the Sec-
retary. In particular, we believe that increased effort is needed to improve the
scope and quality of long-range assessments, such as the Long-Range Vision Pa-
per. Additional improvements should be made in the near- and mid-term prod-
ucts, such as the Chairman's Program Assessment, which evaluates the program
and budget proposals of the Military Departments and defense agencies.
The Secretary's Contingency Planiung Guidance, the resulting Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, and associated contingency plans all need to be linked to the
strategy that results from the Quadrenrual Strategy Review, and to the PPBS
(which allocates resources for near-term readiness), and to the readiness assess-
ments discussed in Chapter 2. Increased numbers of skilled people (within
^The FYDP cross-walk would not be required if Congress also adopts our assessment
framework for reviewing the program and planning periods.
4-13
Directions for Defense
existing DOD headquarters manpower totals) and expanded analytical tools
(e.g., modeling and simulation capabilities) are needed within the Joint Staff to
improve the analytical products that are sent to the Chairman, and from him to
the Secretary of Defense.
Recommendation: Improve other decision
support processes.
The weapon system require-
ments generation process and the
Acquisition Management System
need better analytical support and
other refinements. We recommend establishing regular procedures to assess
non-materiel solutions to operational needs (e.g., changes in doctrine, tactics,
employment concepts, or orgaruzation). Current policy directives already re-
quire consideration of a full range of alternatives — including cross-Service
and non-materiel solutions. But in practice, the result has often been the en-
dorsement of a specific — and expensive — new weapon design prematurely.
Senior acquisition executives should be more heavily involved in the concept
development process for new weapon systems to ensure rigorous examination
of cost and performance trade-offs among alternative solution^ (including ex-
isting weapon systems) before a particular approach is chosen.
Studies over the past decade have identified systemic problems with many
joint weapons programs and the lack of interoperability of Service-developed
systems. The key to fielding effective joint or interoperable systems is the early
involvement of senior managers in defining requirements and in determining
common components or total systems that should be applied across Military De-
partments. The Administration's current attempt to define the next generation
of combat aircraft through the Joint Air Strike Technology program provides
clear evidence of the more general need for improving the joint requirements
and concept development processes. This improvement can be accomplished by
creating fully joint operational requirements organizations before initial "needs"
documents are developed.
Recommendation: Pursue design common-
ality for other major new programs that
have multi-Service application (e.g., tactical
airlift/tankers, heavy-lift helos, and long-
range surveillance aircraft).
In addition to increased com-
monality in the design of the next-
generation combat aircraft, there
are similar real opportunities in
replacing support aircraft. In par-
ticular, the Services, the Coast
Guard, and SOCOM will soon
need to replace their existing fleets of C-130 aircraft and heavy-lift helicopters.
The long-range electronic surveillance aircraft operated by the Air Force and
the Navy will also need to be modernized in the next few years. We recom-
mend that the USD(A&:T) assign specific responsibility for managing joint re-
quirements and concepts development in each of these areas.
4-14
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
Major systems overseen by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)^ are not the
only ones that will benefit from an improved "requirements" and concepts de-
velopment process that ensures a greater range of cost-performance trade-offs
and more attention to cross-Service interoperability. This is particularly impor-
tant when the choices affect joint warfighting, in areas such as CX modern mu-
nitions, key self-protection expendables (e.g., flares, chaff), and fuels and fueling
systems (particularly aerial refueling systems), USD(A&T) should develop a set
of disciplined procedures that assure adequate treatment of interoperability and
also early interaction between those who generate requirements for smaller sys-
tems and subsystems and those who develop and approve solutions.
Greater involvement by the appropriate civilian acquisition executive before
performance specifications are firmly established, followed by more disciplined
implementation of existing policies, will enable the Department to benefit from
enhanced interoperability, increased use of common components, and fewer
Service-unique systems. The consolidation of acquisition support activities
recommended in Chapter 3 should also help increase commonality.
Reconimendation: Implement biennial ap-
propriations.
While the foregoing revisions
to the PPBS and other processes
would be effective imder the exist-
ing budgeting approach, we be-
lieve that implementing biennial budgeting would further enhance the
improvements resulting from a restructured PPBS. We also think that achiev-
ing multiyear stability for DOD funding would be very helpful.
Biennial Budgeting
As originally envisioned, bien-
nial budgeting provides a two-
year authorization and appropria-
tion cycle, with the option of
amending the second year when
circumstances warrant. Defense
management reviews (such as the
Packard Commission), the Na-
tional Performance Review, and
the 1993 Report of the Joint Com-
mittee on the Organization of the
Congress have recommended bi-
ennial budgeting and appropria-
tions. Currently, the Department
prepares a biermial budget
"The most important reform, in the
[Packard] Commission's view, is the adop-
tion by Congress of biennial budgets tied to
a five-year plan .... [This] would promote
stability by providing additional time to do
a better job — to think through military
planning options, to evaluate results of cur-
rent and prior-year execution of the defense
budget, and to ensure that each phase of
the cycle has the attention needed."
— A Quest for Excellence, Final Report of the
Packard Commission, 1986
^The DAB includes the Service Acquisition Executives, members of key offices in OSD,
and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is the Vice Chairman of the DAB.
4-15
Directions for Defense
initially, but Congress continues to appropriate resources for only one year, so
DOD actually develops a new budget every year. There is no benefit from
this additional DOD workload.
Biennial budgeting would yield greater program stability, improved plan-
ning and execution, and other benefits. We urge Congress to implement biennial
appropriations. Failing that, we recommend that Congress revise the legislative
requirement and allow DOD to revert to the annual budget process
Under either a one- or two-year budget process, the Department would bene-
fit from an executive /legislative commitment to a specific level of resources for
the four-year budget and program period we propose. This stability would al-
low the Secretary and subordinate levels of the Department to manage more
flexibly and would help create real incentives for innovation and efficiency
throughout DOD. Incentives should be improved for both individuals and or-
ganizations.
Improving Incentives
A common theme in the National Performance Review is the need to em-
power managers and workers at lower levels by decentralizing authority and en-
couraging them to become more entrepreneurial. In the private sector,
competitive pressures and the profit motive reward managers for making diffi-
cult decisions and reducing costs. Savings can be reinvested, resulting in in-
creased profits or improved effectiveness — metrics for which managers are
rewarded.
Such inducements are much weaker in the Federal sector, where most re-
wards are for strict compliance with rules. A good example is the formal budget
execution process, which allows little flexibility at lower levels. One result is the
familiar "use it or lose it" year-end spending spree. The Administration is con-
sidering specific changes to Federal personnel management systems that, if ap-
proved, would improve the Department's ability to reward entrepreneurial
individuals.
Better organizational incentives are also needed. A powerful incentive in the
Department of Defense would be to give Service Secretaries and heads of de-
fense agencies the authority to retain in their future "top line" plarming a sub-
stantial portion of any savings that can be generated in their department or
agency. For example, if the Secretary of the Navy could plan to spend a substan-
tial part of the savings generated from cuts in infrastructure to accelerate an ap-
proved moderruzation program, the Navy as a whole would be better motivated
to seek out such savings. Similar authority could be delegated to lower levels,
where the Services already have had considerable success with pilot programs
incorporating this concept.
4-16
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
This approach raises some fundamental issues involving budget planrung,
reprogramming authority, and stability of major SecDef programming decisions.
Reliable procedures and accounting systems v^ould be necessary to ensure that
money saved is spent orUy on previously authorized programs. Flexibility
would have to be preserved for the Secretary of Defense to reallocate resources
when reallocation is necessary.
Although full implementation of this concept will require a detailed budget
plarming effort, the near-term situation could be improved substantially by in-
creasing the present reprogramming thresholds within and across appropriation
boundaries.
Improve Information for Decision Support
The Department should adopt
a mission- and output-oriented
framework of the type outlined
below. This will assist senior offi-
cials in making the focused decisions required to provide a more effective, in-
tegrated, and efficient defense establishment. Figure 4-3 depicts our proposed
integrated assessment framework. The "boxes in this figure represent matrices
for arraying information useful for decision-making. Our framework is fo-
cused on the center of Figure 4-3, where we would display the overall capabili-
ties of our forces to perform the CINCs' operational missions, and associated
risks. Each of the six surroimding matrices displays information related to
providing or supporting forces employed by the CINCs. All DoD resources
are assigned to one of these six matrices.
In addition to recording resource inputs, each supporting matrix presents
mission /output-oriented assessments that identify major strengths, weaknesses,
and risks for three different time horizons: the budget period (today and the
next 2 years), the programming period (3 to 4 years in the future), and the plan-
ning period (5 to 10 years in the future). Besides presenting absolute values for
each period, these matrices can be used to show trends and thereby highlight the
time needed to fill gaps in capability.^
Collectively, the matrices in our framework enable senior officials to relate
resource inputs with changes in forces and capabilities to perform CINC mis-
sions. Of course these missions will evolve over time to reflect changes in na-
tional objectives, the geopolitical envirorunent, and military threats, all of which
will have to be incorporated into the continuing assessment process.
^This is particularly important when it will require significant time for resources to affect
output (e.g., an aircraft carrier is not available for operations until 6 to 8 years after funds are
first authorized and appropriated).
Recommendation: Create and use an as-
sessment framework.
4-17
Directions for Defense
Weapons Capabilities
Force Readiness
Improvement and
Replacement
Nondeploying
Support to
^ 1
Forces
Missions
and
Force Units
Technology
Advancement
Personnel
Management and
Individual Training
Facilities,
Headquarters, and
Environment
►
Figure 4-3. A Mission/Output-Oriented Information Framework
Major Defense Missions and Forces
The centerpiece of the assessment framework is the Major Defense Missions
and Forces Matrix, Figure 4-4.
This matrix displays the missions assigned to the CINCs (left colunm) and
the active and reserve forces apportioned'' to the CINCs or joint task forces for
those missions (middle columns) from the Services or other DOD components
(top block). Assessments of the CINC involved, the CJCS, the OSD staff, and the
Services are represented in the right-hand column. These assessments will high-
light major strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in required capability, as well as
risks. By relating inputs to outputs and mission performance, the matrix pro-
motes informed decisions.
^The term "apportioned" means that a force is assigned to a CINC for planning purposes
only. It acknowledges the likelihood that not all missions will be executed simultaneously.
Essentially, this means that some major force elements may be apportioned to several differ-
ent operational missions, with some missions having higher priority than others (thus increas-
ing the risk that a lower priority mission may not be accomplished if the higher precedence
mission occurs first).
4-18
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
Major Defense Missions and Forces
(Program Period Assessment Matrix)
Missions
DoD Components
Services, Agencies, Others
Assessments
CINCs, CJCS, OSD,
Other
F(
Drees {P
ipportio
for
active ai
ned to i
each m
id Res€
sach CI
ission
jrve)
NC
Similar format for budget and planning periods
Figure 4-4. Major Defense Missions and Forces Matrix
Weapons Capabilities Improvement and Replacement
Figure 4-5 is a specific example of a supporting matrix from the overall As-
sessment Framework shown in Figure 4-3. This one is for Weapons Capabilities
Improvement and Replacement. It is consistent with the JROC's new Joint War-
fighting Capabilities Assessment concept. The matrix displays joint warfighting
capabilities (left column); acquisition programs (middle columns) from the Serv-
ices and other DOD components (top block); and assessments by the JROC and
OSD (right column).
The JROC and the USD(A&T) would use this matrix to evaluate proposed re-
quirements and acquisition programs. The assessments in the Major Defense
Missions and Forces Matrix (previously discussed) would identify critical
strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in capability that affect the CINCs' ability to
carry out their assigned missions. This information provides the context for us-
ing the Weapons Capabilities Improvement and Replacement Matrix in the
PPBS, in the requirements generation process, and in the Acquisition Manage-
ment System. In the PPBS, it would be used for front-end modernization assess-
ments and major issue reviews. The JROC would use the matrix in its
evaluations of "mission need" statements for new or improved weapons, which
must consider all existing and approved systems that contribute to a specific
joint warfighting capability. It would also be useful in supporting DAB reviews
conducted by the USD(A&T).
4-19
Directions for Defense
Weapons Capabilities Improvements and Replacement
(Program Period Assessment Matrix)
D)
c
CO
JC CD
o
DoD Components
Services, Agencies, Others
Systems in the current
-Inventory and systems -
^approved/proposed for
procurement
c
CD
E
CO ,v
CO Cj
CD
CO
CO
<
Q
CO
O
O
CC
— 3
Figure 4-5. Weapons Capabilities Improvement and Replacement Matrix
The row headings in the left-hand column of the Weapons Capabilities Im-
provement and Replacement Matrix initially would be the Joint Warfighting Ca-
pabilities Assessment categories developed recently by the JROC. However, we
believe that these categories can be improved to better relate the CINCs' uses for
forces and their assessments of weaknesses and gaps in specific warfighting ca-
pabilities.
Equally important, this matrix could be used by senior decision-makers to
reassess current acquisition programs in the PPBS when their cost, schedule, or
performance goals are projected to exceed thresholds established in the Acquisi-
tion Management System, or when technological advances and changes in the
international envirorunent call into question the operational need for specific
programs, thus helping avoid capability overlaps and redundancies.
Other Matrices
The other five matrices display similar information, including specific defi-
ciencies involving program balance and relative priorities for their respective ar-
eas. For example, the Force Readiness Matrix captures the readiness of Active
and Reserve forces assigned to the Unified Commanders rather than the forces
apportioned to them.^ The results would be based on CINC assessments and /or
a joint readiness assessment procedure as recommended by the Commission in
Chapter 2. It also provides the Chairman and the Secretary with the mid- and
® There are two reasons for this. First, forces are assigned to only one commander at a
time so that resources are counted only once. Second, a CINC would find it difficult, if
not impossible, to assess the readiness of a force unit being used by another CINC
4-20
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
long-term indicators needed to assess more accurately the effects of force- and
equipment-planning decisions on future capabilities.
Improve DOD's Management Structure
Management Structure and Functions
Our reconunendations for an
information framework and en-
hanced decision-making processes
will have more impact if they are
reinforced by modifications in the
management structure. We re-
viewed the functions assigned to
DOD components by law and di-
rectives and identified a need to
clarify and redefine management
responsibilities. These changes in-
volve the responsibilities of the
"But the Joint Chiefs of Staff are a strictly
military body. Responsibility for civilian
control should be clearly fixed in a single
full-time civilian below the President. This
requires a Secretary for the entire military
establishment, aided by a strong staff of ci-
vilian assistants."
— President Harry S Truman, Message to
Congress, 19 December 1945
OSD staff, management of the support base, the responsibilities of the Joint
Staff and joint structures, relationships between OSD and the Joint Staff, and
the supporting staff structure of the Military Departments.
OSD Staff
The Secretary of Defense has both executive department and cabinet officer
responsibilities. The OSD staff should concentrate on assisting the Secretary in
these areas. Our examination of current OSD staff activities suggests that the
following changes should be made:
Recommendation: Create an objective
"integration" element in OSD.
Responsibilities for cross-
cutting, multifunctional pro-
gram integration and assess-
ments, which are currently
divided between the Offices of
the Comptroller and of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, should
be realigned or consolidated. The Secretary needs strong overall staff sup-
port to ensure that he receives a wide range of information and advice
from all DOD elements, and a single staff element to help integrate these
diverse inputs into unified direction for the Department.
• Portions of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy should be organized
Recommendation: Restructure USD(P) to
focus on mission.
4-21
Directions for Defense
along mission lines (as has been done for Counterproliferation) in order to
improve DOD's responsiveness to new and evolving missions. Sharpening
the Policy organization's mission focus also should help strengthen
political-military coordination between OSD and the Joint Staff, and OSD
oversight of contingency planning.
Recommendation: Create boards of direc-
tors for defense agencies.
Boards of directors should be
established to help manage
defense agencies and DOD
field activities. It may also be
desirable to establish a De-
fense Support Organization to manage these agencies/activities and allow
the OSD staff to better concentrate on providing objective advice to the
Secretary. We discuss these two proposals in Chapter 3.
Recommendation: Clarify OSD scope of re-
sponsibilities and relationships.
Further, we believe that the
Department needs to conduct
a broad-based management re-
view of OSD's responsibilities
regarding other DOD compo-
nents. Following the management review, a DOD directive should be cre-
ated to codify the responsibilities of the OSD staff for other DOD
components. While our major thrust has been to reduce codification and
regulation, we believe this directive would help the OSD staff better serve
the Secretary.
The Joint Staff and JROC
Recommendation: Provide CJCS with ad-
ditional analytic and technical resources.
The responsibilities of the Joint
Staff are to support the Chairman
in his many duties. Those respon-
sibilities have grown as a result of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but
there has been no proportional increase in the Joint Staffs planning and
analysis capabilities, A current initiative is to expand the JROC, led by the
Vice Chairman, from its original charter regarding new weapons requirements
to one of assessing all important aspects of the Nation's military posture. By
tapping the Service staffs that support their JROC principals (the Vice Chiefs),
this initiative has increased the analytic talent available to the Joint Staff.
However, following this practice may increase the Joint Staffs reliance on
Service staffs for their assessments, which runs counter to the intent of
Goldwater-Nichols to increase the Joint Staffs independence. We recom-
mend the Secretary direct that additional analytical resources be made avail-
able to the Joint Staff,
4-22
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
OSD AND Joint Staff Relationships
The responsibilities and relationships of the OSD staff and the Joint Staff
need to be explicitly stated. Each serves a different purpose. Simply put, the
Joint Staff supports the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the Presi-
dent, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, v^hile OSD
provides policy advice, independent perspectives, and analytical support to the
Secretary. Our recommended directive clarifying OSD responsibilities and rela-
tionships should improve this relationship.
Given the increasingly important role of the JROC and the growing compe-
tence of the Joint Staff, it is imperative that OSD possess a correspondingly
strong capability to assess the Chairman's advice, along with that of the CINCs,
the Military Departments, and other DOD components; and to provide inde-
pendent advice and perspectives to the Secretary. Providing this capability
should be a primary duty of the OSD integration element recommended previ-
ously. OSD participation in selected JROC activities may be desirable to develop
consensus but should not be considered a substitute for furnishing independent
OSD advice and perspectives to the Secretary.
We foimd considerable recent improvement in OSD's participation in the
Joint Staff's contingency and operational planning arena. At present, the OSD
staff has three access points to the contingency planning process, from the earli-
est efforts through two levels of review and the Secretary's final approval. This
effective participation should be extended to force employment and crisis man-
agement activities. These arrangements should be codified in regulation.
Restructure the Military Department Staffs
Our assessment of roles, missions, and functions led us inevitably to look at
the management of headquarters staffs in the Military Departments. With two
staffs in each headquarters (three in the Navy Department), the potential for un-
necessary redundancy seemed high.
Title 10 U.S.C. provides for a Secretariat and a Service staff reporting to the
Service Secretary in each Military Department. (In the Department of the Navy,
there are three headquarters staffs: the Secretariat, the CNO staff, and Head-
quarters, U.S. Marine Corps.) This staff structure is a remnant of the days when
Service Secretaries were cabinet members and Service Chiefs were in the opera-
tional chain of command.
We identified two possible advantages to having separate Secretariat and
Service staffs. First, the civilian Secretariat is available to support the Secretary
directly in functional areas deemed essential to civilian control or that otherwise
need senior civilian oversight. Second, the Service staff can provide independent
4-23
Directions for Defense
military perspectives, especially in support of the Service Chiefs role as a mem-
ber of the JCS. Basically, separate staffs provide different sources of advice to the
Service Secretary and Chief and serve as independent bases of support for each.
Recommendation: Combine the Secretariat
and Service staffs.
However, our review con-
cluded that the advantages of
separate headquarters staffs are
outweighed by disadvantages in
several important respects. The
presence of two staffs impedes integration of effort, and forces choices be-
tween "civilian business functions" and "military functions." Split responsi-
bilities between Secretariat and Service staffs cause confusion at higher and
lower echelons, resulting in unnecessary friction and cumbersome manage-
ment processes.
In addition, efforts to reduce duplication and improve specialization between
the two staffs leave the appearance that "sole responsibility" activities assigned,
to the Service Secretary by Title 10 should be of less concern to the Service Chief,
while predominantly military fimctions are of less concern to the Secretary. This
split leads to an environment in which both the Service Chief and the Secretary
have difficulty meeting their broad leadership responsibilities.
We believe that the Military Department Secretary's responsibility for all
matters in that department is clear and indivisible and that the Service Chiefs
effectiveness as the senior military officer also demands a broad. Service-wide
perspective. We conclude that Military Department Secretaries and Chiefs
would be better served by a single staff composed of experienced civilians and
uniformed officers. This staff should report through the Service Chief. Integrat-
ing the staffs would immediately highlight areas of existing duplication, present
the opportunity for consolidation of several staff functions, and improve effi-
ciency in headquarters management processes.
Recommendation: Reduce the number of
political appointees in Service Secretariats.
A single staff must be struc-
tured to promote clear lines of
authority and accountability and
must be able to interact effectively
with OSD, the Joint Staff, CINC
staffs, and the headquarters staffs of other Military Departments. The single
staff should have an appropriate mix of senior military and professional civil-
ian personnel. We believe that having a single headquarters staff structure
would reduce the requirement for Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretaries.
Specifically, we recommend that the number of political appointees assigned
to positions in the Military Departments be limited to a total of three or four
senior people.
4-24
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
The consolidation of two staffs into a single headquarters staff .in each Mili-
tary Department is a complex enterprise involving sensitive issues of civilian
control. This change v^ill require a careful assessment by the Secretary of De-
fense and the approval of Congress. Finally, we recognize that a single staff
structure poses a special challenge to the Department of the Navy because of the
presence of two military staffs (i.e., those of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps) in its headquarters, but the aim should
be to achieve consolidated approaches where possible.
Improve Civilian Personnel Quality
Finally, we recognize that the improvements recommended throughout this
report and the effectiveness of DOD overall ultimately depend on the quality of
the OSD, Joint, and Service staffs. The nulitary and civilian defense officials we
met praised the quality of the military and career civilian employees working
throughout DOD. However, they also mentioned the need to improve policies
and persormel management to enhance the quality of career civilians and politi-
cal appointees.
Recommendation: Revise career civilian
personnel management.
We believe management of
senior General Management and
career Senior Executive Service
personnel should be revised to in-
clude mandatory rotational as-
signments, an up-or-out advancement policy, a structured educational system,
access to more positions of greater responsibility, and meaningful compensa-
tion incentives. A system with these attributes could attract and retain higher
quality career personnel.
To increase the professional breadth and depth of career civilians, we believe
that they should have both line and staff assignments outside major staff organi-
zations (e.g., outside OSD and Service headquarters staffs). Additionally, career
civilians should have opportunities to attend military service schools and other
educational institutions without penalty to their organizations. As in the mili-
tary personnel system, replacements should be provided for employees in train-
ing, and they should move to new positions upon completion of educational
assignments.
Senior career professionals should expect to advance at regular intervals or
be dropped from the program. Retirement provisions would have to allow for
early departure, although not necessarily inunediate payment of an annuity.
Our consultations with Defense leaders also led us to observe that political
appointees in OSD and in the Military Department staffs often lack the experi-
ence and expertise in national security and military strategy, operations.
4-25
Directions for Defense
Recommendation: Reduce the numbers of
political appointees and replace them with
military or civilian professionals.
budgeting, etc. required by the
positions they fill. Equally trou-
bling is their relatively short ten-
ure. Further, we find that
financial disincentives, the
lengthy confirmation process, and revolving-door restrictions inhibit efforts to
acquire uruformly competent political appointees. At the same time, we recog-
nize that these disincentives reflect attempts to correct past abuses and are not
likely to be reversed. Consequently, we recommend a substantial reduction in
the number of political appointees serving in senior leadership positions
throughout the Department, Further, we recommend replacing those political
appointees with military or civilian professionals.
New senior appointees (political and career) need assistance in transitioning
to senior positioris in defense. We recommend a Capstone-like^ course to famil-
iarize appointees with DOD,
To implement our recommendations, we suggest four specific irutiatives.
The first of these could start immediately; the others would take longer:
• DOD should provide over-strength civilian billets for long-term training and
adjust total personnel strength accordingly, as is done in the military. The
career management system should provide for rotational billets across DOD
components, as is the case for Presidential management interns.
• Congress should establish a high-level panel of past Defense officials to rec-
ommend ways of replacing senior DOD political appointees with career civil-
ians, thus increasing experience and stability in the Department's upper
management levels.
• Congress should establish a panel, with members appointed by both the
President and Congress, to review restrictive revolving-door and conflict-of-
interest provisions for political appointees. The review should yield recom-
mendations for getting more high-quality people to accept political appoint-
ments or limited-term employment. Taking this step will overcome current
disincentives and restrictions that irJiibit bringing business, technical, and
industrial leaders into the Department and would enhance DOD's exposure
to innovative private-sector business practices and technical practices.
• The Secretary of Defense should investigate the benefits of a two-track career
system for DOD civilians, allowing employees willing to undertake rota-
tional assignments and incur greater risk to have higher potential manage-
ment opportunities.
^Capstone is a six-week course for newly selected flag officers to update their under-
standing of national security, defense planning, and issues of joint and combined opera-
tions.
4-26
Chapter 4, Improved Management and Direction
Summing Up
This chapter has presented ideas and recommendations for improving the
Department's management decision-making and management processes. We
believe that these improvements are critical — although the payoff for many of
thern may not be readily apparent. Still, since most roles and missions changes
are the subtle and sometimes inadvertent results of these decision-making and
management processes, it is our recommendations in this chapter that will equip
the Department to make better roles and missions decisions in the future. Rec-
ognizing the importance of considering roles and missions impacts at the outset
of the requirements and PPBS processes v^ill ensure that decisions focus properly
on resulting joint warfighting capability.
4-27
Conclusion
Conclusion
The Future
The future will continue to reflect the profound change we experience today.
The geographic CINCs will have to perform an array of operations in support of
our global national interests — from winning the nation's wars to preserving the
peace and preventing larger conflicts. Accomplishing those missions requires
the CINCs to mold a broad range of Service-provided capabilities into a imified
effort. Ensuring that the right capabilities exist, and that they can work success-
fully together, is the purpose of every element of the Department of Defense. It
is also the purpose of our report.
In the preceding pages we have detailed our perspective on roles, missions,
and fimctions, as well as our view of how the Department must approach the fu-
ture. Key to both of these is our unanimous belief that DOD has come far to-
ward unified military operations. American forces operate together successfully.
But it is now time to do more. It is time to extend jointness into the management
and decision-making processes that produce the capabilities required in the fu-
ture, and into the support organizations that maintain our defense capabilities.
And those are the fvmdamental directions we set throughout this report.
Implementing our vision of a more unified DOD, in which every component
understands completely its individual role as a contributor, presents DOD with a
significant challenge. But it is a challenge the Department is up to. More impor-
tantiy, it is the challenge of producing the Department's only real product: effec-
tive unified military operations. And it is the challenge of meeting the
Department's ultimate purpose: securing the future for the American people.
I
Glossary
Glossary
Glossary
Capability
Chairman
Close Air Support (CAS)
Close combat
Coalition operation
Combatant command
Combating proliferation
Commander in Chief
Contingency
Ability of a properly organized, trained, and equipped force to
effectively accomplish a particular mission or function.
Unless otherwise stated, refers to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against targets in
close proximity to friendly forces that, in order to prevent
fratricide, requires detailed integration of each air mission
with the fire and movement of those forces.
Combat in which opposing forces are in close proximity to one
another.
An operation conducted by military elements of a group of
nations that have joined together for some specific purpose.
See Unified command.
The full range of actions by the U.S. government to deter,
delay, halt, or roll back the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Combating
proliferation also includes waging war against WMD-armed
adversaries.
The President of the United States. Also, the Commander of
one of the unified combatant commands established by the
President.
A situation or emergency. Military plans are often prepared
for the most likely contingencies that could require the
employment of forces.
Gloss. 3
Directions for Defense
Deep attack
The application of force beyond the area of close combat (see
close combat). Deep attack includes interdiction, strike,
strategic air warfare, deep supporting fires, and conventional
coimterforce operations.
Defense agency
DOD components
An orgaruzation designated by the Secretary of Defense to
provide a service or supplies common to more than one
department (e.g.. Defense Information Systems Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency).
Major organizational elements of the Department of Defense,
such as the Services, agencies, and imified commands.
DOD Directive 5100.1
The document that promulgates the responsibilities and
functiorts of the Department of Defense.
Electronic warfare
Military action involving use of electromagnetic and directed
energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or attack the
enemy.
Executive Agent
Authority delegated (normally to a Military Department or
combatant commander) by the Secretary of Defense to act on
his behalf with respect to certain activities and /or resources.
Field activity
An orgaruzation designated by the Secretary of Defense to
provide a service or supplies that are common to more than
one department (e.g.. Defense POW/MIA Office, Washington
Headquarters Services).
Force package
A grouping of forces from one or more Services. Force
packages are generally formed into joint task forces before
they are employed.
Forward presence
See Presence.
Gloss. 4
Glossary
Functional CINC
Unified Commander in Chief who is assigned a specific
worldwide support function. Currently, these are Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), Headquarters at MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida; Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska;
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Headquarters at
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; and Space Command
(SPACECOM), Headquarters in Peterson AFB, Colorado.
Functions
Specific responsibilities assigned by Congress, by the
President, or by the Secretary of Defense to enable DOD
components to fulfill the purposes for which they were
established.
Geographic CINC
Unified Commander in Chief who is assigned a
regional /geographic area of responsibility (AOR). Currently,
these are Atlantic Command (ACOM), Headquarters in
Norfolk, Virginia; Central Command (CENTCOM),
Headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida; Pacific Command
(PACOM), Headquarters in Camp Smith, Hawaii; European
Command (EUCOM), Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany;
and Southem Command (SOUTHCOM), Headquarters in
Rodman, Panama.
Goldwater-Nichols Act
U.S.C. 164[c])
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986. The original Bill was sponsored by Senator
Goldwater and Congressman Nichols.
(10
Information warfare
Offensive and defensive measures aimed at controlling,
disrupting, or destroying an adversary's information flow
while protecting one's own.
Inter-Service
Between Services. Example: inter-Service training: Training
that is provided by one Service to members of another Service.
Gloss. 5
Directions for Defense
Interagency working group
(IWG)
A group formed by the National Security Council to
deal with specific issues, composed of representatives
from various U.S. Government departments and
agencies.
Joint Mission Essential Task
List
A list of the primary tasks that joint forces must be
prepared to execute to accomplish missions they are
most likely to be assigned. Used for training and
evaluation purposes.
Joint operations
Military operations involving integrated force packages from
more than one Military Department. Also called "unified
operations."
Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF)
The principal Marine Corps warfighting
organization, particularly for a larger crisis or
contingency. It can range in size from less than one
division to multiple divisions and aircraft wings,
together with one or more force service support
groups.
Military Departments
The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Military Services
The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Missions
The tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to
the combatant commanders.
Mobile Subscriber Equipment A modern, secure communications system for
(MSE) ground forces.
National Command Authority The President and the Secretary of Defense or their (NCA)
alternates or successors.
National Military Strategy
(NMS)
National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO)
Produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Articulates the nulitary component of the
National Security Strategy.
The agency that buys and operates satellites for
intelligence purposes.
Gloss. 6
Glossary
National Security Strategy
Original Equipment Manu-
facturer (OEM)
Operations and Maintenance
(O&M)
Operations other than war
(OOTW)
Operational control
Operational Support Airlift
(OSA)
Outyears
Peace operations
Pre-position
Presence
Proliferation
A document published by the President that articulates
the security strategy of the Nation.
The company or corporation that originally produces a
weapon system or item of equipment.
Funds programmed for routine activities such as
training and maintenance of equipment.
Military activities during peacetime and
conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes
between organized forces or sustained combat.
The authority to organize, employ, assign tasks, designate
objectives, and give authoritative direction over subordinate
forces engaged in operations or joint training. It does not
automatically include authoritative direction for logistics,
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training.
All airlift transportation in support of command,
installation, or management fimctions using
DOD-owned or controlled aircraft.
Used in programming. The fiscal years beyond the current
6-year plan.
An umbrella term that encompasses the full range of military
and diplomatic activities to prevent, halt, or contain conflicts.
To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the
point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce
reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force
during initial phases of an operation.
The ability of U.S. military forces to exert influence abroad
during peacetime due to their proximity, their capability to
quickly get to the scene, or their engagement activities with
foreign nations.
The spread of WMD and associated military technologies.
Gloss. 7
Directions for Defense
Roles
Broad and enduring purposes specified by Congress in law for
the Services and selected DOD components.
Secretariat
The staff of the Secretary of a Military Department. Currently
separate from the staff of the Service Chief of Staff.
Secretary
Service Chief
Unless otherwise stated, refers to the Secretary of Defense.
Senior military person in a Service. Chief of Staff of the Army,
Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Commandant of the Coast
Guard.
Theater
As used in this report, theater refers to tihe area of operations
of a geographic CINC.
Title 10, U.S.C.
Title 10, United States Code ("Armed Forces"). The law
establishing the broad responsibilities of the Department of
Defense and its components.
Total Force
The combined capabilities of all components of all
Services — active Reserve, and National Guard.
Unified command
A functional or geographic command composed of forces
provided by two or more Military Departments.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that can be (WMD)
used for large-scale and indiscriminate attack on populations.
Gloss. 8
Appendix A
Implementing Legislation
Appendix A, Implementing Legislation
Appendix A
Implementing Legislation
This appendix presents suggested legislative changes for recommen-
dations we believe cannot be effectively implemented otherwise. We
have tried to identify all legislative changes that are necessary to imple-
ment our recommendations, but the list may not be complete.
We have not attempted to identify implementing legislation for all
recommendations. The list presented here excludes recommendations
that we believe can be implemented without legislation.
Recommendation
Legislation that sharply restricts the ability of the U.S. Government to
conduct constabulary training should be amended to allow greater DOD
participation.
Implementing Legislation
Amend Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C, Section
2420). Police training prohibition.
Recommendation
Encourage Active/Reserve Integration to include making duty with
the Reserves career-enhancing for active duty members of all Services.
Implementing Legislation
Amend Section 619a.(a) Title 10 U.S.C.,One-time legislation to estab-
lish the panel to review restrictive revolving door and conflict of interest
provisions and recommend ways to get more high-quality persons to ac-
cept political appointments or limited-term employment. (Eligibility for
consideration for promotion: joint duty assignment required before pro-
motion to general or flag grade) to allow RC duty to count as joint duty.
This would facilitate Active/Reserve integration by making duty with
the RCs career enhancing for AC members of all Services.
A-3
Directions for Defense
Recommendation
Greater integration and cooperation is required between active and
Reserve components. Seamless integration is the key to effective Reserve
support of the Total Force.
Implementing Legislation
Enact legislation to require that the Reserve Component Automation
System (RCAS), is compatible with Active Component systems, includ-
ing times of premobilization and postmobilization.
Recommendation
"Outsource'' or "privatize" all commercial activities.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 2461, Title 10, U.S.C., Commercial or Industrial Type
Functions.
Repeal Section 2465 , Title 10, U.S.C., Prohibition on Contracts for
Performance of firefighting or security-guard functions.
Repeal Section 2468, Title 10, U.S.C., Authority of Base Commanders
over Contracting for Commercial Activities.
Repeal Section 317 of the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense
Authorization Act, Prohibition of contracts for the performance of certain
Army ammunition activities.
Section 2461, Title 10, provides for Congressional notice, cost com-
parisons, certification and reporting requirements to outsource commer-
cial work done by more than 45 workers. Section 2468 delegates
decisions regarding commercial activities to the installation commander
and mandates use of A-76 procedures. Section 317 prohibits contracting
out at Crane Army Ammunition Activity or McAlester Army Ammuni-
tion Plant.
A-4
Appendix A, Implementing^ Legislation
Recommendation
Establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing
depot-level maintenance.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 2464, Title 10, U.S.C, Core logistics functions. (This
section establishes in law the concept of dependence on organic logistics
fimctions).
Repeal Section 2466, Tide 10, U.SC, Limitations on the performance
of depot-level maintenance of material. (This section establishes in lav^
the limitation of 60% as the minimum amount of depot-level mainte-
nance workload that must be performed by Federal Government person-
nel).
Repeal Section 2469, Title 10, U.S.C., Contracts to perform workloads
previously performed by depot-level activities of the Department of De-
fense: requirement of competition. (This section establishes in law the
requirement that the DOD conduct public/private competitions for
workload exceeding a $3,000,000 threshold).
Repeal Section 2461, Titie 10, U.S.C., Commercial or industrial type
functions: required studies and reports before conversion to contractor
performance. (This section establishes in law the requirement that the
Congress receive formal notification before work performed by DOD ci-
vilian employees is converted to contractor performance).
Recommendation
Transition existing maintenance depots and employees to commercial
enterprises.
Outsource /privatize selected material management activities.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 2461, Titie 10, U.S.C., Commercial or industrial type
functions: required studies and reports before conversion to contractor
performance. (This section establishes in law the requirement that the
A-5
Directions for Defense
Congress receive formal notification before work performed by DOD ci-
vilian employees is converted to contractor performance).
Recommendation
Assign all OSA, except Navy C-9s, to the Air Force for management
and scheduling by USTRANSCOM.
Implementing Legislation
Enact legislation to transfer aircraft to the Air Force.
Recommendation
Reemphasize the Primacy of medical support to nulitary operations.
Establish uniform procedures for sizing the Department's operational
medical needs.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 711 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 1991 (as amended by section 718(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993), Limitation on reduc-
tions in medical personnel.
Repeal Section 718, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Years 1992 and 1993, Minimum number of Navy health professionals.
Repeal Section 518, FY 93 Defense Authorization Act (as amended by
section 716 of the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act), Limitation
on reduction in the number of reserve component medical personnel.
These sections prohibit reductions in military medical manpower.
Recommendation
The total DOD medical program must ensure high access to quality
care for all beneficiaries including the Medicare eligible at no cost to
A-6
Appendix A, Imylementim Legislation
active duty personnel, no increased cost on the average to active duty
families, and at reasonable cost to retirees and their families.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 1086(d) of Title 10, U.S.C., Contracts for health benefits
for certain members, former members, and their dependents.
The current section limits access to care for the Medicare eligible to
direct care only. This will hinder effective down sizing of current system.
Enact a provision that would require Medicare to be first payer for
care received from any Defense Department direct care source. Most ci-
vilian programs offered under the FEHBP already use Medicare as first
payer.
Recommendation
Expand TRICARE by sponsoring a competitive civilian health care
plan (like the various plans offered under the FEHBP) at equal cost to all
beneficiaries for like care to increase access and beneficiary choice and
decrease direct care demand.
Implementing Legislation
Repeal Section 1077, Title 10, U.S.C., Medical care for dependents:
authorized care in facilities of uniformed services.
Repeal Section 1079, Title 10, U.S.C., Contracts for medical care for
spouses and children: plans.
Repeal Section 1086, Title 10, U.S.C., Contracts for health benefits for
certain members, former members and their dependents.
These sections define various benefits for various classes of benefici-
aries in uniformed services facilities and in contracted care.
Enact a basic universal benefit for direct and contracted care (exclud-
ing active duty personnel).
A-7
Directions for Defense
Recommendation
Require enrollment in all DOD sources of care.
Implementing Legislation
Amend Section 1076, Title 10, U.S.C., (Medical and dental care for de-
pendents: general rule) to eliminate priority access to space available
care.
This section gives priority access to active duty families over retirees
and their families. With enrollment this will no longer be necessary (ex-
cept in remote areas where other sources are unavailable).
Recommendation
Institute a medical allowance for active duty families.
Implementing Legislation
Amend pay and allowances requirements to implement.
Recommendation
Restructtire Military Department Staffs to have a single staff serving
Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff; reduce numbers of political ap-
pointees; and accommodate separate Navy and Marine Corps activities
only when necessary.
Implementing Legislation
Amend Sections 3014 (Office of the Secretary of the Army), 3016 (As-
sistant Secretaries of the Army), 3031 (The Army Staff: function; composi-
tion), 3032 (The Army Staff : general duties), 3033 (Chief of Staff), 3034
(Vice Chief of Staff), 3035 (Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Chiefs of
Staff) and comparable sections of Title 10, U.S.C., applicable to the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force, to wit, sections 5014, 5016, 5031-5033,
5035-5045, 8014, 8016, and 8031-8035.
A-8
The amended sections of Title 10 would provide for a single staff re-
inforcing the Military Department Secretary's responsibility for all mat-
ters in the Military Department, and the Chief of Staff's (CNO,
Commandant) effectiveness as the senior military officer. The amended
Title 10 should permit maximum consolidation of staff functions, and im-
provements in efficiency in headquarters management processes. The
amended sections should permit an appropriate mix of military and pro-
fessional personnel, with no more than three or four senior political ap-
pointees.
Recommendation
Congress should establish a panel of former Defense officials to rec-
ommend ways of replacing senior DOD political appointees with career
civilians.
Implementing Legislation
One-time legislation to establish the panel to recommend ways of re-
placing senior DOD political appointees with career civilians.
Recommendation
Congress should establish a panel, with members appointed by both
the President and the Congress, to review restrictive revolving door and
conflict of interest provisions for political appointees.
Implementing Legislation
One-time legislation to establish the panel to review restrictive re-
volving door and conflict of interest provisions and recommend ways to
get more high-quality persons to accept political appointments or
limited-term employment.
A-9
Appendix B
List of Acronyms
Appendix B, List of Acronyms
Appendix B
List of Acronyms
A-76 Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-76.
ACOM U.S. Atlantic Command.
ANG Air National Guard.
AOR Area of responsibility.
ARNG Army National Guard.
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense.
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System.
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure.
BSA Budget Summit Agreement.
C^ Command, control, and communications.
C^I Command, control, communications, and intel-
ligence.
C^I Command, control, communications, comput-
ers, and intelligence.
CAS Close Air Support.
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command.
CINC Commander in Chief (of one of the unified
commands).
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CNO Chief of Naval Operations.
CONUS Continental United States.
B-3
Directions for Defense
CSAR
Combat Search and Rescue.
DAB
Defense Acquisition Board.
DCAA
Defense Contract Audit Agency.
DCI
Director of Central Intelligence.
DCMG
Defense Contract Management Command
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency.
DISA
Defense Information Systems Aeencv.
DOD
Department of Defense.
DSO
Defense Support Organization.
EUCOM
U.S. European Command.
FYDP
Future Years Defense Program.
GAO
General Accounting Office.
GME
Graduate Medical Education.
GOCO
Goverrnnent owned, contractor operated.
HMO
Health Maintenance Organization.
IWG
Interagency Working Group.
JAST
Joint Advanced Strike Technology.
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MEF
Marine Expeditionary Force.
MLRS
Multiple Launch Rocket System.
MSE
Mobile Subscriber Equipment.
NCA
National Command Authority.
NMS
National Military Strategy.
NPR
National Performance Review.
B-4
Appendix B, List of Acronyms
NRO National Reconnaissance Office.
NSC National Security Council.
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer.
OMA Operations and Maintenance Accounts.
OMB Office of Management and Budget.
OOTW Operations Other Than War.
OSA Operational Support Airlift.
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense.
PACOM U.S. Pacific Command.
PEO Program Executive Officer.
PM Program Manager.
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Sys-
tem.
QSR Quadrennial Strategy Review.
RC Reserve Components.
RDT&E Research, Development, Testing and Evalua-
tion.
SME Single Management Element.
SOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command.
SOUTHCOM U.S. Southem Command.
SPACECOM U.S. Space Command.
STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command.
TAMD Theater Air and Missile Defense.
TFX Tactical Fighter, Experimental.
Title 10, U.S.C. Title 10, United States Code ("Armed Forces").
B-5
Directions for Defense
TQM
TRANSCOM
UCP
USD(A&T)
WMD
Total Quality Management.
U.S. Transportation Command.
Unified Command Plan.
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology.
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
B-6